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1.1 Background and Outline of the Research Problem 
A growing global awareness of environmental rights and obligations has in recent decades 
increasingly permeated the public discourse on topics as wide ranging as green buildings, 
electric cars, waste recycling, fur coats and climate change. What may be termed an 
‘environmental rights revolution’ has given rise to the adoption of a number of legal 
instruments aimed at advancing environmental rights worldwide.
2
 In South Africa this 
growing environmental consciousness prompted the adoption of an environmental right as 
part of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution,
3
 which imposes obligations on the state to 
protect the environment for the benefit of present and future generations.
4
 That right, in turn, 
underpinned the enactment of a substantial body of environmental legislation in South Africa 




The rationale and impetus for writing this dissertation originated in a research problem that I 
identified as a member of a team
6
 engaged in drafting new provincial environmental 
legislation for the KwaZulu-Natal Province. The envisaged new legislation had to respond to 





. For instance, one of the key concerns expressed by them was the 
fragmented and outdated provincial legislation and the uncertainty and confusion that it 
                                                          
1
 Often attributed to John Dewey, but believed to be rather a conception by William F Russell in 1914 of 
Dewey’s main point in his book How We Think, published in 1910 (quoteinvestigator.com 31/03/2016.).  
2
 See, for example, RD Boyd The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights, and the Environment (2012).  
3
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution), Bill of Rights, chapter 2. 
4
 Ibid, section 24. 
5
 Ibid, section 40 provides for national, provincial and local spheres of government in South Africa. 
6
 The drafting team consists of Professor Michael Kidd (UKZN), the author of this dissertation (PKX Attorneys) 
and Martin Potgieter (PKX Attorneys). 
7
 Constitution, op cit, see provisions of section 125(f).  
8
 Such as Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. 
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created. They wanted consolidated legislation for the Province. Other examples of needs and 
concerns identified related to: (a) the increasing loss of ecosystems, habitat and biodiversity 
in KwaZulu-Natal which was not adequately addressed by national legislation; and (b) 
pressure on natural resources within provincial protected areas. The drafting process led me 
to confront a number of questions relating to the nature of government in South Africa under 
a supreme Constitution;
9
 and the role, powers and functions of provinces
10
 (as a sub-national 
sphere of government) within such a system, with specific reference to the environment. 
Answers to these questions demanded an analysis of: (a) the South African system of 
multisphere government;
11
 (b) the nature and scope of the environmental right in section 24 
of the Constitution and the substantive obligations it imposes on organs of state to enact 
legislation for the protection of the environment; (c) the application of the Bill of Rights to 
provinces as organs of state;
12
 (d) the constitutional authority of provinces to enact 
environmental legislation;
13
 (e) existing environmental legislation enacted by the national 
sphere of government; and (f) existing environmental legislation in the nine
14
 provinces.   
 
A review of current scholarly analyses of the environmental right in section 24 of the Bill of 
Rights and its implications for government indicated that most studies had primarily been 
done through a national or international lens, with the environmental obligations of the local 
sphere of government increasingly becoming part of the discourse in South Africa.
15
 This 
dissertation sets out to complement current research by providing a critical appraisal of the 
constitutional role, obligations and legislative authority of provincial organs of state in South 
Africa to protect the environment through legislative measures. I therefore considered it 
important to include the information gleaned from my research into existing provincial 
legislation on the environment in this dissertation as it revealed that most provinces still have 
outdated, fragmented and even unconstitutional old order environmental legislation on their 
statute books,
16
 with little new provincial legislation in evidence.
17
 This begged explanation 
                                                          
9
 Constitution, op cit, Preamble, sections 1 and 2. 
10
 Ibid, section 103. 
11
 Ibid, section 40. 
12
 Ibid, section 8. 
13
 Ibid, section 104, Schedules 4 and 5. 
14
 Ibid, section 103. 
15
 See, for instance, the LLD thesis of A Du Plessis, l ‘Fulfillment of South Africa’s Constitutional 
Environmental Right in the Local Government Sphere’ listed in Appendix III below. 
16
 Constitution, op cit, Schedule 6, section 1– ‘old order legislation’ means legislation enacted before the 
previous Constitution took effect; ‘previous Constitution’ means the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993). 
9 
 
and prompted me to also include brief comments on some factors which may constrain 
provinces from exercising their legislative powers in respect of the environment. My 
comments are based on information gleaned from scholarly analyses and the Economic and 





The analysis of national legislation on the environment ensured the alignment of the proposed 
new environmental legislation for KwaZulu-Natal with national legislation. However, since 
the focus of this dissertation is specifically on the provincial sphere of government, an 
analysis of national environmental legislation was excluded from the study because such a 
study poses a number of further research problems which fall outside the parameters of the 
specific research questions posed in this study. What seemed particularly relevant, however, 
was how the Constitution provides for conflicting laws.
19
 The drafters of the provincial 
legislation clearly had to avoid provisions in the new legislation that would be in conflict 
with existing legislation. This dissertation therefore includes a detailed analysis in chapter 4 
below of when legislative provisions would be in conflict and when not, as well as the status 
of legislation that does not prevail.  
 
Further, the focus of this dissertation is on the original constitutional legislative authority of 
provinces, which is vested in their provincial legislatures,
20
 and not the executive.
21
 The 
executive arm of a provincial government has the authority to: (a) implement and administer 
legislation; (b) develop and implement provincial policy; (c) co-ordinate the provincial 
administration; (d) prepare and initiate legislation; and (e) perform any other functions 
assigned to it.
22
 But the executive does not enact legislation. However, it bears noting that 
members of the executive and certain other persons or bodies may adopt subordinate 
(delegated) legislation under enabling provisions which determine the scope of such 
subordinate legislation.
23
 A more detailed discussion on subordinate legislation poses 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17
 See the discussion in chapter 5, part 1 below. 
18
 See chapter 5 below, para 5.4. 
19
 Constitution, op cit, ‘Conflicting Laws’ (sections 146–150). 
20
 Ibid, section 104(1). 
21
 See detailed discussion in chapter 4 below. 
22
 Ibid, section 125. 
23
 C Botha, Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 5
th
 ed (2012) 25-27; also see comments by C 
Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 4
th
 impression) 178 – 182. 
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research questions which go beyond the scope of this dissertation and is therefore not 
included in this study. Likewise, a detailed analysis of the executive authority of organs of 
state, whether at the national, provincial or local spheres, falls outside the ambit of the 
research problem and has therefore been excluded. Thus reference is only made to the 
executive where it is of particular relevance to this study. The dissertation also does not 
include an in-depth discussion on the ‘other’ measures referred to in the environmental right, 




The background provided above led me to distil four key objectives to be achieved through 
this research, namely to determine:   
(i) the nature and scope of the substantive obligations imposed on provincial organs 
of state by the Constitution to protect the environment through legislative 
measures; 
(ii) the original legislative authority of provincial legislatures to fulfil these 
obligations;  
(iii) the extent to which provinces are exercising their legislative authority in pursuit of 
their environmental obligations; and  
(iv) constitutional and other factors which may constrain provinces from enacting 
environmental legislation in the fulfilment of their constitutional mandate.  
  
In order to realise the objectives stated above, I consider what constitutional obligations and 
authority provincial organs of state in South Africa have to protect the environment through 
reasonable legislative measures; and whether provinces are giving effect to their obligations 
envisaged by section 24 of the Constitution, which together constitute the central research 
questions. Questions underlying the primary research questions are necessarily also addressed 
in the dissertation, namely:   
(i) What are the main characteristics of the South African system of government 
which is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government, with 
particular reference to the provincial sphere? 
                                                          
24
 Constitution, op cit, section 24(b). 
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(ii) What is meant by constitutional supremacy and what is the role of the 
Constitutional Court in that regard? 
(iii) What are the provisions on co-operative government in chapter 3 of the 
Constitution in relation to multisphere government in South Africa, and how have 
the courts interpreted those provisions?  
(iv) Can co-operative government play a role in assisting provinces to meet their 
constitutional obligations to protect the environment? 
(v) What is the relevance of international jurisprudence for the environmental right in 
the South African Constitution? 
(vi) What is the nature and scope of the environmental right in section 24, with 
particular reference to the obligations it imposes on provincial government to take 
reasonable legislative measures to protect the environment?  
(vii) What is the nature and scope of the legislative authority of provinces to enact 
legislation to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by section 24? 
(viii) How have the South African courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, 
interpreted the constitutional obligations and legislative authority of provinces, 
with particular reference to the environment; 
(ix) How does section 146 of the Constitution deal with conflicts between national and 
provincial legislation falling within a functional area of concurrent legislative 
competence in Schedule 4 of the Constitution; and how have the courts interpreted 
the constitutional provisions on conflicting laws?  
(x) Are there constitutional and other constraints which inhibit provinces from 
fulfilling their obligations to protect the environment through legislative 
measures? 
 
1.2 The Research Design  
The Preamble to the Constitution makes it clear that the Constitution is an expression of the 
sovereign will of the people of South Africa, who, through their freely-elected 
representatives, adopted the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic.
25
 The 
obligations and legislative authority of provinces to protect the environment are derived 
directly from the Constitution, and answers to the primary research question are therefore 
firstly to be found in the Constitution itself. This demands an analysis of each of the relevant 
                                                          
25
 Constitution, op cit, Preamble. 
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constitutional provisions, together with a review of relevant case law and literature. This is 





The case study on drafting provincial legislation for KwaZulu-Natal does not (and cannot) 
provide substantive answers to the primary and underlying research questions posed above, 
and how to deal with legislative challenges. However, it does highlight: (a) examples of 
pervasive misconceptions about the role, powers and functions of provinces – misconceptions 
that exist mainly within government itself; and (b) some of the difficulties involved in 
drafting provincial legislation for the protection of the environment, often arising from such 
misconceptions. The case study also assisted in the determination of the: 
(i) main objectives of the research project; and  
(ii) primary and underlying research questions that needed to be addressed. 
 
1.3 The Research Methodology 
The research will be conducted through a theoretical analysis of: 
(i) relevant provisions of the Constitution; 
(ii) selected international, national and provincial legislative and other instruments; 
(iii) judgments of the Constitutional Court, in particular, as well as those of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and High Courts, and case law from international jurisdictions; and 
(iv) local and international literature on the primary research questions as well as the 
underlying questions listed in paragraph 1.1 above. 
 
The theoretical analysis referred to above will be supplemented by: (a) the case study on 
drafting environmental legislation for the province of Kwazulu-Natal by discussing practical 
examples of some of the comments received on the published bill, which the drafters of the 
new environmental legislation for the province of KwaZulu-Natal had to consider and 
address; and (b) a review and analysis of existing environmental legislation on the provincial 
                                                          
26
 See chapter 5, part II. 
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statute books. Some factors that may constrain provinces from exercising their constitutional 
powers in the fulfilment of their environmental obligations will also briefly be discussed.  
 
1.4 The Structure of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This introductory chapter provides the background to the research and states the research 
problem, clarifies the objectives of the research, and poses the primary and related research 
questions to be addressed in the study. It includes a brief overview of the research project 
informed by the research design and methodology. Finally, the structure of the dissertation 
and the purpose of each chapter are explained. 
 
Chapter 2: Constitutional Democracy in South Africa  
The four research objectives stated in paragraph 1.1 cannot be achieved in isolation and 
without consideration of the constitutional context within which the research questions are 
posed. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main characteristics 
of constitutional democracy in South Africa, underpinned by the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the rule of law. The impact of constitutional supremacy on government and 
its institutions is also briefly explored, as well as the vital role that the Constitution assigns to 
the Constitutional Court in that regard. An examination of the complex nature of the South 
African system of multisphere government, constituted as national, provincial and local 
spheres follows, with a specific focus on the provincial sphere of government. The chapter is 
concluded with an overview of the provisions on co-operative government in the Constitution 
which lay down the principles which must guide all spheres of government and all organs of 
state on intergovernmental relations. This chapter therefore sets out the constitutional 
parameters within which the environmental obligations and legislative authority of the 
provincial sphere of government must be understood and interpreted.  
 
Chapter 3: The Environmental Right in the Bill of Rights 
The first research objective is to determine the nature and scope of the substantive obligations 
imposed on provincial organs of state by the Constitution to protect the environment through 
14 
 
legislative measures. The environmental right in section 24 of the Bill of Rights is the 
foundation on which such substantive obligations rest. The nature and scope of the 
environmental right also informs the content, purpose and objectives of legislative measures 
enacted to give effect to the right. The benchmarks provided by international environmental 
jurisprudence further assist by locating the environmental right within a wider jurisprudential 
context which fosters a greater understanding of the nature and genesis of this right. This 
chapter therefore provides a detailed discussion of the above issues which are directly related 
to the research problem and first key objective of this study formulated in paragraph 1.1 
above. The chapter also gives an overview of the application and justiciability of the 
environmental right, which explains: (a) where the responsibility for the protection of the 
environment lies; and (b) the potential consequences of any failure to carry out such 
responsibility. A brief explanation of the relationship between the environmental right and 
the functional areas of concurrent and exclusive provincial legislative competence listed in 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution, respectively, concludes the chapter. These Schedules 
are discussed in greater detail in chapter 4 as they relate directly to the original legislative 
authority and functional areas of legislative competence of provinces. 
 
Chapter 4: Enacting Provincial Legislation 
The second research objective is to determine the original legislative authority of provincial 
legislatures to fulfil their obligations under the environmental right in the Constitution. In 
Part I of this chapter the legislative authority and functional areas of legislative competence 
of provinces to fulfil their constitutional obligations in respect of the environment is 
scrutinised. This analysis necessarily includes a discussion on Schedules 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution which list the functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence, as well as the functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence, 
respectively. Here, special reference is made to functional areas which fall within the broad 
concept ‘environment’. Part II deals with the constitutional provisions that govern the 
resolution of conflicts between national and provincial legislation, and the conclusions that 
may be drawn from such analysis. 
 
Chapter 5: Meeting Provincial Obligations 
15 
 
This chapter addresses the last two research objectives stated in paragraph 1.1 of chapter 1, 
namely to determine the extent to which provinces are exercising their legislative authority in 
pursuit of their environmental obligations; and to identify possible constitutional and other 
factors which may constrain provinces from doing so. Part I therefore gives an overview of 
existing provincial environmental legislation, which is indicative of the extent to which 
provinces are taking legislative measures to protect the environment. It also provides brief 
comments on possible causes of what appears to be limited provincial legislative activity as 
far as enacting environmental legislation is concerned. In part II a case study on the drafting 
of new environmental legislation for the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, which provided the 
rationale for this research and assisted in crystallising the main and underlying research 
questions, is discussed. Examples of some of the common misconceptions on the role, powers 
and functions of provincial government are also provided. 
  
Chapter 6: Discussion of Research Findings 
In this final chapter the central conclusions reached in pursuance of the four objectives set for 
this dissertation are discussed under the following headings: a) The nature and scope of the 
substantive obligations of provinces to protect the environment through legislative measures; 
b) the original legislative authority of provincial legislatures to fulfil their environmental 
obligations; c) the extent to which provinces are taking legislative measures to protect the 
environment; and d) factors which may constrain provinces from playing their constitutional 
role in respect of the environment. In this regard consideration is given to whether the 
provisions on co-operative government examined in chapter 3 above may assist provinces in 
resolving some of the difficulties they experience in regard to the fulfilment of their 




CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
‘Law is nothing unless close behind it stands a warm living public opinion’ 
16 
 
- Wendell Phillips27 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Constitution was adopted in the name of ‘the people of South Africa’ as ‘the supreme 
law of the Republic’.
28
 This affirms the notion that the Constitution is ‘of the people, for the 
people, and by the people’,
29
 and that it is, therefore, the will of the people that law or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and that the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled.
30
 The words ‘[w]e, the people’ in the Constitution emphasise the role of ‘the people’ 
in validating the government, as opposed to the government having power over the people.
31
 
The Preamble to the Constitution repeats verbatim not only the opening words of the 
Freedom Charter,
32
 but also many of the other phrases in it. This is significant because it 
demonstrates the continuity between the ‘will of the people’ expressed in the Freedom 
Charter and later repeated in the Constitution.   
 
Thus, in his address to the Constitutional Assembly on the occasion of the adoption of the 
‘New Constitution’, then President Mandela said: ‘As one, you the representatives of the 
overwhelming majority of South Africans, have given voice to the yearning of millions’. In 
reference to the last-minute negotiations and problems experienced to reach agreement, he 
reminded the Assembly that ‘beyond these issues, lies a fundamental sea-change in South 
Africa’s body politic that this historical moment symbolises’. He then added: ‘Long before 
the gruelling sessions of the final moments, it had been agreed that once and for all, South 





                                                          
27
 Wendell Phillips (29 November 1811–2 February 1884) was an American abolitionist; political activist; 
advocate for Native Americans, women’s rights and universal suffrage; orator and lawyer. 
28
 Constitution, op cit, Preamble. 
29
 Lincoln, Abraham ‘Gettysburg address’, reportedly one of the most influential statements of national purpose. 
30
 Constitution, op cit, section 2. 
31
See ‘We The People’ http://constitution.laws.com/we.  
32
 Adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, 26 June 1955. 
33
 Address by President Nelson Mandela to the Constitutional Assembly on the occasion of the adoption of the 
New Constitution, 8 May 1996 www.anc.org.za. 
17 
 
The words and sentiments expressed above, whether in the Preamble to the Constitution, or 
said by Mandela, raise the following questions: What are the essential characteristics of the 
South African Constitution? What is meant by the term ‘constitution’ or ‘constitutionalism’? 
What are the implications of a system of constitutional supremacy for government and its 
institutions, or, put differently, what are the implications of that ‘fundamental sea-change’ to 
which Mandela referred? Lastly, can a system of democratic majority rule be reconciled with 
a supreme constitution where ‘law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid’? In this chapter 
these questions are briefly examined, mainly from a theoretical perspective, because they 
provide the constitutional context within which the ensuing analyses of the obligations and 
authority of provincial organs of state in South Africa to protect the environment must be 
located and interpreted.  
 
2.2 A Supreme Constitution and the Rule of Law 
Freedman states that the South African Constitution has three important characteristics: it is a 
supreme constitution, it is a normative constitution and it is a rights-based constitution.
34
 
According to Maduro the answer to the question of what is in the name ‘constitution’ is 
influenced by the way in which we conceive of constitutionalism in general and the purpose 
it serves, as well as our concept of a political community and what kind of social and political 
relationship it embodies.
35
 He argues, in summary, that constitutionalism is seen as a limit to 
power, an expression of polity and as deliberation. The extent to which constitutionalism can 
assume these different functions depends on the character of a particular political 
community.
36
 The South African Constitution, in a quest to unite all South Africans in ‘one, 
sovereign, democratic state’
37
 establishes in its founding provisions a social order, or 
‘political community’, based on a common South African citizenship where – 
 
‘All citizens are -  
(a) equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and 
                                                          
34
 Freedman, Warren Understanding the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (2013) 2. 
35
 MP Maduro ‘The importance of being called a constitution: Constitutional authority and the authority of 
constitutionalism’ A constitutional identity for Europe? 332. 
36
 Ibid, 332-333. 
37
 Constitution, op cit, section 1. 
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(b) equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.’38 
 
In addition, the rights referred to above are entrenched in the Bill of Rights
39
 which puts 
beyond dispute the fact that ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law’.
40
 Furthermore, the President, as head of state, ‘promotes 




The supremacy of the Constitution is, significantly, not only reflected in the Preamble to the 
Constitution, but also provided for twice in its founding provisions.
42
  The Republic of South 
Africa is thus founded on the values of supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, 
among other. These parameters set by the Constitution define how government and its 
institutions must conduct their business and exercise their powers. The corollary of 
constitutional supremacy is judicial review which allows courts to adjudicate whether law or 
conduct is constitutionally valid, and whether constitutional obligations are being fulfilled. 
The Constitution also provides for judicial authority vested in the courts, which are 
‘independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply 
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice’.
43
 In Doctors for Life, Ngcobo J reiterates 
that the Constitutional Court ‘occupies a special place in the constitutional order. It is the 
highest court on constitutional matters and is the ultimate guardian of our Constitution and its 
values’.
44
 In an address to the Helen Suzman Foundation, former justice of the Constitutional 
Court, Kate O’Regan remarked that in a constitutional democracy the relationship between 
the judiciary, executive and legislature is often tense, for the very reason that the relationship 
is structured to ensure that the power of each is checked by the other.
45
 This is the doctrine of 
the separation of powers which protects the individual from the abuse of power by the state. 
The nature of the South African state places the Constitutional Court as the final court of 
appeal in the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional provisions, and only the 
                                                          
38
 Ibid, section 3 (2). 
39
 Ibid, chapter 2. 
40
 Ibid, section 9. 
41
 Ibid, section 83(c). 
42
 Ibid, sections 1(c) and 2. 
43
 Ibid, section 165(1) and (2). 
44
 Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and Others CCT 12/05, para 22 
(Doctors for Life). 
45
 K. O’Regan ‘A Forum for Reason: Reflections on the role and work of the Constitutional Court’ (Helen 
Suzman Memorial Lecture 2011) Helen Suzman Foundation www.hsf.org.za. 
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Constitutional Court is able to declare legislation and Presidential conduct invalid. This 
‘cannot be seen as thwarting or frustrating the democratic arms of government - instead it 




Siyo and Mubangizi describe judges as the guardians of the Constitution, but warn that there 
have been challenges in South Africa to judicial independence.
47
 They refer to periodic 
statements by politicians about the need to review judgments of the Constitutional Court with 
a view to possible constitutional amendments as a significant threat, not only to the 
independence of the judiciary, but also to the Constitution and democracy.
48
 Political 
criticism of the judiciary brings to the fore the question of whether a system of democratic 
majority rule can be reconciled with a supreme constitution. When President Mandela 
addressed the Constitutional Assembly he apparently had no doubt that it was possible to 
have democratic majority rule and a supreme constitution, and that the Constitution was in 
fact ‘our humble contribution to democracy and the culture of human rights world-wide; and 




But is South Africa today the ‘same body politic as it was when President Mandela took the 
helm’ and when the Constitutional Court first confronted what limited democratic rule would 
look like under the Constitution?
50
 Issacharoff highlights the problems of democracy under a 
dominant party and the response of the Constitutional Court to what is essentially ‘a 
democracy shorn of real electoral competition’.
51
 He refers to emerging threats to democracy 
as a result of deference to policy initiatives of the ruling party which begin to invite a 
‘worrisome deference’ as well to the consolidation of centralised political power, and asks 
whether the Court will be, or can be, a ‘restraining influence on excessive consolidation of 
political power’.
52
 He cites Ramakatsa
53
 as an example of what signals a new constitutional 
jurisprudence emerging to address the threats to democratic governance coming not from the 
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history of apartheid, but from a lack of electoral checks on the consolidation of power. In this 
regard, I submit that the deference to the policies and centralised political power of the ruling 
party, referred to by Issacharoff, could very well act as a more compelling constraint on 
organs of state inhibiting them from exercising their constitutional powers and meeting their 
obligations than any of the complex relationships created by the Constitution. This deference 
could be so strong that it has a paralysing effect on provincial leadership constraining them 
from initiating and enacting provincial legislation for fear of being seen to defy, or be out of 
step with, the centre. These issues will be further considered in chapter 5 where the extent to 
which provinces are meeting their environmental obligations is discussed. 
 
The recent unanimous judgment by the Constitutional Court in Economic Freedom Fighters 
appears to be much more than a ‘signal’ of a new constitutional jurisprudence emerging to 
address the threats to democratic governance to which Issacharoff and others refer.
54
 It places 
the binding nature of the Constitution and the principle that nobody is above the law at the 
centre of the judgment and the public discourse in no uncertain terms. The introductory 
remarks of Mogoeng CJ bear repeating:  
 
‘One of the crucial elements of our constitutional vision is to make a decisive break from the 
unchecked abuse of State power and resources that was virtually institutionalised during the 
apartheid era. To achieve this goal, we adopted accountability, the rule of law and the supremacy 
of the Constitution as values of our constitutional democracy. For this reason, public office-
bearers ignore their constitutional obligations at their peril. This is so because constitutionalism, 
accountability and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop 




Mogoeng CJ then goes on to quote Madala J, with approval, when he said, in summary, that 
certain values in the Constitution have been designated as foundational to our democracy, and 
must be observed scrupulously. If these values are not observed and their precepts not carried 
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out conscientiously, ‘we have a recipe for a constitutional crisis of great magnitude’.
56
 The 
Court seems to live up to the words of Mandela who referred to the Constitutional Court as 
one of the critical institutions that have started doing their work in ‘the most splendid manner, 





2.3 Multisphere Government 
The first part of this chapter provided an overview of: (a) the essential characteristics of 
constitutional democracy in South Africa and the values that underlie the system of 
government; (b) the role of the Constitutional Court as the ultimate guardian of our 
Constitution and its values;
58
 and (c) the fact that law or conduct inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid, and that the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. I now turn to 
the complex nature of what is usually referred to as ‘multilevel’ government in South Africa, 
with a continued focus on the provincial sphere. Since government in South Africa is 
‘constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated’ (emphasis added)
59
 I refer in this dissertation to 
‘multisphere’, rather than ‘multilevel’ government. 
  
Many scholars have analysed the South African system of government. In this regard Davis 
remarks that even a cursory examination of the South African constitutional text ‘reveals the 
extent to which it was shaped by comparative precedent’.
60
 He argues that the reason for this 
‘constitutional borrowing’ is, to a considerable extent, located in the history of negotiations 
that produced the constitutional structure of the country.
61
 According to De Vos and 
Freedman South Africa, whilst not a fully-fledged federal state, displays several 
characteristics of a federal state.
62
 The Constitution establishes what the authors describe as a 
‘quasi-federal’ system of government through not only a vertical division of power between 
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the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, but also a horizontal division 
between the national, provincial and local spheres of government. They draw a useful 
distinction between a ‘divided model of federalism’ where there is a strict division of subject 
matters in respect of which policies and laws may be made, such as in Australia, Canada and 
the United States, and an ‘integrated model of federalism’, such as in Germany and South 
Africa where some subject matters are allocated exclusively to one level or sphere of 
government, but most are concurrent or shared. In the latter model, the national government 







 the Constitutional Court reiterated what it had said in Limpopo I
65
 about the 
competence of a provincial legislature to pass a Bill dealing with its own financial 
management. The Court drew the following distinction between national and provincial 
legislative powers: ‘while Parliament has plenary legislative powers, the legislative powers of 
provinces are circumscribed and are set out in section 104 of the Constitution’.
66
 This accords 
with the distinction drawn by De Vos and Freedman, and their description of an ‘integrated 
model of federalism’.  
 
Murray and Simeon state that the South African constitutional model bears all the hallmarks 
of a federation—albeit a highly centralised one.
67
 In this regard, it broadly follows the Indian 
model, described by Granville Austin as having a ‘unitary tone, and strong centralizing 
features’.
68
 Similarly, B.R. Ambedkar, who played a leading role in drafting the Indian 
Constitution, said at the time that the Draft Indian Constitution ‘has sought to forge means 
and methods whereby India will have a Federation and at the same time will have uniformity 
in all the basic matters which are essential to maintain the unity of the country’.
69
 Murray and 
Simeon point out that whilst South Africa did in the end adopt a federalist model, the term 
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‘federalism’ was carefully avoided.
70
 The authors also state that the South African 
constitutional model has clear similarities with the German model. The fact that the South 
African Constitution ‘borrowed’ from, among others, the German model, is generally 
accepted. However, the authors’ characterisation of the similarities between the German and 
South African model as being ‘most obviously in its conception of provinces as primarily 
administrative bodies, implementing legislation that is agreed nationally’
71
 seems an 
overstatement, which is not supported by the provisions of the Constitution. Unfortunately, 
such assertions reinforce certain misconceptions about the role and powers of provinces. 
Similar misconceptions, rather than any provisions in the Constitution, may indeed have 
contributed to provinces in practice being primarily administrative bodies and implementers 
of national legislation. The case study on drafting provincial environmental legislation for 
KwaZulu-Natal presented in chapter 5 highlights some of these misconceptions. Further, 
whilst provinces do implement national legislation as part of their executive authority,
72
 this 
dissertation will demonstrate that the Constitution itself does not reduce the provincial sphere 
of government to ‘primarily administrative bodies’ which implement legislation agreed to 
nationally. The Constitution specifically provides for the Executive Council of a province to 
exercise their executive authority by not only ‘implementing provincial legislation’, but also 
‘preparing and initiating provincial legislation’.
73
 The extent to which provincial executives 
are in practice initiating legislation and provincial legislatures passing such legislation, is 
analysed in chapter 5 below.   
 
In addition, the deliberate use in the Constitution of the term spheres of government, as 
opposed to ‘tiers’ or ‘levels’ of government, implies that the envisaged relationship between 
the three spheres of government is not hierarchical in nature. However, the Constitution does 
make provision for certain interventions by one sphere in another sphere of government. The 
key examples of interventions permitted by the Constitution are section 100 (‘[n]ational 
intervention in provincial administration’) and section 139 (‘[p]rovincial intervention in local 
government’). In both instances the powers to intervene, the reasons for such intervention and 
the manner in which interventions must take place are clearly circumscribed by those sections 
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and cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner. Chapter 3 of the Constitution further clarifies 
the relationship between the three spheres of government by spelling out the principles of co-
operative government and intergovernmental relations. The provisions of specific relevance 
to this study are examined more fully in paragraph 2.4 below. 
  
Furthermore, the interpretation by the courts of the role of the different spheres of 
government also does not support a view of provinces as mere administrative bodies, as the 
discussion below illustrates: 
In DVB Behuising,
74
 the matter before the Constitutional Court was initiated by a private 
commercial company which succeeded in the High Court. In the Constitutional Court 
judgment Ngcobo J refers, amongst others, to the following ‘central findings’ which led 
Mogoeng J (as he then was) to grant the order sought by the applicant in the High Court:  
 
‘(a) Provincial legislatures have a “clearly defined and very limited legislative authority” and 
have to operate “within the strict parameters” of that authority. 
(b) In construing the powers of provincial legislatures the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution must “… be given a strict interpretation. This is necessary to ensure that no 
provincial legislature is allowed to exercise the authority it does not have and thereby 




Ngcobo J then comments as follows on the above quoted pronouncements of the High Court: 
 
‘I would point out immediately that I respectfully disagree with the view expressed by Mogoeng J 
that the functional areas of provincial legislative competence set out in the schedules should be 
“given a strict interpretation”. In the interpretation of those schedules there is no presumption in 
favour of either the national legislature or provincial legislatures. The functional areas must be 
purposively interpreted in a manner which will enable the national Parliament and the provincial 
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 the question before the Court was whether direct provincial intervention 
in particular municipal land use decisions is compatible with the Constitution’s allocation of 
functions between local and provincial government. The Court had to answer two further 
questions: Firstly, are the provincial appellate powers in the Land Use Planning Ordinance 
(LUPO) constitutionally invalid; and, secondly, if so, what is the appropriate remedy? In 
answering these questions, the Court quoted Moseneke J in Robertson
78
 with approval:  
 
‘The Constitution has moved away from a hierarchical division of government power and has 
ushered in a new vision of government in which the sphere of local government is interdependent, 
“inviolable and possesses the constitutional latitude within which to define and express its unique 
character” subject to the constraints permissible under our Constitution. A municipality under the 
Constitution is not a mere creature of statute, otherwise moribund, save if imbued with power by 
provincial or national legislation. A municipality enjoys “original” and constitutionally 
entrenched powers, functions, rights and duties that may be qualified and constrained by law and 




The Habitat Council Court, per Cameron J, continues in a similar vein, quoting Mhlantla AJ 




‘This Court’s jurisprudence quite clearly establishes that: (a) barring exceptional circumstances, 
national and provincial spheres are not entitled to usurp the functions of local government; (b) the 
constitutional vision of autonomous spheres of government must be preserved; (c) while the 
Constitution confers planning responsibilities on each of the spheres of government, those are 
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different planning responsibilities, based on “what is appropriate to each sphere”; (d) “planning” 
in the context of municipal affairs is a term which has assumed a particular, well established 
meaning which includes the zoning of land and the establishment of townships; and (e) the 
provincial competence for “urban and rural development” is not wide enough to include powers 




Cameron J goes on to state emphatically that municipalities are ‘responsible for zoning and 
subdivision decisions, and provinces are not’.
82
 He adds that all ‘municipal planning 
decisions that encompass zoning and subdivision, no matter how big, lie within the 
competence of municipalities’.
83
 With reference to the Court’s analysis in Gauteng 
Development Tribunal,
84
 Cameron J then states:  
 
‘Provincial and national government undoubtedly also have power over decisions so big (i.e. a 
major new town, for example “Sasol 4”), but their powers do not lie in vetoing zoning and 
subdivision decisions, or subjecting them to appeal. Instead, the provinces have coordinate 
powers to withhold or grant approvals of their own. It is therefore wrong to fear that a province 
would be powerless to stop the development of a ‘Sasol 4. That development would depend on 




Although the statements by the Court in Habitat Council were made with particular reference 
to the local government sphere, I submit that it equally holds for provincial government, and 
that in terms of the Constitution a province is also not, in the words of the Court, ‘a mere 
creature of statute, otherwise moribund, save if imbued with power by … national 
legislation’.
86
 Provinces also enjoy original and constitutionally entrenched powers, 
functions, rights and duties that may be qualified and constrained by law but only to the 
extent the Constitution permits. This interpretation is supported by the Constitution, which 
describes the three spheres of government in exactly the same terms in section 40(1) cited 
above, under the heading ‘Government in the Republic’. The principles of co-operative 
                                                          
81
 Lagoonbay, op cit, para 46; see also Habitat Council, op cit, para 12.   
82
 Habitat Council, ibid, para 13. 
83
 Ibid, para 19. 
84
 Johannesburg Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2000 (1) SA 732 (CC) (Gauteng Development), 
paras 23 and 24. 
85
 Habitat Council, op cit, para 19. 
86
 Ibid, para 11 (quoted above). 
27 
 
government and intergovernmental relations give further credence to a non-hierarchical 






 the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned a High Court order which 
imposed a general obligation upon the Minister to oversee all organs of state to comply with 
the National Environmental Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA). This was done having 
regard to the principles of legality, separation of powers and co-operative government.
89
 Thus 
the Court held that -  
 
‘Such an order appears to misconceive the powers and responsibilities of a national Minister 
under our constitutional system of co-operative government. It seems to be based on the 
erroneous premise that our system of government is hierarchical, with national government 
having the power to supervise the performance of all organs of State in every sphere of 




The Court then quotes Nugent JA in Gauteng Development Tribunal
91
 where he observed 
that the structure of government authority under the present constitutional dispensation 
departs markedly from that which existed under the previous constitutional regime where all 
public power vested in Parliament and devolved upon the lower tiers of government by 
parliamentary legislation. Under the new regime, certain powers are conferred directly on the 
other spheres by the Constitution, to the extent that they exercise ‘original constitutional 




In Kloof Conservancy the Supreme Court of Appeal therefore convincingly dispels a 
pervasive misconception that a Minister, or for that matter a national government department, 
can play ‘big sister’ to the other spheres of government. In reference to interventions in terms 
                                                          
87
 Constitution, op cit, section 41; see also discussion in paragraph 2.4 below. 
88
 Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs v Kloof Conservancy (106/2015) [2015] ZASCA 177 (Kloof 
Conservancy). 
89
 Ibid, summary in headnote. 
90
 Ibid, para 10. 
91
 Johannesburg Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others 2010 (2) SA 554 (SCA), para 14. 
92
 Kloof Conservancy, op cit, para 10. 
28 
 
of section 100 and 139 of the Constitution, the Court stated that neither of those sections 
permits an intervention with regard to compliance with NEMBA, and that the order imposed 
by the High Court ‘incorrectly assumes that the national government has a supervisory and 
ultimately a directory role in respect of the other spheres’. Such an order ‘impinges (rather 




Tronox is one of the most recent judgments in which the Constitutional Court had further 
occasion to consider a matter which touches, in the words of Van der Westhuizen J, ‘the heart 
of the South African constitutional dispensation, namely the distribution of power amongst 
the municipal, provincial and national spheres of government’.
94
 He cites, with approval, 
Gauteng Development Tribunal which ‘provided a ringing affirmation of the need for the 
various spheres of government to “respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and 
functions of government in the other spheres” and “not assume any power of function except 




Based on the above analysis of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, I conclude that the 
relationship between the three spheres of government is not hierarchical in nature. The 
Constitution has moved away from a hierarchical division of government power and has 
ushered in a new vision of government based on the principles of co-operative government 
binding on all three spheres of government, discussed more fully immediately below. 
Furthermore, DBV Behuising left no doubt that in the interpretation of the functional areas of 
provincial legislative competence set out in Schedules 4 and 5 in the Constitution, there is no 
presumption in favour of either the national legislature or provincial legislatures. These 
functional areas must be purposively interpreted in a manner which will enable the national 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures to exercise their respective legislative powers fully 
and effectively.
96
 As previously mentioned, Schedules 4 and 5 are discussed in greater detail 
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below. I now turn to the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental 
relations
97
 and how they relate to the system of multisphere government discussed above. 
 
2.4 Co-operative Government 
De Vos and Freedman state that an important consequence of the integrated model of 
government evident in the Constitution is that mechanisms must be put in place to regulate 
the overlap of power between the various spheres of government, and that the principle of co-
operative government plays an important role in that regard.
98
 In this respect I submit that one 
of the possible dangers of multisphere government is that it could result in fragmented and 
incoherent government, which then becomes ineffective and inefficient. In addition, it could 
lead to fragmented and inconsistent legislation. Such a situation has a negative impact on the 
well-being of people and the enjoyment of their rights. The inclusion of the binding 
provisions on co-operative government in chapter 3 of the Constitution is intended to prevent 
such fragmentation, incoherence and inconsistence.  These provisions could in fact be 
described as the constitutional glue that holds the different spheres of government together. 
Thus, in reviewing intergovernmental relations and co-operative government in South Africa, 
Malan observes that the three spheres of government are required to ‘forge strong, flexible 
goal-directed partnerships that can promote collaboration without weakening performance 
and accountability. This can only happen if political office-bearers and officials in the public 
sector change their mindset to embrace co-operation’.
99
 Indeed, in National Gambling Board 





The above comments underscore the importance of the binding constitutional provisions on 
co-operative government, as well as the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 
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 (IGRFA). This dissertation will therefore not be complete without the brief analysis 
below of chapter 3 of the Constitution and the IGRFA.  
 
2.4.1 Chapter 3 of the Constitution 
Section 40(1) of the Constitution provides that government in South Africa is constituted as 
three distinctive, interdependent and interrelated spheres, namely the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government, as stated above. Section 40(2) is couched in peremptory terms, 
and places clear obligations on all spheres of government in respect of co-operative 
governance: 
 
 ‘All spheres of government must observe and adhere to the principles of this Chapter and 
must conduct their activities within the parameters that the Chapter provides.’ 
  
Section 41 deals with the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental 
relations. The provisions of subsection 41(1) are also peremptory and place the following 
specific obligations in respect of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations on 
all organs of state within each sphere of government: 
 
‘(1) All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must – 
(a) preserve the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic;  
(b) secure the well-being of the people of the Republic; 
(c) provide effective transparent, accountable and coherent government in the Republic as a 
whole; 
(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people; 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the 
other spheres; 
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the 
Constitution; 
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(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on 
the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; 
and 
(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by- 
  
(i)  fostering friendly relations;  
(ii) assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common 
interest; 
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another.’ 
 
Subsection 41(2) obliges Parliament to enact what is now the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act 13 of 2005 (IGRFA): 
 
‘(2) An Act of Parliament must – 
(a) establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate 
intergovernmental relations; and 
(b) provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of 
intergovernmental disputes.’ 
 
Subsection 41(3) provides for intergovernmental disputes, again in obligatory terms: 
 
‘(3) An organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable 
effort to settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, 
and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute.’ 
 
Subsection 41(4), the only permissive subsection in section 41, refers to the powers of courts 




‘(4) If a court is not satisfied that the requirements of subsection (3) have been met, it may refer a 
dispute back to the organs of state involved.’ 
 
In reviewing intergovernmental relations and co-operative government, Malan notes that the 
principles spelt out in chapter 3 cannot be separated from the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution, as the latter refers to the basic rights of individuals which find application in all 
laws, administrative decisions taken and acts performed.
102
 I submit that, for the same 
reasons, these principles can also not be separated from the environmental right entrenched in 
section 24 of the Constitution. The constitutional provisions on co-operative government and 
intergovernmental relations are therefore pertinent to an examination of provincial 
obligations and authority to enact environmental legislation, which ideally requires 
considerable co-operation between the different spheres of government. The realisation of the 
environmental right may be hampered by the fact that significant intergovernmental co-
operation and communication appears to be lacking. I elaborate on this point in chapter 5 




2.4.2 The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IGRFA) 
This Act was enacted in terms of section 41(2) of the Constitution
104
 and establishes a 
framework for the national, provincial and local governments to promote and facilitate 
intergovernmental relations; to provide for mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the 
settlement of intergovernmental disputes; and matters related thereto.
105
 To this end the Act 
establishes national, provincial and municipal intergovernmental fora and structures; and 
provides for implementation protocols and settlement of intergovernmental disputes.  
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Of specific interest to this study is the fact that the IGRFA recognises in its Preamble the 
nexus between the realisation of constitutional rights (which obviously includes the 
environmental right) and effective, efficient, transparent, accountable and coherent 
government, by providing that: 
 
‘all spheres of government must provide effective, efficient, transparent, accountable and 
coherent government for the Republic to secure the well-being of the people and the 
progressive realisation of their constitutional rights (emphasis added).’ 
   
When this is read together with the point made by Malan
106
 that the principles spelt out in 
chapter 3 of the Constitution cannot be separated from the Bill of Rights, it serves as an 
important reminder that failure to fulfil the binding obligations emanating from the 
Constitution, specifically as provided for in Chapters 2 and 3, impacts negatively on people 
and their rights. It also serves as a reminder that the Constitution was adopted as the supreme 
law of the Republic, by the people of South Africa, for the following specific purposes: 
 
‘… so as to- 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundation for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the 
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law; 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and 
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state 




Further, the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and -  
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2.4.3 Judicial interpretation of chapter 3 
Woolman points out that during the first decade after the Constitution came into effect 
Parliament failed to enact the legislation required by the Constitution that would prevent 
‘different spheres of government and opposing organs of state from going to war (or court) 
over vital policy matters’; and that during that time the courts played their part in ‘holding 
things together’.
109
 He cites, for instance, the First Certification Judgment and the National 
Gambling Board judgments where, in both decisions, the Court drew a line between political 
and legal forms of dispute resolution.
110
 Woolman also points out that when the IGRFA was 
finally passed, it adopted in many respects the Court’s views on how intergovernmental 
conflicts should be resolved. Further, the Act defines intergovernmental relations as 
‘relationships that arise between different governments or between organs of state from 
different governments in the conduct of their affairs’, and ‘Government’ as ‘(a) the national 
government; (b) a provincial government; or (c) a local government’.
111
 However, the Act is 
silent on relations between provincial departments within a given province. This leads 
Woolman to the important observation that the language of section 125 of the Constitution 
which provides for the executive authority of provinces almost inexorably leads to the 
conclusion that the Premier and the Executive Council of a province may determine how 
policy is implemented and how various departments are to work together to that end. 
Moreover, to summarise Woolman’s argument, if the Premier wants to establish dispute 
resolution mechanisms, which could be in the form of provincial legislation, ‘there is nothing 
in the Final Constitution to prevent them from doing so’.
112
 I submit that such legislation, 
although not directly on the environment, could assist provinces to give effect to their 
environmental obligations by specifically providing for closer co-operation between different 
departments within in a particular province on issues pertaining to the environment.  
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In Minister of Police v Premier of the Western Cape, Moseneke DCJ interpreted the 
provisions on co-operative government under the heading ‘Chapter 3 obligations’. He held 
that chapter 3 of the Constitution has two parts: section 40(1) affirms that the three spheres of 
government are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated, whilst section 40(2) requires 
organs of state to comply with the principles of co-operative government spelt out in section 
41. Section 41(3) requires an organ of state to: a) make every reasonable effort to settle an 
intergovernmental dispute using mechanisms and procedures provided for; and b) to exhaust 
all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve a dispute. Of further importance is 
that a court has discretion to refuse to hear such a dispute if it is not satisfied that the parties 
have done so, although a court is not thereby precluded from hearing the dispute.
113
 He then 
cites National Gambling Board, with obvious approval, where the same court held that the 
duty of organs of state to avoid litigation is at the heart of chapter 3, and that parties are duty 
bound to make a meaningful effort to comply with the requirements of co-operative 
government. This obligation entails much more than an effort to settle a pending court case – 
it ‘requires of each organ of state to re-evaluate its position fundamentally’.
114
 Moseneke DCJ 
adds that spheres of government and organs of state are obliged to arrange their activities in a 
manner that ‘advances intergovernmental relations and bolsters co-operative governance’. If 
they do not, they breach peremptory requirements of the Constitution. He then observes that 
despite this an ever-increasing number of intergovernmental disputes end up in court, 
especially at the Constitutional Court, and that such litigation is always at the expense of the 
public purse from which they all derive their funding. Further, the litigation also often delays 




In conclusion, the binding provisions of chapter 3 of the Constitution discussed above and the 
pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in that regard place the pivotal role that co-
operative governance ought to play in regulating the overlap of power between the different 
spheres of government beyond dispute. Yet, it appears that organs of state are not always in 
practice giving effect to their constitutional obligation to ‘observe and adhere’
116
 to the 
principles of co-operative government, at least not to the extent intended by the Constitution. 
Thus, the ideal of the three spheres of government co-operating with one another ‘in mutual 
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trust and good faith’
117
 has more often than not failed to be realised, despite the existence of 
an ‘array of institutions (that) have greased the wheels of intergovernmental relations’.
118
 The 
comments by Moseneke DCJ in Minister of Police v Premier of the Western Cape that more 




I have argued above that the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental 
relations cannot be separated from the environmental right entrenched in section 24 of the 
Constitution, as these principles should find application in legislation enacted to give effect to 
the right. In that regard I submit that the environmental right informs the substantive purpose 
or objective of legislation enacted to realise the right as envisaged in the Constitution; and 
that an understanding of the environmental right is an essential precondition for taking 
meaningful legislative measures in pursuance of the right. Chapter 3 below therefore provides 
a detailed analysis of the substantive content of the environmental right and the obligations it 
imposes on, specifically, provincial organs of state.  The legislative authority and functional 




THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
3.1 Overview 
Provincial obligations to protect the environment, and the legislative authority of provinces to 
fulfil such obligations, are derived from the Constitution.
120
 Any environmental legislation 
enacted by the provincial sphere of government must consequently be consistent with the 
enabling provisions in the Constitution. In this chapter I analyse the obligations imposed on 
provinces to protect the environment provided for in section 24 in the Bill of Rights. This 
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requires a detailed examination of the environmental right, and the nature, scope and content 
of the obligations it imposes on organs of state to protect the environment. In line with the 
stated objectives of this study, the analysis focuses on provincial obligations. Reference is 
also made to the principles distilled from international environmental jurisprudence, and their 
relevance to the environmental right in the South African Constitution. This is followed by a 
brief discussion of the application and enforcement of the environmental right and a summary 
of the main conclusions drawn from the analysis as a whole. The chapter is concluded with a 
brief mention of the relationship between the environmental right and Schedules 4 and 5 of 
the Constitution, which list functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence and functional areas of exclusive legislative competence, respectively.  
 
3.2 The Bill of Rights and the Environmental Right 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The Bill of Rights is ‘a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa’, enshrines the rights of all 
people in the country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.
121
 Subsections 7(2), which provides that the state must ‘respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’, and 8(1), which provides that the Bill of Rights 
‘applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state’, are of particular significance for the interpretation of rights in the Bill of Rights. These 
two subsections will be further discussed in chapter 4 (part I) when the legislative authority 
of provinces is examined. Entrenched in the Bill of Rights, the environmental right provides 
as follows: 
 
‘Everyone has the right— 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that -  
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and  
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(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 




The substantive meaning of section 24 has to date only been directly considered by the South 
African courts in a limited number of cases. Therefore, I firstly draw on the principles 
distilled from international environmental jurisprudence, and discuss their relevance for the 
interpretation of the environmental right in the South African Constitution. Thereafter I 
analyse the provisions of section 24 itself, and the obligations imposed by it. This is 
concluded with a brief overview of the enforceability and justiciability of section 24.   
 
3.2.2 International environmental jurisprudence 
Cowen, in one of the early papers that deals with the environmental right in the 
Constitution
123
 stresses that section 39 of the Constitution expressly requires every court, 
tribunal or forum to consider international law. Furthermore, sections 232 and 233 declare 
that customary international law is law in the Republic unless inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament, and that when interpreting legislation, every court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation that is consistent with international law. He stated his 
firm belief that several basic environmental principles were being developed at the level of 
international customary law, and moreover, that South African constitutional law and 
customary international law may well turn out to be mutually supportive of each other.
124
 He 
then cites litigation between Hungary and Slovakia before the Permanent Court of 
International Justice
125
 where two competing legal rights were involved, namely the right to 
development and the right to environmental protection. The court needed to find a practical 
way of balancing these sharply opposed contentions—environmental protection versus 
economic development. In order to achieve this, the Court was called upon to interpret and 
apply the principle of ‘sustainable development’ for the first time. In doing so, the Court 
restated what it said in 1996, namely that:  
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‘The environment is not an abstraction but represents a living space, the quality of life and the 
very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the general 
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 




The Court also made it clear that the principle of sustainable development is fundamental to 
the determination of the competing considerations in the case before it. And although 
‘sustainable development’ was a fairly recent concept, it was likely to play a major role in 
determining important environmental disputes in future. In deciding how to balance the right 
to develop and the right to environmental protection, the court held that it is clear that a 
principle must be followed which pays due regard to both rights, namely the principle of 





Cowen further points out that it is important to note that sustainable development is not the 
only principle of modern international environmental law that has to be observed—a number 
of further principles are increasingly ‘hardening’: 
(a) the polluter must pay; 
(b) biodiversity must be maintained; 
(c) the precautionary principle must be observed; 
(d) intergenerational equity must be observed; 
(e) effective environmental impact assessment procedures must be observed; 
(f) the principle of internalising costs and of improved pricing and of providing incentive 
mechanisms must be observed; and all these goals should be kept in mind while 
(g) promoting justifiable economic and social development.  
He continues by saying that, fortunately, the above-mentioned broad propositions are all to be 
found either in section 24 of the Constitution, or in ‘policy statements’, or in either ‘hard’ or 
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‘soft’ international law which ought to be observed by South Africa”.
128
 In this regard, 
Cowen mentions the work of Kidd and Henderson, who also emphasise the importance of 




Davis reminds us of the international origins of the Bill of Rights, and the role ‘constitutional 
borrowing’ played in its drafting. He points out that the Bill of Rights in the interim 
Constitution (IC)
130
 followed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in its essential 
structure.
131
 In this regard, Davis refers to the limitations clause which was a variation on 
section 1 of the Canadian Charter and the manner in which this section had been interpreted 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Oakes,
132
 which helped shape the final version of the 
limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution. According to Davis, Professor Halton 
Cheadle introduced the concept of scrutiny into the limitations clause by drafting a provision 
that guaranteed that certain rights could be limited only where the limitation, in addition to 
being reasonable and justifiable in an open, democratic society based on freedom and 
equality, was necessary, thus introducing an American influence.
133
 Article 19(2) of the 
German Grundgesetz, which holds that ‘[i]n no case may the essence of a basic right be 
infringed’, also influenced the limitations clause.  In the end, some significant changes were 
made to the Bill of Rights, including the addition of socio-economic rights and a concept of 
substantive equality, alterations to the property clause, express provision that the Bill of 
Rights be applied horizontally, and the eradication in the levels of scrutiny in the limitation 
clause. In its final form the ‘Limitation of rights’ in section 36 of the Constitution thus reads: 
 
‘(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all the relevant factors, including –  
(a) The nature of the right; 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
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(c) The nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may 
limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.’ 
 
Davis continues to say that despite the changes that were brought about in the final 
Constitution, ‘the essential structure and content of the interim bill of rights was transported 
into the final document’.
134
 He does, however, warn (by quoting a minority judgment by 
Kriegler J) about uncritical use of comparative law. Kriegler J pleaded for a more nuanced 
use of comparative law by saying ‘where a provision in our Constitution is manifestly 
modelled on a particular provision in another country’s constitution, it would be folly not to 
ascertain how jurists of that country have interpreted their precedential provision’.
135
 On the 
other hand, he warned courts to be extremely careful before adopting North American 
jurisprudence with regard to freedom of expression as the two systems were ‘inherently 
incompatible in that they stemmed from different common law origins and were located in 
materially different constitutional regimes’. He went on to say: 
 
‘The United States Constitution stands as a monument to the vision and libertarian aspirations of 
the Founding Fathers; and the first Amendment in particular to the values endorsed by all who 
cherish freedom. But they paint eighteenth century revolutionary insights in broad, bold strokes. 
The language is simple, terse and direct, the injunctions unqualified and the style peremptory. Our 
Constitution is a wholly different kind of instrument. For present purposes it is sufficient to note 
that it is infinitely more explicit, more detailed, more balanced, more carefully phrased and 
counterpoised, representing a multi-disciplinary effort on the part of hundreds of expert advisors 




De Wet and Du Plessis point out that the Constitutional Court has not had sufficient 
opportunity to clarify the meaning of the positive obligations of the state imposed by the 
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environmental right in section 24.
137
 They therefore distil some of the positive obligations of 
a substantive nature implied by this section, with particular reference to substantive duties, by 
drawing on the way in which international human rights bodies have interpreted and applied 
similar provisions of the different human rights instruments, namely the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (African Charter), the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(American Declaration) and the American Convention of Human Rights (American 
Convention). The authors do acknowledge the inherent limitations of international human 
rights jurisprudence in relation to positive obligations pertaining to the environment due to 
the fact that environmental protection per se is not yet a justiciable right before most 
international human rights bodies. They also point out that most human rights instruments 
were drafted before the emergence of environmental protection as a common concern, and 
therefore do not directly mention the environment, with the exception of the African Charter 
which explicitly recognises a human right to a ‘satisfactory environment’ in article 24 
thereof.
138
 They submit, however, that in accordance with the Constitution,
139
 the benchmarks 
developed by these bodies may be a useful tool in clarifying the core content and scope of the 
obligations imposed by section 24, especially bearing in mind that South Africa, as a party, 
would in any event be bound to give effect to all obligations flowing from the African 
Charter and the ICCPR. 
 
The authors highlight two main threads of substantive positive environmental obligations, 
which have crystallised in the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies, mainly 
(with the exception of the SERAC
140
 case before the African Commission) distilled from non-
environmental human rights. These are:  
(i) A broad obligation to engage in environmental impact and risk assessments of 
activities that pose a danger to the environment or human health, or both. This 
obligation stretches beyond the mere execution of environmental assessments to the 
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effective regulation, minimisation and prevention of environmental harm that may 
result from such activities. South Africa has a history of environmental impact 




(ii) A positive duty to limit exploitation of natural resources and to prevent pollution of 
water, air and soil (derived from the rights of indigenous peoples, notably the right to 
life and the right to culture). The environmental right in section 24 of the Constitution 
extends the right to everyone in South Africa, and would include indigenous people 
and traditional communities, although the distinction between the two is blurred and 
the concepts overlap. This overlap is relevant if section 24 is to be interpreted in 
accordance with international human rights jurisprudence, as it indicates that a broad 
category of people in South Africa could potentially claim protection of their natural 




In regard to the latter, De Wet and Du Plessis point out the importance of the view of 
international human rights bodies that the protection of the way of life of indigenous peoples 
requires a limitation of the economic exploitation of their natural habitat, the prevention of 
pollution of their environment, as well as the eradication of the consequences of pollution.
143
 
They furthermore state that at first glance it is more difficult to link the obligation to protect 
the way of life and culture of indigenous people to the text of section 24  of the Constitution, 
than is the case with the obligation to conduct environmental assessments. However, since 
the Constitution affords the environmental right to everyone in South Africa, De Wet and Du 
Plessis are of the view that it seems likely that the ‘way of life’ of indigenous people and 
traditional communities fits within the notions of a right to an environment that is not harmful 
to their ‘health’ or ‘well-being’ (section 24(a)) and ‘social development’ (section 24(b)(iv)), 
notions which are intrinsically part of human life.
144
 Furthermore, section 31(1)(a) of the 
Constitution provides that persons belonging to a ‘cultural, religious or linguistic community’ 
may not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to enjoy their culture, 
practise their religion, and use their language. The authors therefore argue that section 24, 
read with section 31, may be interpreted as placing an obligation on the state to, for instance, 
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demarcate certain natural resources essential to the survival of indigenous people, and to limit 
or exclude certain commercial activities and development within such an area; to prevent 
pollution that could threaten the way of life of such communities; and to provide reparation 
where communities have suffered injury as a result of environmental degradation. They also 
point out that the National Heritage Resources Act (NHRA)
145
 protects the cultural heritage 
resources of, among others, traditional communities and indigenous people. Such protection 
includes the protection of ancestral graves, royal graves and graves of traditional leaders, thus 
underscoring the view that cultural heritage, traditional communities and environmental 
protection go together.
146
 I submit that it also demonstrates that the environmental right 
cannot be understood in isolation from other rights in the Constitution (I elaborate on this 
point in paragraph 3.2.6 below). 
 
 
On the whole, therefore, the substantive obligations for the (indirect) protection of the 
environment, albeit somewhat general, illustrate the ‘intertwining’ of human life (health and 
well-being) and the environment, and also underscore the anthropocentric dimension of 
environmental protection. Furthermore, ‘the explicit recognition of a right to a satisfactory 
environment would not relieve courts (or policy makers) from balancing the positive 
substantive obligations inherent in such a right with other legitimate public interests, 




The above analysis illuminates: (a) the nature and scope of the duties and obligations that 
section 24 may impose on provincial organs of state in respect of cultural, traditional, 
linguistic and even indigenous communities; and (b) the potential objectives, purpose and 
content of legislation enacted in pursuance of their environmental rights. This is of particular 
relevance in a province such as KwaZulu-Natal with its diverse population, and must be born 
in mind by organs of state when giving effect to their environmental obligations. 
 
In considering the implications of international human rights jurisprudence for South Africa, 
De Wet and Du Plessis make the point that judicial interpretation and clarification of the 
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state’s obligations contained in the environmental right are ‘crucial to guide the conduct of 
the legislature and the executive in relation to environmental governance’. They postulate 
that because international judicial interpretation is primarily based on the interpretation of 
non-environmental human rights, its scope is likely to be more limited than in the case of the 
explicit environmental right in section 24 of the Constitution. However, the South African 
environmental right is likely to include those obligations distilled from non-human rights 
instruments, and this overlap suggests that the positive obligations generated through 
international jurisprudence create a ‘minimum threshold for environmental protection 
(emphasis added)’ in South Africa, which cannot be discarded through ‘policy whims of the 




3.2.2.1 Conclusions drawn from international jurisprudence 
From the above analysis of international jurisprudence and the role it plays in interpreting the 
nature and scope of section 24 of the Bill of Rights, it is clear that the South African 
environmental right is deeply rooted in the global history of environmental rights, and must 
be understood within that history. Of particular importance are the following: 
(i)  Customary international law is law in the Republic unless inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament, and when interpreting legislation, every 




(ii)  The international origins of the South African Bill of Rights and its evolution 
from the IC to its current form greatly assist in the interpretation of the nature and 




(iii) The positive obligations generated through international jurisprudence create 
benchmarks, i.e. provide a minimum threshold for environmental protection in 
South Africa, which cannot be ignored by legislatures and the executive.
151
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(iv) However, an uncritical use of comparative law without ascertaining whether the 
legal provisions stem from different common law origins, or are located in 




3.2.3 Section 24 of the Constitution 
Scholars generally agree that the inclusion of an enforceable substantive environmental right 
in the Constitution has sparked unprecedented development of the domestic environmental 
law and governance framework.
153
 When read with section 7(2) of the Constitution, it is clear 
that whilst everyone in South Africa must respect this right, the state incurs an ‘additional 
duty to take positive action towards its fulfilment’.
154
 One of the stated objectives of this 
dissertation is to interrogate the nature and scope of the binding substantive obligation 
imposed on provincial organs of state to protect the environment through legislative 
measures. Such an analysis firstly requires a comprehensive overall understanding of the 
nature and scope of the environmental right provided for in section 24 of the Constitution, 
which is, significantly, situated within the Bill of Rights. As stated above, domestic judicial 
guidance in this regard is limited as the courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, have 
only directly considered the substantive meaning of section 24 in a few cases. This means 
that until the courts comprehensively clarify the ‘meaning, scope and reach’ of the 
environmental right, it is up to legislators, policy makers and decision makers to make sense 
on their own of their constitutional obligation to protect the environment through ‘reasonable 
legislative and other measures’.
155
 Du Plessis also points out that the environmental right has 
not yet been scrutinised to the extent that is sufficient for public authorities to be clear on the 
‘preventative, implementable and enforceable properties of the right in relation to such 
authorities’ other constitutional powers and mandates’.
156
 Fortunately, in the absence of 
sufficient guidance from the courts, the abundance of scholarly analyses of section 24 (read 
with available judicial decisions), provide invaluable insights into the nature and scope of 
environmental right, and the different perspectives on and approaches to the right.  
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I commence the analysis of section 24 with an overview of the dominant normative 
paradigms which could inform the interpretation of environmental rights to a greater or lesser 
extent, depending on the approach adopted. An understanding of these paradigms will lay the 
foundation for my approach to the interpretation of the obligations imposed on provincial 
organs of state by the environmental right in section 24 of the Constitution; and is therefore 
essential to realising the stated objectives of this dissertation.   
 
3.2.4 Normative paradigms underpinning environmental rights 
The rationale for protecting or conserving the environment has been the subject of 
‘ecophilosophical’
157
 discourse for some time. The relevance of this debate to an analysis of 
the environmental right lies in the fact that an interpretation of section 24 demands an 
understanding of the normative values on which it is premised, or, put differently, what the 
provisions in section 24 are attempting to achieve. This, in turn, informs the content, purpose 
and objectives of legislation enacted to give effect to the right. I now turn to some pertinent 
scholarly analyses of the normative paradigms underpinning environmental rights:  
 
Firstly, Du Plessis identifies three normative paradigms underpinning environmental rights 
generally, which consequently influence their interpretation and application, namely the 
anthropocentric, ecocentric and theo-cultural paradigms,
158
 discussed in turn below. 
 
According to Du Plessis, anthropocentrism, in the context of the environment, is based on the 
notion that a healthy and sustainable natural environment should be holistically maintained 
for the sake of human well-being, rather than for the sake of the environment itself. This 
human-centred approach presumes an unequal symbiotic relationship between humans and 
the natural environment with humans acting as the custodians of the environment, establishes 
a fundamental legal entitlement, and holds that fundamental environmental rights should be 
afforded to people.
159
 She suggests that the anthropocentric approach is widely accepted as 
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the paradigm most suited to an understanding of the need for environmental rights as it seems 
‘particularly compatible with the notion of sustainable development with its explicit emphasis 
on human needs’; and fits well with notions of ‘intergenerational equity’ and ‘rights based 
ethics’.
160
She goes on to say that anthropocentrism finds resonance with the idea of 
utilitarianism which is concerned with the ‘greatest good for the greatest number of people 
for the greatest period of time’; as well as the argument that it is impossible to interpret 
constitutional provisions concerning the environment in a non-anthropocentric way given that 
constitutions are written for people.
161
 Du Plessis concludes that section 24 of the 
Constitution has a clear ‘anthropocentric nature’ since it values the environment in terms of 
the ‘human purposes it serves’, i.e. its usefulness for individuals and humanity generally; and 





Ecocentrism, Du Plessis explains, in its most extreme form, is the opposite of 
anthropocentricism, and suggests that rights should be afforded to the natural environment, 
and that existing environmental rights should not be interpreted in terms of its value to 
humanity, but in accordance with the intrinsic worth of the environment. This approach is 
directly related to so-called ‘deep ecology philosophy’, biocentrism and environmental ethics. 
The ‘deep ecology’ approach views humans as an integral part of the environment alongside 
all other organisms  and does not distinguish between dominant and subordinate forms of life. 
Biocentrism requires that the potential effect of human actions on all living things (with their 
own right to existence) be considered in decision making. Environmental ethics relates 
directly to biocentrism and requires that activities affecting the environment be evaluated in 




Theocentrism is located in a belief that whilst the environment has intrinsic value, human 
beings should care for and preserve the earth as guardians, in the way demanded by their 
deity or their religious rules. Hence a theocentric approach to the protection of the 
environment stems from a sense of duty towards the environment set in a religious belief 
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 She also refers to Theron,
165
 who distinguishes between an egocentric, 
anthropocentric and ecocentric approach, with the egocentric and anthropocentric approaches 
being very closely related and not meriting a distinction.  
 
Secondly, Kidd, in his analysis, identifies essentially two kinds of environmental rights: the 
rights of humans to a safe and healthy environment, and the rights of the environment itself 
(i.e. trees, rocks, rivers and so on) not to be degraded.
166
 However, he states that in South 
Africa, where human rights generally have only recently been given constitutional protection, 
we are a long way off affording rights to the environment itself. He suggests that section 24 is 
therefore essentially anthropocentric, rather than ecocentric. If read with section 38 of the 
Constitution (enforcement of rights), this anthropocentricity is further made clear.
167
 Kidd 
refers to the right of the environment itself not to be degraded as the ‘biocentric’ approach to 
environmental rights, which includes different perspectives.
168
 Firstly, there is the view that 
the richness and diversity of life has intrinsic value and humans do not have a right to reduce 
these resources, except to satisfy their basic needs. This approach rejects the idea that nature 
itself has rights, and prefers the idea of ‘rightness’ which acknowledges the ‘intrinsic 
rightness of non-human existence and sensibilities’.
169
 He points out that a similar viewpoint 
has recently been expressed in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth
170
 
which recognises that Earth itself has certain inherent rights. The second perspective referred 
to by Kidd regards nature itself as the rights holder.
171
 Concerning the anthropocentric 
approach which regards the subject of rights as human beings, Kidd suggests that this 
approach may entail a purely utilitarian view of nature as a source of resources for humans, 
or it may ‘place humans at the centre of nature and recognise the utilitarian aspect, yet accord 
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3.2.4.1 Conclusions drawn from normative paradigms 
Arising from the above analysis of the potentially different normative paradigms on which 
environmental rights may be based, I conclude that whilst the environmental right in the 
Constitution is essentially anthropocentric, there seems to be an implied or indirect right 
afforded to the environment itself in section 24. I base this view on the wording of section 
24(b), which provides that everyone has a right to have ‘the environment’ protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations (my emphasis). I therefore submit that whilst section 
24 clearly affords this right to people as indicated by the word ‘everyone’, and not to the 
environment per se, the end result may not be very different in practice, with the environment 
itself being the ultimate beneficiary of the protection afforded by the right. It appears, 
therefore, that the wording of section 24(b) may open the door to developing the notion that 
the environment itself has rights, as envisaged by Stone.
173
 Du Plessis also raises the 
possibility of ‘radical and extensive’ legal development that accommodates the extension of 
rights to the natural environment, ‘given the increasingly distressed state of the world 





For the purpose of this study I will therefore adopt a nuanced anthropocentric view of section 
24, which places humans at the centre, but with the caveat that this does not exclude the 
possibility, firstly, of interpreting the right from a somewhat more ecocentric perspective, 
and, secondly; that environmental jurisprudence may develop to incorporate a more 
ecocentric approach to the environmental right. Furthermore, in giving effect to the 
obligations imposed on the state by the environmental right, it may be prudent for the 
legislative and executive arms of government to take cognisance of the various cultural and 
religious beliefs of the people who are the subjects of the environmental right, and how such 
beliefs shape their perception of the environment. This suggestion, although made with 
reservations, is based on the fact that laws made without popular support may be legal, but 
invariably lack legitimacy. Lastly, I suggest that the notion that the environment has intrinsic 
value should also inform the interpretation of section 24.  
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3.2.5 Interpretation of the provisions in section 24 
The method of interpreting the Constitution and the Bill of Rights has been considered in a 
number of judgments of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. Currie 
and De Waal state that, in summary, these judgments hold that ‘the language of the 
constitutional text must be interpreted generously, purposively and in context’.
175
 According 
to the authors, the purpose of interpreting a provision in the Bill of Rights is to establish 
whether law or conduct is inconsistent with that provision. This involves two enquiries: 
firstly, the meaning or scope of the implicated right must be determined; and, secondly, it 
must be determined whether the challenged law or conduct conflicts with the right. A 
provision of the Bill of Rights can protect certain activities (which places a negative or 
defensive obligation on those bound by the right); or it can demand the fulfilment of certain 
objectives (which places positive obligations on those it binds); or it can do both.
176
 The 
environmental right in the Bill of Rights is an example of a right which places both negative 
and positive obligations on the state. These obligations are discussed in detail below. 
 
Section 24 consists of two parts, i.e. subsections (a) and (b), with subsection (a) being a 
fundamental human right, and subsection (b) ‘more in the nature of a directive principle 
requiring the state to take positive steps towards the attainment of the right’.
177
 Section 24(a) 
encompasses two aspects: ‘everyone’ has the right to (i) an environment that is not harmful to 
their health; and (ii) an environment that is not harmful to their wellbeing. Both aspects 
require an understanding of the meaning of ‘environment’. In this regard Kidd argues that the 
definition of ‘environment’ in NEMA is too narrow and that it would be unacceptable to limit 
the meaning of environment in section 24 similarly, which should be understood more in line 
with the dictionary meaning of humans’ surroundings (given that it is a human right).
178
 He 
further observes that the right to health was recognised under the common law, and is 
therefore not new. However, it must be distinguished from the right of access to health care 
services, provided for in section 27 of the Constitution. The concept ‘health’ goes beyond 
mere physical health. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines health as a ‘state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being’, which consequently overlaps with the 
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 The meaning of the right to well-being, on the other hand, has only 
recently been considered by the courts.
180
 In HTF the High Court suggested that the term is 
‘open ended and manifestly … incapable of precise definition. Nevertheless, it is critically 
important in that it defined for the environmental authorities the constitutional objectives of 
their task’.
181
 The High Court also quoted Glazewski with approval:  
 
‘In the environmental context, the potential ambit of a right to well-being is exciting but 
potentially limitless. The words nevertheless encompass the essence of the environmental 
concern, namely a sense of environmental integrity; a sense that we ought to utilise the 
environment in a morally responsible and ethical manner. If we abuse the environment we feel a 
sense of revulsion akin to the position where a beautiful and unique landscape is destroyed or an 




Kotzé and Du Plessis point out the potential challenge to the High Court’s interpretation of 
the term ‘well-being’ as being open-ended and incapable of precise definition. This challenge 
comes to the fore in the Court’s subsequent remark that the term is nevertheless ‘critically 
important’ in that it defined for the environmental authorities the constitutional objectives of 
their task.
183
 I agree with the authors: there is clearly an inherent contradiction in the above-
cited pronouncement of the High Court. A term manifestly incapable of precise definition 
cannot simultaneously define for the environmental authorities the constitutional objectives of 
their task in any precise or exact terms (as a definition should do). It can, at best, be 
indicative of the broad parameters of their task. 
 
Kotzé and Du Plessis further point out that the Court wrongly interprets section 24(b) as 
being reminiscent of an ‘aspirational’ constitutional directive principle as opposed to an 
enforceable environmental right. Nonetheless, the authors acknowledge that the HTF court 
contributes to a deeper understanding of section 24 by showing that: (i) the content of section 
24(a) cannot be separated from the positive obligations provided for in section 24(b); (ii) 
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constitutional environmental protection raises issues of intergenerational equality which 
imply a stewardship role on the part of the state; and (iii) the rights and interests of certain 
individuals may have to be limited in order to realise and protect the constitutional 
environmental right.
184
   
 
In Hichange Investments, exposure to a ‘stench’ was regarded as being adverse to one’s 
health and well-being.
185
 However, the concept ‘well-being’ is not confined to situations 
where there is a direct impact on a person, but it includes notions of concern for the aesthetic 
and spiritual dimension of the natural environment, including the idea of a ‘sense of place’. 
Thus knowledge of, or a reasonable anticipation of, a threat to the environment anywhere, 
and not only in close proximity to a person, may have an impact on a person’s environmental 
well-being.
186
 Kotzé and Du Plessis refer to section 24(a) as being ‘exceptionally broad’ with 
the notions of ‘”environment”, “health” and “well-being” … being loaded with probable 
meaning’.
187
 Citing various scholars, the authors postulate that the definition of 
‘environment’ in NEMA indicates that the environment transcends mere ecological interests 
and also includes, for example, the socio-economic and cultural dimensions of the inter-
relationship between people and the natural environment. In the context of section 24, 
‘health’ refers to both mental and physical health to the extent that it can be negatively 
affected by external factors such as pollution or exposure to hazardous substances. ‘Well-
being’ refers to a person’s welfare and implies that people must be protected against 
environmental harm which may impact on their ability to be ‘content and at ease’, and has a 




Kidd introduces a further dimension to the idea of well-being, namely that poverty is the 
absence of well-being. Consequently, the meaning of ‘well-being’ is a critical component of 
the study of poverty and poverty alleviation in the social sciences.
189
 In this regard Kidd 
refers to ‘3-D well-being’, i.e. an ‘interplay of three dimensions of well-being: the material, 
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the relational and the subjective (also referred to as perceptual)’.  This means that whereas the 
conventional discourse on poverty emphasised material deprivation, the role of both 
relationships and subjective experiences and emotions are now also receiving attention.
190
 I 
therefore submit that in South Africa, with continued abject poverty amongst many 
communities, this needs to be borne in mind by policy and lawmakers when making sense of 
the multifaceted duties imposed on them by the environmental right, as well as by other 
rights, which exist within a Constitution which has transformation of society at its core.
191
   
 
Turning to section 24(b), Kidd observes that ‘conserved’ is currently a more acceptable 
concept than ‘protected’ which is used in that section, although it is unlikely that it was a 
deliberate choice. In contrast, the notion of protecting the environment for the ‘benefit of 
current and future generations’ (which was not in the final draft of the Constitution) clearly 
was.
192
 This internationally recognised concept embodies the notion of intergenerational 
equity, i.e. that the present generation holds the environment in trust for future generations. 
Furthermore, section 24(b) is more akin to a directive principle, as stated above, having the 
character of a so-called second generation right imposing a constitutional imperative on the 
state to secure the environmental rights through ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’. 
This requires the state to take positive steps towards the attainment of the right, aimed at the 
objectives set out in subsection (b).
193
 Section 24(b), however, does not only require the state 
to take ‘legislative and other measures’, but also that such measures must be ‘reasonable’. In 
Grootboom the Constitutional Court considered how the state must meet such obligations 
imposed on it by the Constitution.
194
 Although the judgment does not specifically refer to the 
obligations emanating from the environmental right, it does clarify the dual nature of the 
obligations imposed on organs of state by the Constitution, namely, to take ‘legislative and 
other’ measures, and to ensure that such measures are ‘reasonable’. In this regard Yacoob J 
said: 
 
‘The state is required to take reasonable legislative and other measures. Legislative measures by 
themselves are not likely to constitute constitutional compliance. Mere legislation is not enough. 
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The state is obliged to act to achieve the intended result, and the legislative measures will 
invariably have to be supported by appropriate, well directed policies and programmes 
implemented by the Executive. These policies and programmes must be reasonable both in their 
conception and their implementation. The formulation of a program is only the first stage in 
meeting the State’s obligations. The program must also be reasonably implemented. An otherwise 





In BP the High Court also pronounced, among other things, on the dual nature of the 
obligations that section 24 imposes on organs of state.
196
 In this case, the High Court 
considered an application for the building of a new petrol station. The applicant contended 
that the legal mandate of the environmental authority was limited to a consideration of 
environmental matters, whereas the authority itself relied on section 24 of the Constitution 
and NEMA. The authority argued, successfully, that its mandate included both socio-
economic and environmental considerations. The Court agreed, and held that environmental 
authorities had a constitutional duty to give effect to section 24, which duty included the 
taking of reasonable legislative and other measures. Such measures could include decision-
making guidelines, which the authority in this case had developed. The Court further held 
that in addition to being ‘reasonable’, such measures must also contribute to the progressive 




In Mazibuko O’Regan J provided further clarity in relation to the ‘reasonableness’ of 
measures discussed above, summarising the Court’s position in that regard by stating that the 
positive obligations imposed upon government by the social and economic rights in our 
Constitution will be enforced by courts in at least the following ways:  
 
‘If government takes no steps to realise the rights, the courts will require government to take 
steps. If government’s adopted measures are unreasonable, the courts will similarly require that 
they be reviewed so as to meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness. From Grootboom, it 
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is clear that a measure will be unreasonable if it makes no provision for those most desperately in 
need. If government adopts a policy with unreasonable limitations or exclusions, as in Treatment 
Action Campaign No 2, the Court may order that those are removed. Finally, the obligation of 
progressive realisation imposes a duty upon government continually to review its policies to 




Kidd states that compliance with the constitutional directive to take ‘legislative measures’ has 
been substantial, judging by the significant legislative activity in the environmental field in 
the new constitutional era.
199
 Furthermore, the environmental right provides the 
‘underpinnings’ of such environmental legislation.
200
 A large body of environmental 
legislation has indeed been enacted by the national sphere of government in South Africa 
since the coming into effect of the Constitution, with NEMA providing the framework and 
principles applicable to the actions of all organs of state that may significantly affect the 
environment.
201
 In contrast, provinces have enacted very little environmental legislation in 
pursuance of the same constitutional directive referred to by Kidd.
202
 This apparent 
legislative inactivity by provinces is significant as the environmental right provides the same 
‘underpinnings’ for provinces to take legislative and other measures to protect the 
environment as it does for the national government. Furthermore, the binding obligations 
imposed on provinces (as organs of state)
203
 by the Bill of Rights generally, and the 
environmental right particularly, are couched in exactly the same terms as those imposed on 
the national sphere.
204
 In view of this apparent discrepancy, an appraisal of the extent to 
which provinces have enacted legislation in pursuance of their constitutional obligations to 
protect the environment is done in chapter 5 of this study, as previously mentioned. 
 
In addition to the provisions of subsection 24(b) discussed above, this subsection also lists 
three objectives that the envisaged legislative and other measures must achieve, namely to:  
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;  
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(ii) promote conservation; and  
(iii)secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while   
promoting justifiable economic and social development.  
 
According to Kotzé and Du Plessis, the language in subsection (b)(i)-(iii) is less ambiguous 
than in the case of section 24(a), although the obligations imposed are ‘void of any 
explanatory detail’.
205
 Kidd argues that the first two objectives do not require much 
discussion, although objective (ii) is incomplete as it does not refer to the purpose of 
conservation, which can be assumed to be the environment. Objective (iii) expressly brings in 
the concept of ‘sustainable development’ (albeit somewhat clumsily).
206
 Sustainable 
development also closely relates to the notion of ‘well-being’, discussed above.
207
 In BP the 
Court emphasised the importance of sustainable development in South Africa, and expressed 
itself as follows:  
 
‘Pure economic principles will no longer determine, in an unbridled fashion, whether a 
development is acceptable. Development, which may be regarded as economically and financially 
sound, will, in future, be balanced by its environmental impact, taking coherent cognisance of the 
principle of intergenerational equity and sustainable use of resources in order to arrive at an 
integrated management of the environment, sustainable development and socio-economic 
concerns. By elevating the environment to a fundamental justiciable human right, South Africa 
has irreversibly embarked on a road, which will lead to the goal of attaining a protected 





Kotzé and Du Plessis provide a very succinct summary of the contribution of BP to a better 
understanding of section 24, which stems from the Court’s: 
(i) confirmation of the socio-economic factors in the relationship between people and 
the environment;  
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(ii) view that the entire environmental right must be interpreted in the context of both 
intergenerational environmental protection and sustainable development;  
(iii) emphasis that the positive duties that the state incurs in terms of the environmental 
right require an integrated approach which takes into consideration environmental 
and socio-economic concerns and principles;  
(iv) recognition that constitutional environmental protection requires the balancing of 
different rights and interests; and  
(v) acknowledgement of the link between the environmental right and sustainable 
development in that a rights based approach to environmental governance elevates 
the status of environmental governance to a constitutional level, thus enabling the 
achievement of sustainability.
209
   
 
In Fuel Retailers, the Constitutional Court for the first time dealt with the environmental right 
in a fairly comprehensive manner.
210
 The Court pronounced on the nature and scope of an 
environmental authority’s obligation to consider the social, economic and environmental 
impact of development (in this case the building of a proposed filling station, similar to BP); 
and whether the authority in question complied with its obligations. It also confirmed that 
socio-economic development had to be balanced against environmental protection, and that 
the environment and development are inexorably linked.
211
 Here the Court referred to the 
explicit obligation to promote ‘justifiable economic and social development’ in section 
24(b)(iii) and stated that:  
 
‘[t]he Constitution recognises the interrelationship between the environment and development; 
indeed, it recognises the need for the protection of the environment while at the same time it 
recognises the need for social and economic development. It contemplates the integration of 
environmental protection and socio-economic development. It envisages that environmental 
considerations will be balanced with socio-economic considerations through the ideal of 
sustainable development. This is apparent from section 24(b)(iii) …. Sustainable development 
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The same Court also commented on the importance of protecting the environment, how this 
links to other environmental rights, and the trusteeship of the present generation, in the 
following words:  
 
‘The importance of the protection of the environment cannot be gainsaid. Its protection is vital to 
the enjoyment of other rights contained in the Bill of Rights; indeed, it is vital to life itself. It must 
therefore be protected for the benefit of present and future generations. The present generation 
holds the earth in trust for the next generation. This trusteeship position carries with it the 
responsibility to look after the environment. It is the duty of the court to ensure that this 




The Court further stated that decision-makers who are guided by the concept of sustainable 
development will ensure socio-economic development that is ecologically rooted,
214
 and that 
the obligation to ensure that sustainability is reflected in government processes is primarily 
that of the judiciary.
215
 In analysing the Constitutional Court’s contribution in Fuel Retailers 
to an understanding of section 24, Kotzé and du Plessis lament the fact that the Court failed to 
bring new insights into the substantive meaning and scope of the environmental right itself 
(along with the BP and HTF judgments).
216
 They conclude their article by stating that ‘the 
elusive wording of section 24(a) and the ambiguity of the positive duties listed in section 
24(b) still leave room for speculation about the scope of the protection afforded by the 
environmental right; and the courts have to date only confirmed the generally accepted 
meaning of section 24’.
217
 In this regard, I suggest that it should not only be up to the courts 
to provide fresh insights into the meaning of the environmental right. Courts often are 
informed by scholarly analyses in a particular field - both domestic and international - 
especially where there is a paucity of primary authority on an issue. Such secondary 
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authorities can be persuasive, although courts are not obliged to follow academic writing. In 
the case of the South African Bill of Rights, many legal scholars who contributed to the 
formulation of section 24 of the Constitution have made substantial contributions to its 
interpretation, and continue to do so. I therefore suggest that new insights should not only 
emanate from the courts, but also from further scholarly analyses of the environmental right. 
Such fresh insights could enhance future interpretation of section 24 by the courts. One 
possibility is to give the environmental right a more ecocentric (or biocentric) interpretation 
than is currently the case. 
 
HTF was subsequently taken on appeal to the Supreme Court and finally came before the 
Constitutional Court.
218
 Here the issue at stake was the interpretation of certain provisions 
that required an interpretation that gives effect to the environmental right in section 24.
219
  In 
doing so, the late Skweyiya J quoted extensively from the earlier pronouncements of the 
same Court in Fuel Retailers, with obvious approval.
220
 He confirmed that: 
 
‘Under our Constitution, therefore, environmental protection must be balanced with socio-
economic development through the ideal of sustainable development. The concept of sustainable 





3.2.6 The environmental right and other rights 
There seems to be general agreement that the environmental right needs to be considered in 
relation to other rights in the Bill of Rights. In this regard Kidd states that while many of the 
rights are interconnected, it has been observed that it would be ‘anomalous to derive more 
extensive obligations from a particular right in circumstances where the specific interests at 
stake are expressly protected in a more limited form by another set of rights’.
222
 An in-depth 
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study of the relationship between the environmental right and other rights falls outside the 
direct objectives of this dissertation and will not be further pursued further in this study. 
 
3.2.7 Application and enforcement of the environmental right 
Kidd provides a useful working guide for the application of the environmental right as a 
whole by suggesting the following:  
(i) The right could be invoked by any person where it is necessary for that person to 
protect his or health or well-being, although this might rarely happen because of 
the existence of a large body of environmental legislation which gives effect to the 
right. Direct reliance on the constitutional right would furthermore be rare because 
of the principle of avoidance, which requires that remedies should be located in 
common law or legislation before relying directly on constitutional remedies.  
(ii) The right could be used as a ‘trigger’ for invoking the standing provision in 
section 38 of the Constitution.  
(iii) The environmental right should influence government actions, including 
legislative and executive decisions and policies, as it provides the underpinnings 
for enacting environmental legislation.  
(iv) The right should act as a guide to the interpretation of both the common law and 
all legislation (not only so-called environmental legislation) through section 39 of 




An analysis of the environmental right in section 24 would not be complete without briefly 
considering its enforcement, or justiciability, set out in section 38 of the Constitution, which 
reads:  
 
‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in 
the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, 
including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are -  
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
                                                          
223
 Kidd, op cit, 25-26. 
62 
 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acing as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.’ 
 
De Vos and Freedman state that the Constitution has adopted a ‘generous approach’ towards 
legal standing,
224
 and the Constitutional Court has held in a number of cases that a 
complainant does not have to show that he or she has a ‘direct or personal interest’ in the 
relief sought. All that is required is for a complainant to allege that one of the fundamental 
rights in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and that one of the categories of 
persons listed in section 38 has a ‘sufficient interest’ in obtaining a remedy.
225
 Kotzé and Du 
Plessis point out that the provisions in NEMA on standing largely mirror the equivalent 
provisions in the Constitution, but differ in a significant respect in that they also allow any 
person or group of persons to seek judicial recourse where that person or persons act on 
behalf of the environment,
226
 and not only on behalf of that person or persons where their 
environmental interests are affected. This makes the NEMA provisions more ecocentric, as 
opposed to the more anthropocentric approach in the Bill of Rights.
227
 Kidd submits that 
whilst the standing provision has been broadened significantly in the Constitution compared 
to the common law position, it is unlikely that section 38 will ‘find much use in conjunction 
with section 24’.
228
 The reason for this is that it would usually be more appropriate to use the 




The above analysis of the application and enforcement of the environmental right serves as an 
important reminder to organs of state that they can be challenged before a competent court 
for failure to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by section 24, on the basis that such 
failure infringes or threatens a complainant’s environmental rights. 
 
3.3 Summary of Obligations Imposed by section 24 
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In this chapter of the study I did a detailed analysis of the nature and scope of the substantive 
obligations imposed on organs of state, more specifically on provincial organs of state, by 
section 24 (read with sections 7(2), 8(1) and 38) of the Constitution. This analysis lead me to 
the following conclusions: 
(i) Provinces have an obligation to enact legislation and institute other measures for 
the protection of the environment that: (i) prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development. 
(ii) Such legislation must be reasonable and must be implemented reasonably. 
(iii) The legislation must protect the environment for the benefit of present and future 
generations. Section 24 therefore places a trusteeship duty on the present 
generation. 
(iv) Legislative measures by themselves are not likely to constitute compliance with 
the Constitution and have to be supported by other measures such as policies, 
guidelines and programmes to be implemented by environmental authorities and 
the executive. 
(v) These policies, guidelines and programmes must also be reasonable, both in their 
conception and implementation, to constitute compliance with the state’s 
obligations. 
(vi) Section 24 provides the underpinnings for provincial organs of state to enact 
legislation and take other measures for the protection of the environment.  
(vii) The environmental right is justiciable and, consequently, failure to comply with 
the obligations placed on organs of state by section 24 may be challenged in a 
competent court as provided for in section 38 of the Constitution. 
 
However, the above conclusions on the substantive obligations of provinces to enact 
legislation for the protection of the environment lead one to ask whether these obligations 
compel a province to enact legislation, whether there is a need for such legislation, or not. I 
submit that that is not what is envisaged by the Constitution, nor is it implied in this study. 
Thus, where there is sufficient legislation in existence on a particular aspect of the 
environment, provinces are not compelled to enact legislation on the same matter. On the 
64 
 
other hand, where a province identifies specific environmental needs or has concerns not 
adequately provided for by national legislation and other instruments, a province must fulfil 
their environmental obligations. For instance, where a province identifies loss or potential 
loss of biodiversity in that province because of pressure on a particular species or subspecies 
of flora or fauna endemic to the province, not adequately catered for in national legislation, 
that province has an obligation to act. Another similar example of where a province should 
act is when there is progressive loss of habitat and ecosystems, such as in KwaZulu-Natal, 
which poses a serious threat to biodiversity. Of course, nothing prevents a province from 
discussing such issues at the appropriate intergovernmental fora established under the 
constitutional provisions on co-operative government and intergovernmental relations 
(discussed in paragraph 2.4 of chapter 2 above) and the National Environmental Management 
Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA). At executive level there are also intergovernmental fora, for 
instance the so called ‘MINMECs’.
230
 But, this often is a lengthy process which may only 
yield results once the harm has been done. Problems caused by long delays in finalising 
national legislative and policy measures were specifically brought to the attention of the 
drafters of the proposed new environmental legislation for KwaZulu-Natal. Another example 
of where provinces ought to give effect to their environmental obligations is where there 
remains fragmented, outdated and old order legislation, often containing unconstitutional 
provisions, on their stature books. This aspect is discussed in detail in chapter 5 below. Thus, 
in answer to the question on when provincial obligations to enact environmental legislation 
arise, I submit that the Constitution does not envisage such legislation as just a ‘gap-filling’ 
exercise, as will be clarified in the detailed analysis of the legislative authority of provinces in 
chapter 4 below. At the same time care should be taken to avoid overregulation and 
conflicting legislative provisions. Chapter 4 therefore provides a detailed analysis of the 




I conclude this chapter with a brief explanation of the relationship between the environmental 
right in the Constitution and the functional areas of concurrent and exclusive provincial 
legislative competence. 
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3.4 The Relationship between the Environmental Right and Schedules 4 and 5 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution list functional areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence and functional areas of exclusive legislative competence 
respectively. The Constitution also provides that a provincial legislature may pass legislation 
for its province on any matter within a functional area listed in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5.
232
 
The functional areas listed in Schedule 4 include ‘Environment’ as well as other areas that 
fall within the broad concept ‘environment’. Schedule 5, in turn, also includes functional 
areas that fall within the wider notion of ‘environment’. This means that there is clearly a 
direct link between the environmental right and Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. This is 






ENACTING PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION 
 
4.1 Overview 
Chapter 3 provided an analysis of the nature and scope of section 24 of the Bill of Rights and 
the obligations it imposes on, particularly, provincial organs of state to protect the 
environment through reasonable legislative measures. In line with the second research 
objective set for this dissertation, the enquiry now turns to the legislative authority
234
 and 
concurrent and exclusive competence of provinces
235
 to take legislative measures for the 
protection of the environment. Part I presents a detailed analysis of the constitutional 
provisions underpinning provincial legislative authority and the Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of those provisions, which, together, provide the jurisprudential foundation for 
the conclusions reached in that regard. Scholarly analysis further informs the study. Because 
‘environment’
236
 is a functional area of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence, the potential for conflicts between national and provincial legislation arises. Part 
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II therefore sets out how conflicts between national and provincial legislation are to be 
resolved. This enquiry demands an analysis of section 146 of the Constitution, which 
provides for the resolution of such conflicts. The evolution of section 146 through its 
different guises to its current form is also tracked as it provides greater insight into the scope 
and purpose of the section.  
  
Part I 
The Authority of Provinces to Enact Legislation for the Protection of the Environment 
 
4.2 Respecting, Protecting, Promoting and Fulfilling the Environmental Right 
Heyns and Brand
237
 point out that the most important general provision which describes the 
duties imposed on the state by the rights in the Bill of Rights is section 7(2). This subsection 
enjoins the state to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’.
238
 It 
follows that the environmental right in the Bill of Rights can be no exception, and 
consequently places an obligation on the state, including provincial organs of state, to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the environmental right. Heyns and Brand submit that whilst the 
exact meaning of these terms is not defined in the Constitution, international jurisprudence 
does provide some guidelines, namely: 1) the obligation to ‘respect’ means that the state itself 
has a negative duty not to interfere with the existing enjoyment of these rights; 2) the duty to 
‘protect’ places a positive duty on the state to protect the bearers of these rights from 
unwarranted interference by private or non-state parties, or at least to provide effective 
remedies where that happens; 3) the obligation to ‘promote’ imposes a positive duty on the 
state to ensure that people are aware of their rights; and 4) the obligation to ‘fulfil’ refers to 
the positive obligation on the state to ensure the full realisation of the rights in question.
239
 
Liebenberg, in similar vein, states that the ‘Constitution places an overarching obligation on 
the state’, and that section 7 ‘establishes that the rights in the Bill of Rights impose a 
combination of negative and positive duties on the state’.
240
 Furthermore, the binding nature 
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of these provisions on the state is made clear in section 8 (1) of the Constitution, which reads: 
‘The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary 
and all organs of state’.  
 
From the above analysis of the duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the environmental 
right, I conclude that the general provisions in sections 7(2) and 8(1) do not only describe the 
overarching obligations imposed on the state by the environmental right, but also provide the 
context within which the legislative measures to be taken by provinces to meet those 
obligations must be understood. Further, it illuminates what the objectives and content of 
such legislative measures should include. Therefore, when enacting legislation in pursuance 
of their environmental obligations, legislators must bear in mind that their legislative task 
includes the obligation to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the environmental right. This 
task must also be informed by the meaning and scope of sections 24
241
 and 104, read with 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. The latter provisions are analysed immediately below. 
 
4.3 Section 104 and Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution 
This enquiry commences with an examination of what Madlingozi and Woolman refer to as 
‘substantive constraints on provincial legislative authority’.
242
 The first step in the enquiry is 
a critical appraisal of the nature and scope of section 104 of the Constitution, which sets out 
the legislative authority of provinces.  Of specific relevance to this study are the following 
provisions of the section:  
 
(1) The legislative authority of a province is vested in its provincial legislature, and confers on 
the provincial legislature the power - 
(a) to pass a constitution for its province or to amend any constitution passed by it in terms of 
sections 142 and 143; 
(b) to pass legislation for its province with regard to  
(i) any matter within a functional area listed in Schedule 4; 
(ii) any matter within a functional area listed in Schedule 5; 
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(iii) any matter outside those functional areas, and that is expressly assigned to the 
province by national legislation; and 
(iv) any matter for which a provision of the Constitution envisages the enactment of 
provincial legislation; and  
(c) to assign any of its legislative powers to a Municipal Council in that province. 
(3) A provincial legislature is bound only by the Constitution and, if it has passed a constitution 
for its province, also by that constitution, and must act in accordance with, and within the 
limits of, the Constitution and that provincial constitution. 
(4) Provincial legislation with regard to a matter that is reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, 
the effective exercise of a power concerning any matter listed in Schedule 4, is for all 
purposes legislation with regard to a matter listed in Schedule 4. 
(5) A provincial legislature may recommend to the National Assembly (NA) legislation 
concerning any matter outside the authority of that legislature, or in respect of which an act of 




I will now briefly analyse each of the above cited subsections, and then draw conclusions 
pertinent to the determination of the legislative authority of provinces to meet their 
environmental obligations. 
 
4.3.1. Section 104(1)(a) - provincial constitutions 
This subsection gives a province the authority to pass or amend a constitution for its 
province, in accordance with sections 142 and 143 of the Constitution. Madlingozi and 
Woolman argue that this competence appears to extend the legislative competence conferred 
on a provincial legislature by section 104, but that an analysis of the Constitutional Court 
provincial certification judgments suggests that sections 142 and 143 do not create a 
‘meaningfully independent basis for the exercise of power by provinces’, and, unless the 
Court fundamentally changes its interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions, or 
those provisions are amended, ‘provincial constitutions will never amount to anything more 
than window dressing’.
244
 I will briefly comment on this point under the analysis of the 
various certification judgments in paragraph 4.5 below. 
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4.3.2. Section 104(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and Schedules 4 and 5 
The Constitution allocates legislative powers between the national and provincial government 
on the basis of the subject matter of the legislation, and the nine provinces are entitled to 
legislate, amongst others, on the subjects listed as ‘functional areas’ in Schedules 4 and 5 of 
the Constitution, which must be read with section 104(1)(b)(i) and (ii).
245
 For the purpose of 
this study I will focus on those listed functional areas which could be brought within the 
ambit of the ‘environment’ as envisaged by section 24. 
 
4.3.2.1 Schedule 4 - concurrent national and provincial legislative competence 
Schedule 4 lists ‘Functional Areas of Concurrent National and Provincial Legislative 
Competence’, and is divided into ‘Part A’ and ‘Part B’. Part A lists a number of functional 
areas which could fall within the ambit of the concept ‘environment’. Such functional areas 
are ‘Administration of indigenous forests’, ‘Cultural matters’, ‘Nature Conservation, 
excluding national parks, national botanical gardens and marine resources’, ‘Pollution 
control’, ‘Regional planning and development’, ‘Soil conservation’, ‘Tourism’, and ‘Urban 
and rural development, with ‘Environment’ listed separately as an area of concurrent 
competence.
246
 The list of functional areas in Part B is preceded by a provision that restricts 
their application to: ‘[t]he following local government matters to the extent set out in section 
155(6)(a) and (7)’. An examination of Schedule 4 Part B falls outside the direct scope of this 
study and will therefore not be pursued in this dissertation. 
 
Madlingozi and Woolman explain the term ‘concurrent’ used in Schedule 4 as meaning that 
both the national Parliament and the various provincial legislatures possess the power to pass 
laws on the same matters. They submit that concurrent legislative competence has several 
practical implications for the exercise of legislative authority by the national government, and 
that Parliament cannot: 1) prevent provincial legislatures from enacting legislation on any of 
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the listed functional areas; 2) veto provincial legislation; or 3) block provincial initiatives that 




4.3.2.2 Schedule 5 – exclusive provincial legislative competence 
Section 104(1)(b)(ii) grants provinces exclusive original legislative authority over all matters 
listed in Schedule 5. This Schedule is also divided into ‘Part A’ and ‘Part B’. In Part A the 
functional areas which could, similar to Part A of Schedule 4, be interpreted as falling within 
the ambit of the concept ‘environment’ are: ‘Museums other than national museums’, 
‘Provincial planning’, ‘Provincial cultural matters’, also possibly ‘Provincial recreation and 
amenities’, ‘Provincial roads and traffic’, and ‘Veterinary services, excluding regulation of 
the profession’.
248
 Part B list ‘local government matters to the extent set out for provinces in 
section 155(6)(a) and (7)’. For reasons stated above, I will not pursue an analysis of Schedule 
5, Part B in this study. 
 
There is often a perception that provinces only have concurrent, but not exclusive legislative 
competence on the environment. I submit that considering the subject matter of the various 
functional areas listed in Part A of Schedule 5, it could be argued that provinces do have 
exclusive legislative competence in respect of certain aspects included in the broad notion of 
‘environment’, particularly in those areas cited above. In the Liquor Bill judgment the Court 
gives examples of concurrent Schedule 4 competences which could overlap with Schedules 5 
competencies, and cites, amongst other, ‘environment’ and ‘provincial planning’; ‘cultural 
matters’ and ‘provincial cultural matters’.
249
  However, it must be born in mind that whilst 
‘exclusive’ provincial legislative competence does suggest that only provincial legislatures 
are competent to pass legislation in the areas listed in Schedule 5, section 44(2) of the 
Constitution permits the national legislature to intervene, i.e. to legislate in respect of 
functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence. This national authority may 
be exercised only to the extent that national legislation is:  
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(a) to maintain national security; 
(b) to maintain economic unity; 
(c) to maintain essential national standards; 
(d) to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or  
(e) to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of 




In the First Certification Judgment, the Court stated that: ‘[t]his power of intervention is 
defined and limited. Outside that limit the exclusive provincial power remains intact, and 
beyond the legislative competence of Parliament.’
251
 It also held that if regard is had to the 
nature of the exclusive competences in Schedule 5 and the requirements of section 44(2), ‘the 
occasion for intervention by Parliament is likely to be limited’.
252
 In the Liquor Bill
253
 
judgment (discussed in detail in paragraph 4.3.6 below) Cameron AJ (as he then was) refers 
to these pronouncements by the Court, thus reinforcing the Court’s earlier interpretation of 





In concluding the analysis above of section 104 and Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution, 
there can be little doubt that provinces have the legislative competence to pass legislation for 
the protection of the environment on: (a) the functional area ‘environment’ and related areas 
(cited above) listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution; and (b) the functional areas (cited 
above) included in the broad concept ‘environment’ listed in Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
For instance, such legislation may afford protection to indigenous forests in a particular 
province in order to conserve ecosystems or threatened plant species that are under threat or 
exist only in that province. Further examples could be legislation on the control of invasive 
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species, other than alien species, growing on provincial road reserves which may only be a 
problem in a certain province; and the protection of cultural heritage sites threatened by 
development.  
 
4.3.3 Section 104(1)(b)(iii) – matters assigned to provinces by national legislation 
Section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the Constitution expressly provides that Parliament has the power to 
‘assign any of its legislative powers, except the power to amend the Constitution, to any 
legislative body in another sphere of government’. This power is known as legislative inter-
delegation, and requires an Act of Parliament. Such an assignment extends legislative powers 
to a provincial legislature for as long as the Act remains in force, and once a power to 
legislate is assigned to a province, Parliament is no longer competent to legislate in such an 
area, until the assignment is repealed by national legislation. If the assignment is repealed, 
provincial laws already made under the now repealed Act remain valid, although a province 
would no longer have the power to make any additional laws in respect of the matters that 
were assigned to them (and subsequently repealed) as it would no longer have the necessary 
assigned legislative competence. At the same time, Parliament would not have the power to 
repeal extant provincial laws as it does not have the legislative competence to repeal 




Following the above discussion on matters assigned to provinces by national legislation, I 
submit that the provisions of section 44(1)(a)(iii), which give the NA the constitutional 
authority to assign ‘any’ of its legislative powers (except the power to amend the 
Constitution) to any legislative body in another sphere of government, seem to open up the 
possibility (at least in principle) for the NA to assign its concurrent competence in respect of 
the environment and related matters to a provincial legislature. In the unlikely event that this 
should happen, provinces would have their legislative authority extended, and would 
consequently enjoy exclusive legislative competence in respect of the environment (i.e. until 
such assignment is repealed by Parliament).  
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4.3.4 Section 104(1)(b)(iv) – constitutional provisions which envisage enactment of 
provincial legislation 
In Limpopo I the Court considered whether the power to pass legislation regulating the 
financial management of a provincial legislature was ‘envisaged’ by the Constitution. 
Pursuing the theme of maximum clarity in respect of the allocation of legislative powers to 
the various spheres espoused in the judgment, the Constitutional Court adopted a restrictive 
approach in their argument. It held that only those provisions in the Constitution which, ‘in 
clear terms, provide for the enactment of provincial legislation’, fell under section 
104(1)(b)(iv). It went on to say that our constitutional scheme does not allow ‘legislative 
powers to be implied’. The Court argued that if it were otherwise, the constitutional scheme 
for the allocation of legislative powers would be undermined, and the ‘careful delineation 
between the legislative competence of Parliament and that of provincial legislatures would be 
blurred’. The Court also felt that implied legislative powers would result in uncertainty about 
the legislative powers of provinces.
256
 The Court then cites section 155(5) of the Constitution, 
which provides that provincial legislation must determine the different types of municipalities 
to be established in a province, as an example of an express provision where the Constitution 
envisages the enactment of provincial legislation.
257
 The Court also cites a number of other 




Sections 142 and 143 (read with section 104(1)(a) are further examples of provisions which 
give a province the express constitutional authority to enact legislation in the form of a 
constitution for its province. This is relevant to this study because a provincial constitution 
may provide for a Bill of Rights which extends the environmental right in the Bill of Rights. 
In the KwaZulu-Natal Certification
259
 judgment, the Constitutional Court held that a 
provincial bill of rights could (in respect of matters falling within the province’s powers) 
place greater limitations on the province’s powers or confer greater rights on individuals than 
does the IC, and it could even confer rights on individuals which do not exist in the IC. (This 
judgment is discussed in detail in paragraph 4.5 below.) In addition, section 24(b), discussed 
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in chapter 3 above, envisages ‘reasonable legislative measures’ to be taken by provinces for 
the protection of the environment. The Bill of Rights also places certain other binding 
obligations on provinces (as organs of state) to take legislative measures pertaining to the 
realisation of certain rights. Examples in this regard are sections 25(5) and (7) (‘property’); 
26(2) (‘housing’); 27(2) (‘health care, food, water and social security’); and 29(1)(b) 
(‘education’). These sections all relate, at least to some extent, to the concepts ‘health’ and 
‘well-being’ envisaged in the environmental right, and underscores the proposition that rights 
in the Bill of Rights are interrelated, and cannot be read in isolation from one another.  
 
Following the discussion in the preceding paragraph on constitutional provisions which 
‘envisage’ enactment of provincial legislation, I submit that the Constitution needs to be 
examined in its totality to determine which provisions envisage the enactment of provincial 
legislation which may impact directly or indirectly on the realisation of the environmental 
right. However, this dissertation focuses primarily on the enactment of provincial 
environmental legislation within the listed functional areas of provincial legislative 
competence related to the environment, and a more detailed analysis of where the 
Constitution ‘envisages’ the enactment of provincial legislation will not be pursued. 
However, this may be a fruitful area for future research. 
 
4.3.5 Section 104(3) – provinces bound by the Constitution and provincial constitutions 
A province derives original legislative authority from the Constitution, and in terms of 
section 104(3) is bound only by the Constitution and its own provincial constitution (where it 
exists). Therefore, when enacting provincial legislation for the protection of the environment, 
provinces must act in accordance with, and within the limits of the Constitution and their own 





4.3.6 Section 104(4) – provincial legislation reasonably necessary or incidental (incidental 
power) 
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This subsection confers incidental legislative powers on a province, and provincial legislation 
enacted under this provision is for all purposes legislation with regard to a matter listed in 
Schedule 4, i.e. concurrent legislation. This implies that where the incidental legislative 
power conferred on provinces by section 104(4) is invoked in the enactment of provincial 
legislation, the scope of Schedule 4 is effectively extended.  
 
In the Liquor Bill case the Court held that the phrase ‘reasonably necessary for, or incidental 
to’ should be interpreted as meaning ‘reasonably necessary for and reasonably incidental 
to’.
261
 Bronstein states that in DVB Behuising the incidental legislative power was an 
important factor in the outcome of the matter.
262
 She goes on to say that one of the central 
issues in this case turns on a simple question of categorisation, i.e. whether the Proclamation 
(which was the subject of the dispute) could be classified as fitting into the list of legislative 
competences of the provinces as set out in Schedule 6 of the IC.
263
 In the majority judgment 
Justice Ngcobo held that: 
 
‘I am satisfied that the ‘tenure’ and deeds registration provisions of the Proclamation were 
inextricably linked to the other Provisions in the Proclamation and were foundational to the 
planning, regulation and control of settlements. These provisions were an integral part of the 
legislative scheme of the Proclamation and accordingly fell within schedule 6.’264 
 
Hence, the Court held that the tenure provisions in the Proclamation were within the 
competence of the provincial government. However, Bronstein argues that one problem with 
DVB Behuising is that ‘although the reasoning of the majority judgment is convincing, it 
provides no clear system for establishing the scope of the incidental power’, and that the 
judgment may give the impression that there are no meaningful doctrinal grounds for judges 
to regard a particular power as incidental to a provincial power, or to regard a matter as one 
that should be reserved for the national legislature.
265
 She says a second problem with the 
majority judgment is that it does ‘not explore the proper perspective for looking at a 
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legislative scheme when assessing whether provisions – which are essentially out of place in 
a piece of provincial legislation- are acceptable on the basis of the incidental power.’
266
 It 
follows that the perspective that one adopts will determine what you see – the broader your 
perspective, the more likely you are to see the provisions under scrutiny as necessary or 
incidental to a broader scheme.
267
 Bronstein also suggests that in approaching the incidental 
power, comparative law must be used with caution in ‘federalism cases’, as each federal 
system ‘reflects pragmatic and context-specific responses to political power relations in a 
particular country’.
268
 She argues that there is clearly a need for a relatively straightforward 
and uncontroversial method of analysis to determine what must be incidental or necessary to 
what; and that the Canadian Supreme Court has provided a useful analytical framework in 
City National Leasing.
269
 The test laid down in this case requires the Court to: 1) inquire into 
the subject matter of the specific provisions being challenged (the ‘impugned provisions’). 
The impugned provisions need to be interpreted naturally and in context, but after that their 
role must be looked at in isolation for the purpose of characterisation.
270
 If the impugned 
provisions ‘can stand alone’ because they are within the powers of the particular legislature, 
they need ‘no other support’. If not, the analysis must continue. If the impugned provisions 
intrude into the exclusive legislative sphere of another level of government, it is necessary to 
establish the extent of the incursion. That is, the court must determine how invasive the 
intrusion is. 2) The court must ask whether the impugned provision is part of a broader 
legislative scheme that is within the competence of a particular legislature. Once it is clear 
that the provision does intrude, the next task is to establish whether the impugned provision 
can be construed as valid in the context of the broad legislative scheme. Conceptually a 
legislative scheme may include the entire statute, or it may consist of part of a statute that 
could have been enacted alone and can be severed from the rest of the law, and in some cases 
a legislative scheme may consist of a number of statutes intended to govern different aspects 
of a common field. Once such a scheme has been identified, it must be decided whether the 
subject matter of the scheme is within the power of the enacting legislature. If so, ‘the 
relationship between the particular impugned provision and the scheme’ must be scrutinized. 
The court should then ask how well the provision is integrated into the scheme of the 
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legislation and how important it is for the efficacy of the legislation.
271
 In this regard the 
Canadian courts follow a proportional exercise: the more a provision encroaches, the more 
essential the provision must be to an otherwise valid legislative scheme in order to be 
considered ‘incidental’; the less it encroaches, the easier it will be to persuade a court that it 
should survive.
272
 The City National Leasing Court cites various cases where courts have 
considered the nature of the relationship required between a provision which encroaches on 
provincial jurisdiction and a valid statute, for the provision to be upheld, and set down 
slightly different requirements in different courts, viz.: ‘rational and functional connection’, 
‘ancillary’, ‘necessarily incidental’, ‘truly necessary’, ‘intimate connection’, ‘an integral 
part’, ‘necessarily incidental’, a ‘valid constitutional cast by the context and association in 
which it is fixed as a complementary provision’. Here Dickson CJC commented that all the 
tests cannot be identical, because as the seriousness of an encroachment on provincial powers 





Bronstein states that at ‘the point beyond which incidental power cannot go’, the Canadian 
approach seems sensible, and coheres with the majority judgment in DVB Behuising. She 
argues that when interpreting the scope of the incidental power it seems best to start with a 
broad assumption that almost any impugned provision can be saved and found to be 
‘legislation with regard to a matter listed in Schedule 4’ as envisaged in sections 44 (3) and 
104 (4) of the Constitution. Such an assumption can be justified because ‘any incidental 
power automatically operates in an area of de facto provincial and national concurrency’, and 
when a court needs to ‘draw a line beyond which a provincial legislature cannot go, it is not 
appropriate to limit the scope of the incidental power’ – section 146 is the more appropriate 
place for such an analysis.
274
 Bronstein also points out that another ‘rule of thumb’ that has 
been suggested to define the scope of the incidental power is where the ‘end’ intended by the 
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In considering the scope of the incidental power in relation to Schedule 5 competences, 
Bronstein points out that there is no specific constitutional provision which regulates this. In 
this regard the Court pointed out in the First Certification Judgment that the allocation of 
necessary ancillary powers is not expressly made in regard to the powers of provinces listed 
in Schedule 5, but since Schedule 5 ‘defines the exclusive powers of the provinces, the 
provinces would necessarily also be the repository of powers incidental to the powers vested 




  The Court also held that although the NT does not 
specifically authorise provinces to enact legislation authorising the imposition of user 
charges, such a power would be within the ‘express or implied power to legislate with regard 
to matters reasonably necessary for or incidental to the effective exercise of a NT sch 4 or 5 
competence’.
278
 Moreover, the court held that it cannot ‘seriously be suggested that provinces 
cannot pass legislation making provision for a user charge for abattoirs, health services, 
public transport, etc. In so far as charges might be raised which are unrelated to the actual use 
of services provided, they would be within the general power to impose rates and levies’.
279
 
Although these comments specifically refer to ‘user charges’, I submit that the same 
principles would apply to incidental provincial powers to legislate with regard to matters 
reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective exercise of any other competence, 
whether in respect of an area listed in Schedule 4 or 5.  
 
In line with the discussion on section 104(1)(b)(iii) above, Bronstein submits that legislation 
that was competent when it was passed cannot later become incompetent, and that such an 
approach seems to be the most coherent, although the answer is not always self-evident.
280
 
She illustrates this by posing the hypothetical question of what happens to a legislative 
provision that was valid because of the incidental power when the rest of the legislative 
scheme upon which it depends is repealed, and that provision is left standing. Bronstein 
contends that it is reasonable to conclude that such a provision would be invalidated on the 
grounds that it is no longer ‘reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective exercise 
of a power concerning any matter listed in Schedule 4’.
281
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The above analysis of the incidental legislative authority in section 104(4) indicates that 
rather than acting as a constraint on provincial legislative powers, this provision can at times 
serve to broaden and extend the legislative authority of provinces to a degree where a 
provincial legislature may even validly legislate in areas of exclusive national legislative 
competence. 
 
4.3.7 Section 104(5) – recommendation by provincial legislature to National Assembly 
Although this subsection forms part of section 104 which provides for the legislative 
authority of provinces, it only enables provinces to recommend to the NA legislation 
concerning any matter: a) outside the provincial authority; or b) in respect of which an Act of 
Parliament prevails. It does not give provinces the authority to enact such legislation 
themselves, and therefore falls outside the scope of this study and will not be pursued.   
 
4.4 Legislative Constraints Imposed by the Legality Principle 
Budlender points out that the legality principle which flows from the rule of law is binding on 
all legislative and executive organs of state in all spheres of government.
282
 This principle 
was first articulated in Fedsure, where the Court held that the legality principle provided that 
legislative and executive organs of state ‘may exercise no power and perform no function 
beyond that conferred on them by law’.
283
 In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers the Court stated 
that ‘the exercise of public power … should not be arbitrary’; and decisions must be 
‘rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in fact 
arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement’.
284
 The Court made it clear that the question 
whether a decision is rationally related to the purpose for which it was given, ‘calls for an 
objective enquiry’.
285
 The significance of the legality principle was further clarified in New 
National Party, where Yacoob J stated that:  
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‘Courts do not review provisions of Acts on the grounds that they are unreasonable. They will do 
so only if they are satisfied that the legislation is not rationally connected to a legitimate 
government purpose. In such circumstances, review is competent because the legislation is 





The effect of these pronouncements by Yacoob J is that laws and acts that are not rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose are unconstitutional, because arbitrariness is 
inconsistent with the legality principle.
 




However, Budlender cautions that the legality principle must not be conflated with the more 
stringent test of ‘reasonableness’.
288
 He cites Pharmaceutical Manufacturers where the court 
explained the rationality standard as follows: 
  
‘[I]t does not mean that courts can or should substitute their opinions as to what is appropriate, for 
the opinions of those in whom the power has been vested. As long as the purpose sought to be 
achieved by the exercise of public power is within the authority of the functionary, and as long as 
the functionary’s decision, viewed objectively, is rational, a court cannot interfere with the 





The above discussion makes it clear that provincial legislative authority must be exercised 
rationally, and legislation enacted for the protection of the environment must be related to a 
legitimate government purpose, for instance to address loss of biodiversity, to meet the test of 
constitutionality.  
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4.5 The Legislative Authority of Provinces as Interpreted by the Courts 
Provincial powers have been a contentious and vigorously contested terrain from the outset, 
and the Constitutional Court has been called upon to analyse and interpret the nature and 
scope of provincial legislative authority almost from its inception. This is demonstrated by 
the following judgments:  
  
In the First Certification Judgment the Court concluded that the powers and functions of the 
provinces in terms of the new text before it (the NT) were ‘less than and inferior to’ the 
powers and functions which the provinces enjoyed under the IC.
290
 The Court then turned to 
the difficult question whether they were ‘substantially less than or substantially inferior’ to 
such powers, and concluded that, to the extent set out in the judgment, they were indeed 
‘substantially less than and inferior to the powers and functions of provinces in the IC’.
291
 
The provisions of section 146 (discussed in detail in part II of this chapter) were an important 
factor in the Court’s conclusion, specifically the so-called override provisions and the 
presumption in favour of national legislation, which were to apply to legislation in the entire 
field of concurrent powers. These provisions would have given added strength to national 
legislation and weakened the position of provinces should a conflict between competing 
legislation arise, and their ‘combined weight’ were ‘sufficient to be considered 
substantial’.
292
 The Court consequently decided not to certify the Constitution at that stage. 
 
In the Second Certification Judgment
293
 when the amended text (the AT) was placed before 
it, the central question facing the Court was whether the powers and functions of provinces in 
the AT were still substantially less than or inferior to those in the IC, and therefore still did 
not constitute compliance with constitutional principle (CP) XVIII.2.
294
 The Court analysed 
the various provisions in the IC, the NT and the AT and concluded that the ‘amendments to 
the NT contained in the AT 146(2) and (4) effectively restore the balance’ which had been 
tilted against the provinces in the NT, despite the fact that the powers and functions of the 
                                                          
290
First Certification Judgment, op cit, para 471. 
291
 Ibid, paras 472 and 482. 
292
 Ibid, paras 480-481. 
293
 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT 37/96) 
[1996] ZACC 24; 1997 (1) BCLR 1; 1997 (2) SA 97 (4 December 1996), para 145–204. 
294
 The IC, op cit, CP XVIII.2 provides that: ‘The powers and functions of the provinces defined in the 
Constitution, including the competence of a provincial legislature to adopt a constitution for its province, shall 
not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in this Constitution’.  
82 
 
provinces in terms of the AT are still less than or inferior to those accorded to the provinces 
in the IC, but ‘not substantially so’
295
.The Constitution was consequently certified on 4 
December 1996. The effect of the changes made to section 146 in the AT is discussed in Part 




 judgment was delivered on 6 September 1996, on the 
same day as the First Certification Judgment. This inescapably suggests that the Court would 
have considered the two constitutions submitted for certification from the same interpretative 
paradigm. In the KwaZulu-Natal Certification judgment, the Court stated that: ‘a province 
cannot by means of the bootstraps of its own constitution confer on its legislature greater 
powers than those granted it by the Interim Constitution’.
297
 However, on the chapter in the 
KwaZulu-Natal constitutional text containing the bill of rights, the court held that there ‘can 
in principle be no objection to a province embodying a bill of rights in its constitution’.
298
 In 
this regard the Court pointed out that section 160(1) of the IC, which conferred a general and 
unlimited right on a provincial legislature to pass a constitution, subject only to the 
inconsistency qualification in section 160(3), ‘neither prescribes nor proscribes any form or 
structure or content of such constitution’.
299
  The Court indicated that if this were the case, ‘it 
would require the clearest indication in the interim constitution that no bill of rights, of any 
nature, could be embodied in a provincial constitution duly passed pursuant to section 160(1). 
There is no indication of any such proscription.’
300
 In addition, the Court held that ‘... there is 
no indication in the interim Constitution that Chapter 3 was intended to deal “completely, 
exhaustively or exclusively” with fundamental rights at all levels of government. The only 
limitation on the content of a provincial constitution is the inconsistency provision in section 
160(3); but where the Interim Constitution itself embodies a bill of rights it cannot be argued 
that the mere presence of a bill of rights in a provincial constitution is, without more, 
inconsistent with the Interim Constitution or the constitutional Principles’.
301
 However, the 
Court points out that the powers of a provincial legislature to enact a bill of rights are limited 
in different ways. In the first place the legislature cannot provide for the provincial bill of 
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rights to operate in respect of matters which ‘fall outside its legislative or executive 
powers’.
302
 Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges that drafting a provincial bill of rights 




In respect of a ‘law’ which a province may competently make, the Court held that:  ‘there 
can, in principle, be no reason why the province may not limit its powers or confer rights, 
provided such provisions do not conflict with other provisions of the interim Constitution’.
304
  
For instance, a provincial bill of rights could (in respect of matters falling within the 
province’s powers) ‘place greater limitations on the province’s powers or confer greater 
rights on individuals than does the interim Constitution, and it could even confer rights on 
individuals which do not exist in the interim Constitution’.
305
 However, the Court made it 
clear that a province may not incorporate any provisions in its bill of rights which are 
‘inconsistent with’ similar provisions in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
306
 I submit that 
the Court used a bill of rights here as an example to illustrate a principle which would govern 
provincial law making generally. This submission is supported by the Court’s comments in 




An important question posed by the KwaZulu-Natal Certification Court is when such 
provisions would be ‘inconsistent with (onbestaanbaar met)’
308
 the provisions of the IC. The 
Court then formulated the following test in respect of inconsistency:  
 
‘We are of the view that a provision in a provincial bill of rights and a corresponding provision in 
Chapter 3
309
 are inconsistent when they cannot stand at the same time, or cannot stand together, or 
cannot both be obeyed at the same time. They are not inconsistent when it is possible to obey each 
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without disobeying the other. There is no principial or practical reason why such provisions 




In this regard, the Court stated that in applying this test it must be born in mind that the 
potential conflict in obedience arises when the provision in the provincial constitution has to 
be observed:  
 
‘The lesser limitation of power and the lesser right in Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution, 
postulated above, would be obeyed in the act of obeying the greater limitation of provincial power 
and the greater right in the provincial bill of rights, whereas there would be no room for 
inconsistency in respect of a new right, provided such new right did not, because of its particular 





The Court also stressed that the test for inconsistency only applies to inconsistencies arising 
from provisions which fall within provinces’ legislative competence. A different kind of 
inconsistency would be where a provincial legislature purports to provide in its constitution, 
whether in the bill of rights or elsewhere, matters outside of its legislative competence 
(emphasis added).
312
  A province cannot usurp powers and functions which it patently does 
not have.
313
 In such a case the purported provisions will not only be inconsistent, but also 
clearly unconstitutional. This is comprehensively demonstrated in this judgment, and was one 
of the primary reasons why the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution did not pass certification muster. 
 
Based on the KwaZulu-Natal Certification judgment the following general principles in 
respect of provincial legislative powers (which include powers to enact of environmental 
legislation) can be distilled: 
(i) Provinces can only legislate within their legislative authority derived from the 
Constitution, and attempts to usurp powers they do not have will be unconstitutional.  
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(ii)  Different provisions in national and provincial legislation on the same matter are not 
necessarily inconsistent or in conflict, as long as such provisions comply with the test 
formulated by the Constitutional Court in respect of inconsistency or conflicts 
between legislation, namely that legislative provisions are inconsistent when they 
cannot stand at the same time, or cannot stand together, or cannot both be obeyed at 
the same time. They are not inconsistent when it is possible to obey each without 
disobeying the other. There is no principial or practical reason why such provisions 
cannot operate together harmoniously in the same field.
314
 For instance: if a province 
were to enact legislation allowing persons in that province to carry out activities 
involving a specimen of a listed threatened or protected species without a permit, this 
would constitute a clear conflict with section 57(1) of NEMBA, which provides that a 
person ‘may not carry out a restricted activity involving a specimen of a listed 
threatened or protected species without a permit’. Such different and contradictory 
provisions in provincial and national legislation will be inconsistent as they cannot 
stand together, and cannot both be obeyed at the same time. On the other hand, if a 
province wanted to impose greater restrictions on activities involving a specimen of a 
listed or protected species in that province, it will not constitute a conflict with 
NEMBA. This is so because the activities restricted in terms of NEMBA, as well as 
the more onerous restrictions in the provincial legislation, can both be obeyed at the 
same time, i.e. they can operate harmoniously in the same field.  
(iii) In order to avoid conflicts between national and provincial legislation, the test for 
inconsistency laid down by the Constitutional Court must guide drafters and 
legislators of provincial legislation. This is equally so in the case of legislation aimed 
at protection of the environment, where there are a vast number of existing national 
legislative instruments.  
(iv) The arguments of the Court in respect of a bill of rights in a provincial constitution are 
also pertinent, and may indicate that a provincial constitution could possibly amount 
to more than mere window dressing, as postulated by Madlingozi and Woolman.
315
 
However, avoiding conflicts between a provincial bill of rights and the Bill of Rights 
in the Constitution, especially in respect of the environmental right, may be a difficult 
and complex task, as stated by the Court.
316
 I submit that such a task would involve, 
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as a bare minimum, careful consideration of: (a) the nature and scope of the right in 
section 24 of the Constitution and its relationship to other rights and the functional 
areas of provincial legislative competence; and (b) the need for a provincial 
constitution with its own bill of rights which includes an environmental right. The 
latter enquiry is beyond the objectives of this dissertation and therefore not pursued 
(v) In pursuance of its constitutional obligations to take legislative and other measures to 
protect the environment, a province may adopt a constitution for its province 
providing for an environmental right in a bill of rights which is greater (or lesser) than 
the environmental right in the Constitution, provided that such greater or lesser right 
does not have the effect of eliminating or limiting the right protected in the 
Constitution. 
 
The First Western Cape Certification
317
 judgment was decided in terms of the Constitution 
(the so-called ‘New’ Constitution (NC)). The Court concluded that the provisions relating to 
the constitution making powers of provinces under the IC and the NC are essentially the 
same.
318
 Of significance in this judgment are the Court’s pronouncements on the repetition of 
clauses of the NC in the Constitution of the Western Cape (WCC). In this regard, the Court 
stated that what appeared in the KwaZulu-Natal constitutional text was the repetition of 
matters which had nothing to do with provincial powers or competence. By contrast, in the 
WCC all of the provisions of the NC that are repeated ‘relate to matters which directly affect 
governance within the province’. The Court concluded that: ‘[i]t would indeed have been 
difficult for the WCC to be coherent and comprehensible without the repetition of those NC 
provisions which form the matrix for the related provisions of the WCC. We can find no fault 
with such provisions.’
319
 The Court elaborates on its pronouncements as follows: ‘[i]n 
particular the ANC objected to WCC 32 (1) on the ground that it purports to confer a 
competence on members of the Western Cape legislature to apply to the constitutional court 
for a declaration that a provincial Act is unconstitutional, thereby affecting the jurisdiction of 
this Court which is beyond the competence of the provincial legislature. We do not agree.’
320
 
The Court continues thus:  
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‘Certainly a provincial legislature does not have the power to expand or contract the scope of 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. In particular, it has no power to regulate access to this 
Court. But WCC 32(1) does not purport to confer such power on the Western Cape legislature by 
virtue of the WCC itself. Rather, the challenged clause merely mirrors NC 122(1), the source of 
power to regulate access by provincial legislators to the constitutional court. It is not an attempt at 




The Court therefore concluded that the objection cited above and similar objections ‘must 
fail’.
322
 The Court cautioned, however, that: ‘where provisions of the NC are repeated in the 
WCC, any future amendment of the NC provision in respect of a matter falling outside the 
competence of the provincial parliament under NC 104(1) or NC 143 would to that extent 
render the repeated provision in the WCC unconstitutional and of no effect’.
323
 With regard 
to the provincial legislature being referred to as ‘Provincial Parliament’ in the WCC (as 
opposed to the term provincial ‘legislature’ used in the Constitution), the Court  held that 
there was no express inconsistency – the ‘difference is one of form and not substance’.
324
 In 
reference to the signing, safekeeping, publication and commencement of a provincial 
constitution, the Court acknowledged that the provision repeats the provisions the NC 145, 
save that it requires additional publication of the provincial constitution in the official gazette 
of the province. However, the Court was of the view that it falls impliedly within the 
province’s constitution-making power, and does ‘not amount to an inconsistency with the 
NC’.
325
 The Court therefore withheld certification of the WCC in this judgment on ‘limited 
grounds of inconsistency only’.
326
 These grounds all relate to areas where the Western Cape 
lacked constitution-making powers. After the Western Cape legislature dealt with the 





From the Western Cape Certification judgments, the following conclusions relevant to this 
study, particularly on the content of provincial legislation, may be drawn: 
                                                          
321
 Ibid, para 25.  
322
 Ibid, para 26. 
323
 Ibid, para 27. 
324
 Ibid, para 39. 
325
 Ibid, para 41. 
326
 Ibid, para 86. 
327
 Certification of the amended text of the Constitution of the Western Cape, CCT 29/97. 
88 
 
(i) Repetition (or ‘mirroring’) of provisions of national legislation in provincial 
legislation can be done, but only in areas where provinces have legislative authority 
conferred on them by the Constitution.  
(ii)  Provisions in a provincial Act legislating on matters that fall within an area of 
provincial legislative competence, which repeat provisions in a national Act, will not 
necessarily be rendered unconstitutional merely by virtue of an amendment to such 
provisions in the national Act. However, it is a possibility which should be born in 
mind when drafting provincial legislation.   
(iii) Care should be taken not to confuse form and substance when drafting provincial 
legislation, and to be wary of reading a conflict into anything that appears different on 
the face of it. 
(iv) A requirement in provincial legislation to publish the legislation in an official 
provincial government Gazette in addition to publishing it in a national Gazette, does 
not amount to an inconsistency with the Constitution. 
 
The pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in the Liquor Bill
328
 judgment, particularly 
in respect of areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence, are of great significance. 
Some of the issues the Liquor Bill Court had to consider were:  a) whether Parliament could 
intervene in ‘liquor licences’, a functional area of exclusive provincial competence listed in 
Schedule 5; b) the Western Cape government’s attack on the extent to which the Bill intruded 
in an area of exclusive provincial legislative competence by permitting national intervention 
in provincial powers to regulate retail liquor licensing; and c) whether such intrusion was 
necessary. The Court therefore felt it had to determine the scope of the exclusive provincial 
legislative competence within the functional area of ‘liquor licences’, which in turn required 
‘consideration of the national and provincial context against which that exclusive competence 
is afforded’.
329
 In doing so the Court held that:  
 
‘The constitution makers’ allocation of powers to the national and provincial spheres appears to 
have proceeded from a functional vision of what was appropriate to each sphere, and accordingly 
the competences itemised in Schedules 4 and 5 are referred to as being in respect of “functional 
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The Court also found it significant that section 104(1)(b) confers powers on each province to 
pass legislation ‘for its province’, which makes it clear from the onset that the Schedule 5 
competences must be interpreted as conferring power on each province to legislate in the 
‘exclusive domain’ of its own province only.
331
 Therefore, ‘where provinces are accorded 
exclusive powers these should be interpreted as applying primarily to matters which may 
appropriately be regulated intra-provincially’.
332
 The Court’s comments on what may be 
deemed ‘necessary’ to justify national intervention in functional areas of exclusive provincial 
competence, as envisaged by section 44(2) of the Constitution, are instructive: 
 
‘While the Minister’s evidence in my view shows that the national interest necessitated legislating 
a unified and comprehensive national system of registration for the manufacture and distribution 
of liquor, it failed to do so in respect of its retail sale. There, he averred only that “consistency of 
approach” is “important”. This may be true. But importance does not amount to necessity, and the 
desirability from the national government’s point of view of consistency in this field cannot 
warrant national legislative intrusion into the exclusive provincial competence, and no other 




From the Liquor Bill judgment the following conclusions of direct relevance to provincial 
legislative authority and areas of competence may be drawn: 
(i) The powers of the national and provincial spheres are derived from a functional vision 
of what is appropriate to each sphere, hence the use of the term ‘functional areas’ in 
Schedules 4 and 5. The ambit of provincial powers must be interpreted in accordance 
with that vision. 
(ii) Provinces may only pass legislation applicable within their own provincial 
boundaries. 
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(iii) Evidence is required to establish whether a provision in national legislation is 
‘necessary’ as opposed to merely ‘important’ (or even desirable) when deciding 
whether national legislation prevails over provincial legislation in terms of section 
146(2)(c) of the Constitution (discussed in part II of this chapter). 
 
I conclude part I of this chapter on the enactment of provincial legislation by emphasising the 
conclusions that may be drawn from the Habitat Council judgment, discussed above, which 
go to heart of this study, namely that provincial government, as a sphere of government in its 
own right, operating within a non-hierarchical system of government, enjoys original and 
constitutionally entrenched powers, functions, rights and duties that may only be constrained 





Conflicting Laws (section 146-150) 
 
4.6 Introduction 
The case study on the drafting of provincial environmental legislation for KwaZulu-Natal
335
 
highlights certain misconceptions. Firstly, there seems to be confusion about what constitutes 
a conflict between provincial and national legislation, and when different provisions in 
provincial and national legislation on the same subject can in fact ‘operate together 
harmoniously in the same field.’
336
 This confusion gives rise to a pervasive misconception 
that national legislation always prevails over provincial legislation. These perceptions were 
evident from many of the comments received following the publication of the first draft of 
the KwaZulu-Natal Bill. Considering and responding to the comments where conflict was 
alleged, prompted an in-depth analysis of the constitutional provisions on conflicting laws. 
The observations by Madlingozi and Woolman seem particularly apt in this regard: they 
suggest that the legislative authority shared between national and provincial legislatures 
provided for in sections 44(1)(a)(ii) and 104(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution seems to invite 
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conflict, and that section 146 provides a ‘rubric’ for the analysis and resolution of such 
conflicts.
337
 Section 146 provides as follows: 
 
‘(1) This section applies to a conflict between national legislation and provincial legislation 
falling within a functional area listed in Schedule 4. 
(2) National legislation that applies uniformly with regard to the country as a whole prevails over 
provincial legislation if any of the following conditions is met: 
(a) The national legislation deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by 
legislation enacted by the respective provinces individually. 
(b) The national legislation deals with a matter that, to be dealt with effectively, requires 
uniformity across the nation, and the national legislation provides that uniformity by 
establishing- 
(i) norms and standards; 
(ii) frameworks; or 
(iii) national policies. 
(c) The national legislation is necessary for- 
(i) the maintenance of national security; 
(ii) the maintenance of economic unity; 
(iii) the protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, 
capital and labour; 
(iv) the promotion of economic activities across provincial boundaries; 
(v) the promotion of equal opportunity or equal access to government services; or 
(vi) the protection of the environment. 
(3) National legislation prevails over provincial legislation if the national legislation is aimed at 
preventing unreasonable action by a province that- 
(a) is prejudicial to the economic, health or security interests of another province or the 
country as a whole; or 
(b) impedes the implementation of national economic policy. 
(4) When there is a dispute concerning whether national legislation is necessary for a purpose set 
out in subsection (2)(c) and the dispute comes before a court for resolution, the court must 
have due regard to the approval or rejection of the legislation by the National Council of 
Provinces. 
(5) Provincial legislation prevails over national legislation if subsection (2) or (3) does not apply. 
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(6) A law made in terms of an Act of Parliament or a provincial Act can prevail only if that law 
has been approved by the National Council of Provinces. 
(7) If the National Council of Provinces does not reach a decision within 30 days of its first 
sitting after a law was referred to it, that law must be considered for all purposes to have been 
approved by the Council. 
(8) If the National Council of Provinces does not approve a law referred to in subsection (6), it 
must, within 30 days of its decision, forward reasons for not approving the law to the 
authority that referred the law to it.’ 
 
4.7 Evolution of section 146 
Tracking the evolution of section 146 from the IC (section 126) to its current form 
illuminates: a) the political tension inherent in the allocation of powers between national and 
state (provincial) governments in a federal system; and b) some of the complexities involved 
in resolving conflicts between national and provincial legislation, especially where the 
national and provincial spheres have concurrent legislative competence. When the 
Constitutional Court concluded in the First Certification Judgment that, to the extent set out 
in the judgment, the powers and functions of the provinces in terms of the new text (the NT) 
were substantially less than or substantially inferior to their powers under the IC, the 
provisions of section 146 in the NT were a critical factor that contributed to that conclusion.  
Of particular concern to the Court were the so-called override provisions and the presumption 
in favour of national legislation, which would apply to legislation in the entire field of 
concurrent powers. These provisions gave added strength to national legislation in respect of 
such matters, and weakened the position of provinces should there be a conflict with 
competing provincial legislation. The Court consequently decided not to certify the 




In the Second Certification Judgment the Court concluded that the effect of the amendments 
to section 146 in the AT was to remove the presumption in favour of national legislation, and 
the fact that national legislation had to be approved by the NCOP will not create any 
presumption in favour of national legislation.
339
 This makes it clear that there is no 
presumption in favour of national legislation in the Constitution, and consequently national 
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legislation does not automatically prevail over provincial legislation. Furthermore, it was 
contended on behalf of those who objected to section 146(2)(b) of the AT that this section 
diminished the powers and functions of the provinces in terms of the IC by now permitting 
the need to express uniformity through mechanisms such as ‘norms and standards’, 
‘frameworks’ or ‘national policies’. The comparable provisions in IC 126(3)(b) and (c) 
referred to ‘norms and standards’ and ‘minimum standards’, but did not mention 
‘frameworks’ or ‘national policies’. It was the addition of the latter two categories that caused 
the objection, on the ground that it extended the likelihood of national legislation prevailing 
over provincial legislation.
340
 The Court accepted that there may have been some increase ‘in 
the range of national legislation which may now take precedence over provincial legislation’, 
but was of the view that that was not a ‘substantial increase’. Here the Court argued as 
follows: in terms of AT 146(2)(b), a ‘framework or national policy’ can only take precedence 
over provincial legislation if it is a framework or national policy which ‘deals with a matter 
that, to be dealt with effectively, requires uniformity across the nation’ and it provides that 
uniformity. This is effectively the same criterion that applied in terms of IC 126(3)(b). The 
Court went on to say that the criterion of uniformity is a ‘significant limitation of the range of 
national policies and frameworks which may override provincial legislation’, and that it is an 
‘objectively justiciable criterion’ (emphasis added). Also, under the IC an override for the 
purpose of uniformity is permitted where legislation contained ‘norms and standards’. In this 
regard the Court held that neither of these words is capable of precise definition. This, 
together with the criterion of uniformity, makes it unlikely that even under the IC framework 
legislation and national policies which establish uniformity through standards, rules or 
patterns of conduct ‘would have been held to fall within the scope of “norms and 
standards”’.
341
 The Court therefore held that the ‘amendments to the NT contained in the AT 
146(2) and (4) effectively restore the balance’ which had been tilted against the provinces in 
the NT,
342
 despite the fact that the powers and functions of the provinces in terms of the AT 
are still less than or inferior to those accorded to the provinces in the IC, but ‘not substantially 
so’.
343
 The Court’s interpretation of the provisions of section 146 in the Constitution set out 
above is useful as it clarifies  when national legislation will prevail over provincial 
legislation, and when not, and that there is not an automatic presumption in favour of national 
legislation. 
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4.8 Resolving conflicts 
4.8.1 General 
Klaaren submits that given the breadth of the provincial legislative competence and its 
concurrency with that of the national legislature, some degree of conflict between national 
and provincial legislation is inevitable. However, courts will generally attempt to harmonise 
potentially conflicting statutes; and where such provincial legislation is found not to conflict 
with national legislation, it is often termed ‘complementary or supplemental legislation’.
344
 
He suggests that before asking the ‘conflict’ question concerning which legislation prevails, 
one should ask the prior ‘competence’ question, namely whether the two pieces of legislation 
are validly enacted.
345
 Klaaren proposes a ‘five part legislative competency and conflict test’, 
where the first two parts relate to competence and the last three to conflict: 
1. What is the matter with which the challenged legislation deals? 
2. Does the matter of the challenged legislation fall within the competence of the originating 
legislature?  
3. Is there any conflict between the challenged piece of legislation and another piece of 
legislation? 
4. If yes, is the degree of conflict between the challenged legislation and the conflicting 
legislation constitutionally significant? 
5. If yes, is the area of conflict one where the national legislature has an override?346 
 
Bronstein, in similar vein, identifies the following four questions that require answers when 
solving problems of legislative conflict: 
1. Is the national legislation competent and valid?  If yes: 
2. Is the provincial legislation competent and valid? If yes: 
3. Is there conflict between the national and the provincial legislation? If yes: 
4. Does the national legislation prevail in terms of section 146?347  
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The first two questions suggested by Bronstein also help to establish legislative competence. 
She states that it is ‘logically impossible to have conflict in the absence of competent 
provincial legislation and national legislation’.
348
 Once competence is established, the next 
step is to ask whether there is any conflict between the legislation (the ‘threshold 
question’)
349
. If there is conflict, then the provisions of section 146 must be engaged to find 
the answer. However, Bronstein warns that establishing true conflict is not an easy task.
350
 In 
the KwaZulu-Natal Certification judgment (analysed in paragraph 4.5 of this chapter) the 
Court formulated the test for establishing inconsistency or conflicts between national and 
provincial legislation. Bronstein refers to this test, and similar tests in other jurisdictions, as 
the ‘test for direct conflict’.
351
 She submits that while this test does minimise legislative 
conflict, it tends to maximise regulation by, for instance, inducing ‘multiple licensing 
requirements for businesses’; and also ‘tends to function in a manner that leads to the 
proliferation of regulation in a mechanical, unconsidered manner’.
352
 These are important 
observations, and, I submit, the danger of over regulation should be heeded by legislators 
when enacting legislation in an area of concurrent national and provincial competence.  
 
4.8.2 Interpretation of conflicts 
The interpretation of apparent conflicts between national and provincial legislation is 
governed by section 150 of the Constitution, which provides as follows –  
 
‘When considering an apparent conflict between national and provincial legislation, or between 
national legislation and a provincial constitution, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation or constitution that avoids a conflict, over any alternative 
interpretation that results in a conflict.’ 
 
Bronstein, despite being quite critical of the so-called test for direct conflict, states that it 
does seem to ‘resonate’ with section 150 of the Constitution, which ‘would ensure that the 
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minimum number of cases would undergo scrutiny’ in terms of section 146.
353
 She also says 
that although no coherent rationale for defending the test in South Africa exists, it could be 
argued that section 150 requires the use of such a test.
354
 However, Bronstein qualifies this by 
stating that section 150 cannot be properly understood in isolation and needs to be read with 
section 146. She foresees that eventually judges will have an opportunity to build a body of 




I now turn to the specific provisions of section 146 and examine them in turn below. 
 
4.8.3 Section 146(1) – conflict between national and provincial legislation 
Section 239 of the Constitution defines national and provincial legislation to include 
subordinate legislation, unless the context indicates otherwise. The general rule is that 
subordinate legislation validly made in terms of empowering legislation is part of that 
legislation for the purpose of section 146.
356
 Section 146 consequently applies to all 
legislation falling within a functional area listed in Schedule 4, as defined. 
 
4.8.4 Section 146(2) – national legislation that applies uniformly 
This section provides that only national legislation that applies uniformly with regard to the 
country as a whole is capable of prevailing over provincial legislation. However, national 
legislation can only prevail if any of the conditions envisaged by subsections (a) (b) or (c) is 
met.
357
 Bronstein argues that for purposes of deciding which legislation prevails in conflict 
cases, it is not sufficient to rely on what an Act purports its objects to be – a court needs to 
examine the content of such legislation carefully in order to establish whether an Act does 
indeed do what it purports to do. In this regards she points out that the long titles and 
preambles of national legislation are generally framed in a way that purports to meet the 
requirements of section 146, very often precisely for that reason.
358
  




 Ibid, 16-11. 
355
 Ibid, 16-16. 
356
 Bronstein, op cit, chapter 16, 16-29. 
357
 Constitution, op cit, section 146(2). 
358




In the First Certification Judgment, the Court held that the courts would have jurisdiction to 
determine whether ‘the interests of the country as a whole require a matter to be dealt with 
uniformly’ for the purposes referred to in section 146(2); and that such an exercise involves 
both an objective and a subjective element. However: 
 
‘The test in each case is ultimately objective because it is not the subjective belief of the national 
authority which is the jurisdictional fact allowing the national legislation to prevail over the 
provincial legislation, but there is inherently some subjective element involved in the assessment of 
what the interests of the country require or what is necessary. Some deference to the judgment of the 




Section 146(2)(a) and (b) 
Section 146(2)(a) provides that national legislation prevails in respect of matters that cannot 
be ‘regulated effectively’ by provinces individually; and section 146 (2)(b) provides that 
national legislation prevails if it deals with matters that ‘requires uniformity across the 
nation’. Section 146(2)(b) specifically allows for national legislation to provide uniformity by 
establishing: 1) norms and standards; 2) frameworks; or 3) national policies. In the Second 
Certification Judgment, the Court considered these provisions in the AT and the addition of 
‘frameworks; or national policies’ to this section, when the IC only allowed for framework 
legislation that established ‘norms and standards and minimum standards’. The Court 
responded to the contention that the additional provisions in subsection (2)(b) extended the 
scope of the corresponding provision in the IC, by stating that: 
 
‘One of the definitions of “uniform” given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is “conforming to 
the same standard, rules or pattern”. The achievement of uniformity in the context of AT 
146(2)(b) therefore requires the establishment of standards, rules or patterns of conduct which can 
be applied nationally. As we have stated above, this is an objectively justiciable criterion. Under 
the IC an override for the purpose of uniformity is permitted where legislation contained norms 
and standards. Neither of these words is capable of precise definition. The concise Oxford 
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Dictionary defines “standard” as an “object or quality or measure serving as a basis or example or 
principle to which others conform or should conform or by which the accuracy or quality of 
others is judged”. “Norm” is defined as “a standard or pattern or type”. Given the ill-defined 
import of the words norms and standards, and the governing criterion of uniformity, it is likely 
that even under the IC, framework legislation and national policies which sought to establish 
uniformity by establishing standards, rules or patterns of conduct would have been held to fall 





In the Second Certification Judgment, the Court made it clear that the conditions that national 
legislation must meet before it can prevail, set out in this subsection, are objectively 
justiciable: 
 
‘The issue as to whether or not the particular national legislation dealt with a matter which was 
necessary for the maintenance of national security or economic unity or the protection of the 
common market or any of the other factors listed in NT 146(2)(c) is now objectively justiciable in 




The ‘factors’ listed in section 146(2)(c) referred to by the Court were clearly of concern to the 
legislators when drafting the Constitution, as evidenced by the fact that very similar 
provisions exist in section 44(2).
362
 Unlike section 146 which applies to conflicting 
legislation falling within a functional area listed in Schedule 4, section 44(2) provides for 
national legislative intervention with regard to matters falling within a functional area of 
exclusive provincial competence listed in Schedule 5. Both sections give precedence to 
national legislation which is ‘necessary’ in the circumstances listed in those sections. 
Although Cameron J’s comments in the Liquor Bill case regarding one such ‘factor’, i.e. the 
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maintenance of economic unity, were made in respect of section 44(2), they assist in 
understanding the issues that a court would take into consideration when deciding whether 
national legislation is necessary:  
 
‘In the context of trade, economic unity must in my view … mean the oneness, as opposed to the 
fragmentation, of the national economy with regard to the regulation of inter-provincial, as 
opposed to the intra-provincial, trade. In that context it seems to follow that economic unity must 
contemplate at least the power to require a single regulatory system for the conduct of trades 
which are conducted at a national (as opposed to an intra-provincial) level. Given the history of 
the liquor trade, the need for vertical and horizontal regulation, the need for racial equity, and the 
need to avoid the possibility of multiple regulatory systems affecting the manufacturing and 
wholesale trades in different parts of the country, in my view the economic unity requirement of 
section 44(2) has been satisfied … I am of the view that the Minister has shown, at least in regard 
to manufacturing and distribution of liquor, that the maintenance of economic unity necessitates 
for the purposes of section 44(2)(b) the national legislature’s intervention in requiring a national 




However, Bronstein suggests that the idea that national regulation of the manufacture and 
distribution of liquor is necessary for the maintenance of economic unity seems an 
overstatement;
364
 and that the drafters of the Constitution could never have anticipated that 
the promotion of equal opportunity or equal access to government services might require 
identical treatment between citizens of all provinces in all circumstances.
365
 She submits that 
the judiciary has a duty to promote national unity, but that duty does not require ‘identical 
regulatory regimes throughout the country’. Hence, she cautions that the courts should ‘not 
advance uniformity for uniformity’s sake’.
366
 The following pronouncement by the 
Mashavha Court is instructive in that regard: 
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‘It is inherent in our constitutional system, which is a balance between centralised government 
and federalism, that on matters in respect of which the provinces have legislative powers they can 




I submit that the above cited dictum applies equally to provincial environmental legislation 
where provinces do have legislative powers.
368
 The same dictum by the Mashavha Court is 
cited with approval in FEDSAS,
369
 a recent case before the Constitutional Court where one of 
the central issues was whether certain amendments to provincial Regulations
370
 were in 
conflict with the South African Schools Act.
371
 The Federation of Governing Bodies for 
South African Schools (FEDSAS) contended that provincial legislation that conflicts with 
national legislation is unconstitutional and is ‘required to be struck out’; and that the amended 
Regulations caused a conflict between national and provincial legislation.
372
 Moseneke DCJ 
responded to this contention by providing a clear exposition of the law governing conflicts 
between national and provincial legislation: 
 
‘I think not. This contention ignores the provisions of the Constitution and the Schools Act. 
Education is a functional area of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence. 
Parliament may legislate on education and a province too. …The legislative competence of a 
province cannot be snuffed out by national legislation without more. The Constitution anticipates 
the possibility of overlapping and conflicting national and provincial legislation on concurrent 




He goes on to say that for this very reason the Constitution has extensive provisions geared to 
regulate envisaged conflict between national and provincial legislation; and the ‘conflict 
resolution scheme of sections 146, 149 and 150 of the Constitution’ departs from the 
conventional hierarchy that provincial legislation may not be in conflict with national 
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legislation; and ‘automatic repugnancy between the two classes of legislation does not arise’. 
Under the conflict resolution scheme ‘provincial legislation prevails over national legislation 
except if the national legislation applies uniformly countrywide or the matter cannot be 
regulated effectively by respective provinces or the matter is one listed in the Constitution as 
requiring uniformity across the nation’.
374
 Moreover, Moseneke DCJ held that even if there is 
conflict, Schedule 4 national and provincial legislation is not rendered invalid – a court must 
first attempt to avoid the conflict by ‘preferring any reasonable interpretation of the two 
pieces of legislation which avoids conflict’. And, if the conflict persists, the provincial 
legislation prevails. National legislation ‘may’ enjoy supremacy over provincial legislation 
‘only in accordance with’ the test laid down in sections 146(2) and (3), and in terms of 
section 148 if section 146 does not apply. This does not mean that such provincial legislation 




In concluding this analysis of national legislation that applies uniformly, I would argue that 
the Court’s pronouncements in Liquor Bill in respect of the requirement of evidence to 
establish whether a provision is necessary as opposed to important (or even desirable), is of 
the utmost importance for the enactment of provincial environmental legislation.
376
 This is so 
because section 146(2)(c)(vi) specifically lists legislation for the protection of the 
environment as legislation which prevails over provincial legislation if that legislation is 
‘necessary’. The Liquor Bill Court therefore assists provinces in understanding the issues that 
a court would take into consideration when deciding whether national legislation is necessary 
and therefore prevails over provincial legislation. This, in turn, will guide provincial 
legislatures on how to avoid potential conflicts when enacting provincial legislation on the 
environment.  
 
4.8.5 Section 146(3) – preventing unreasonable action by a province 
An analysis of subsection 146(3) on national legislation aimed at preventing unreasonable 
action by a province once again assists legislative drafters and provincial legislatures to 
understand what is meant by ‘unreasonable action by a province’ that will cause national 
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legislation to prevail. This allows provinces to steer clear of such unreasonable provisions in 
their own legislation, including in environmental legislation. The override provision in this 
subsection is triggered by unreasonable action by a province that is prejudicial to the 
economic, health or security interests of another province or the country as a whole, or 
impedes the implementation of national economic policy.
377
 Klaaren regards the standard of 
unreasonableness required for such an override as a ‘high threshold’. He submits that once 
the threshold is reached, the national legislation need not apply uniformly across the country, 
but may target only a particular province.
378
 Also, the override provision is clearly aimed at 
‘renegade or out-of-place provincial legislation’ that could not be dealt with by one of the 
other provisions which allow national legislation to prevail. Klaaren argues that provincial 
legislation which either directly or indirectly discriminates against those outside the province 
without justification is more likely to be overridden by national legislation in terms of this 
section.
379
 In New National Party the Court considered legislative unreasonableness, and the 
majority held that decisions as to the ‘reasonableness of statutory provisions are ordinarily 
matters within the exclusive competence of Parliament’.
380
 This statement is somewhat 
ambiguous as to whether it can be interpreted to mean that the reasonableness of provincial 
legislation is ‘ordinarily a matter within the exclusive competence of the provincial 
legislature’; or, whether a court should ‘defer to Parliament’s assurance that “national 
legislation is aimed at preventing unreasonable action” by a province?’
381
 Bronstein 
convincingly argues that the better interpretation is that national legislation intended to 
prevent unreasonable action by a province should prevail if it is ‘objectively probable’ that it 
will achieve that end.
382
 She adds that ‘[e]xcessive deference’ to the national legislature does 
not resonate with, firstly, the strength of the word ‘unreasonableness’; and, secondly, the 




In FEDSAS, the issue of whether the disputed provincial Regulations were invalid because 
they are ‘irrational or not reasonable nor justifiable’ was also considered.
384
 The Court held 
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that the Regulations were not so, as they clearly served a legitimate purpose.
385
 One may 
therefore conclude that where provincial legislative provisions serve a legitimate government 
purpose, such as for instance preventing pollution of an ecosystem, or loss of biodiversity, 




4.8.6 Section 146(4) – approval or rejection by NCOP 
This paragraph briefly explains how courts will resolve disputes on the necessity
387
 of 
national legislation for a purpose set out in subsection 146(2)(c) where there was approval or 
rejection of the legislation by NCOP. Such an explanation is, once again, relevant to 
provinces when drafting and enacting provincial legislation. Subsection 146(4) provides that 
a court must have ‘due regard to the approval or rejection of the legislation’ by the NCOP in 
deciding a dispute as to whether national legislation is necessary for a purpose set out in 
subsection 2(c). The Second Certification Judgment Court explained that the fact that 
national legislation has been approved by the NCOP will not create any presumption in 
favour of the national legislation - all that the court must do is to have ‘due regard’ to the 
approval or rejection of the legislation by the NCOP. This simply means that ‘the court has a 
duty to give to the approval or rejection of the legislation by the NCOP the consideration 
which it deserves in the circumstances.’
388
 Citing these pronouncements by the Court, 
Klaaren submits that section 146(4) has two consequences: 1) it reinforces the commands of 
co-operative government and that a court and other constitutional organs should strive to 
interpret potentially conflicting laws co-operatively and consistently; and 2) it indicates that 
consideration should be given in that process to the actions of NCOP. He postulates that 
where the NA and the NCOP are in agreement it will enable a Court to ‘find a national 
override in terms of section (2)(c)’; where the NCOP is opposed to the national legislation, 
the judiciary should be ‘hesitant’ to find an override. Furthermore, these consequences extend 




4.8.7 Section 146 (5) – provincial legislation prevails 
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This subsection makes it clear that in the absence of circumstances or factors which 
specifically justify a national legislative override envisaged by subsections (2) or (3), 
provincial legislation will apply. In this regard Bronstein considers the ‘direct conflict test’ 




4.8.8 Section 146 (6), (7) and (8) – role of NCOP 
Klaaren submits that the Constitution is clear that both national and provincial subordinate 
legislation may prevail once it has passed through a political process.
391
 Hence, in terms of 
section 146(6) a ‘law’ made in terms of an ‘Act’ of Parliament or a provincial ‘Act’ may 
prevail only if that subordinate law has been approved by the NCOP. Approval is assumed if 
the NCOP does not reach a decision within 30 days of its first sitting after the law was 
referred to it (subsection (7).  Klaaren states that the Constitution does not specifically 
address conflicts between national and provincial subordinate legislation where neither has 
been approved by the NCOP, as such conflicts would fall into the residual category governed 
by section 148 which means national legislation would prevail.
392
 Section 146(8) does not 
deal with conflicts per se, but simply provides for the NCOP to give reasons within 30 days 
where it does not approve a law.  
 
4.8.9 Section 147 – other conflicts 
Section 147(1) regulates conflicts between national legislation and provincial constitutions. 
Where there is such a conflict, provincial constitutions have ‘no special status that elevates 
them above ordinary provincial legislation’.
393
 In the First Certification Judgment the Court 
held that national legislation specifically required or envisaged by the Constitution, and 
national legislation enacted in terms of section 44(2) interventions, are given preference over 
the provisions of a provincial constitution. Thus, ‘[c]onflicts between national legislation and 
provisions of a provincial constitution in the field of concurrent legislative competences set 
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out in Schedule 4 are to be dealt with in the same manner as conflicts in respect of matters 




Section 147(2) provides that national legislation referred to in section 44(2) prevails over 
provincial legislation in respect of matters within the functional areas of exclusive provincial 
competence, to the extent that it is necessary as set out in section 44(2)(a)-(e), as discussed 
above. This means that when section 44(2) applies, the national legislation automatically 
prevails. Bronstein states that for this reason disputes about Schedule 5 powers will tend to be 
primarily disputes about legislative competence rather the conflict, and that the Liquor Bill 




4.8.10 Section 148 – conflicts that cannot be resolved 
Section 148 provides -  
‘If a dispute concerning a conflict cannot be resolved by a court, the national legislation 
prevails over provincial legislation or provincial constitution.’ 
 
The Constitutional Court stated in the First Certification Judgment that it had ‘some 
difficulty in understanding’ the meaning of CP XXIII, which required ‘precedence to be 
given to the legislative powers of the national government where a dispute between the 
national and provincial governments cannot be resolved by a court on a construction of the 
NT’. The Court’s difficulty apparently lay in the fact that ‘[r]esolving such disputes is 





4.9 The Effect of Conflict 
In KwaZulu-Natal Certification, the Court considered how a conflict or potential conflict 
between legislation had to be resolved, and which of the conflicting provisions were to 
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prevail. In this regard the Court held: ‘[i]f the conflict is resolved in favour of one of the 
conflicting laws the other is not invalidated, “it is subordinate and to the extent of the conflict 
rendered inoperative.” A law so subordinated is not nullified;’
397
 The Court went on to say 
that such a law ‘remains in force and has to be implemented to the extent that it is not 
inconsistent with the law that prevails, and if the inconsistency falls away the law would then 
have to be implemented in all respects. In effect the subordinated law, or relevant provision 




4.10 Conclusions on Conflicting Laws 
The following conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis of the constitutional 
provisions on conflicting laws: 
(i) There is no presumption in favour of national legislation over provincial 
legislation in the Constitution. 
(ii)  The legislative authority of provinces is derived from the Constitution and not 
from Parliament.  
(iii) Legislation on the environment and related matters listed in Schedule 4 are areas 
of concurrent legislative competence and may therefore be competently passed by 
Parliament as well as provincial legislatures. 
(iv) The Constitution anticipates the possibility of overlapping and conflicting national 
and provincial legislation on concurrent provincial and national legislative 
competences, and courts will generally attempt to harmonise potentially 
conflicting statutes. 
(v) Where provinces have legislative authority and competence, they can legislate 




(vi) The ‘uniformity’ envisaged by the Court in the Second Certification judgment400 
clearly would only apply if any of the limited conditions provided for in section 
146 (2)(a)(b) and (c) is met. In the absence of the conditions provided for in those 
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subsections, the Constitution does not require identical regulatory regimes 
throughout the country. 
(vii) Different provisions in national and provincial legislation are not automatically in 
conflict with each other, or inconsistent. Provinces do have the power to enact 
legislation which is different from national legislation, provided that the test laid 
down in the KwaZulu-Natal Certification judgment is met.
401
 
(viii) The conflict resolution scheme of the Constitution departs from the conventional 
hierarchy that provincial legislation may not be in conflict with national 
legislation. Provincial legislation prevails over national legislation,
402
 except 
where national legislation applies uniformly countrywide if any of the following 
limited conditions is met: 1) such a matter cannot be regulated effectively by the 
respective provinces; or 2) to be dealt with effectively, the matter is listed as 
requiring uniformity; 3) the national legislation is necessary for the listed 
purposes.
403
 National legislation aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a 
province also prevails.
404
 Thus, national legislation prevails only in the limited 
circumstances envisaged by section 146(2) or (3).  
(ix) Even if there is conflict, Schedule 4 national and provincial legislation is not 
rendered invalid – a court must first attempt to avoid the conflict by preferring any 
reasonable interpretation of the two pieces of legislation which avoids conflict.  
(x) National legislation may enjoy supremacy over provincial legislation only in 
accordance with the test laid down in sections 146(2) and (3), and in terms of 
section 148 if section 146 does not apply. This does not mean that such provincial 




(xi) National legislation intended to prevent unreasonable action by a province should 
prevail if it is ‘objectively probable’ that it will achieve that end.
406
 
(xii) Approval of national legislation by the NCOP will not create any presumption in 
favour of the national legislation – but a court is required to have ‘due regard’ to 
the approval or rejection of the legislation by the NCOP.
407
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(xiii) National legislation specifically required or envisaged by the Constitution, and 
national legislation enacted in terms of section 44(2) interventions, are given 
preference over the provisions of a provincial constitution.
408
  
(xiv) Conflicts between national legislation and provisions of a provincial constitution 
in the field of concurrent legislative competences are dealt with in the same 




(xv) In the event of conflicts between provincial legislation in an area of Schedule 5 
exclusive provincial competence national legislation prevails when it is necessary; 
and evidence is required to establish whether national legislation is necessary as 




Chapter 4 provided a detailed analysis of the constitutional provisions that underpin the 
authority of provinces to enact legislation for the protection of the environment. This was 
done in two interrelated but distinct parts which focused on: (a) the constitutional authority of 
provinces to enact environmental legislation; and (b) the constitutional provisions on 
conflicting laws, respectively. Part I established that provinces have both the authority and 
concurrent and exclusive competence to enact legislation in respect of the environment and 
matters falling within the broad concept ‘environment’, listed in Schedules 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution. Part II provided insight into the provisions of the Constitution on conflicting 
laws, as well as how these provisions have been interpretation by scholars and the courts. The 
latter analysis is intended to guide provincial legislators on what constitutes legislative 
conflicts, a concept which is often misunderstood, with a view to avoiding true conflicts 
when enacting legislation for the protection of the environment. This chapter therefore 
addressed the second objective of this dissertation, namely to determine the original 
legislative authority of provinces to enact environmental legislation. 
 
I now turn to a discussion on the extent to which provinces are exercising their legislative 
authority in pursuit of their environmental obligations and possible factors that may constrain 
them from doing so. 
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  CHAPTER 5 
MEETING PROVINCIAL OBLIGATIONS 
 





This chapter examines: (a) the extent to which provinces are exercising their legislative 
authority in pursuit of their constitutional environmental obligations; and (b) factors which 
may constrain provinces from exercising such authority to the extent provided for in the 
Constitution. This is done in two interrelated parts which both fall under the subject matter 
discussed in this chapter, but examine distinct aspects of the research questions posed in 
chapter 1. Thus, part I provides the information gleaned from my research into environmental 
legislation currently on provincial statute books; and also highlights possible causes of what 
appears to be considerable inactivity on the part of most provinces to enact environmental 
legislation. Part II consists of a case study on the drafting of environmental legislation for 
KwaZulu-Natal which highlights a number of misconceptions on the nature and scope of 
provincial legislative powers, which may inhibit provinces in the exercise of their legislative 
powers. 
 
Part I – Provincial Environmental Legislation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Constitution has ushered in a new vision of a less hierarchical division of government 
power in South Africa.
412
 Even so, a vision that is not realised in practice remains a mere 
vision. Are provinces giving effect to this new vision, or are they through legislative 
                                                          
411
 Peter Senge, senior lecturer Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
412
 See particularly the analysis in chapter 4, part I; Habitat Council, op cit, para 11; Robertson, op cit, para 60; 
and Kloof Conservancy, op cit, para 10. 
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inactivity reducing their constitutional roles to that of moribund creatures of statute, waiting 
to be imbued with power by national legislation?
413
 It is beyond the scope of this research 
project to answer such a complex question comprehensively, but I will provide a broad 
overview of the current state of provincial environmental legislation in this part of the 
chapter, as well as the extent to which provinces have exercised their legislative authority to 
enact legislation to protect the environment. It was indeed the state of environmental 





‘It is rather odd that – 20 years into our constitutional democracy – we are left with a statute book 
cluttered by laws surviving from a bygone undemocratic era remembered for the oppression of 
people; the suppression of freedom; discrimination; division; attempts to break up our country; 
and military dictatorships. When these laws determine criminal liability, the situation looks even 
worse. It is not clear from the facts of the matter why this is the case. It is clear though, that 
people like Ms Khohliso and the rest of us – and indeed our much-valued vultures and other 
wildlife – deserve to be guided and protected by democratically elected Legislatures through 
clearer laws and a cleaner statute book.’  
 
Khohliso concerned a traditional healer in the Transkei (part of the Eastern Cape Province) 
who was charged with and convicted of being in possession of two vulture’s feet. The matter 
went on appeal to the Eastern Cape Local Division of the High Court, and finally ended up in 
the Constitutional Court. One of the issues before the Constitutional Court was the 
constitutional validity of certain sections of Decree 9 (Environmental Conservation) of 1992 
(Transkei). The Decree was issued by the then President of the former Republic of the 
Transkei
415
 on the advice of the territory’s Military Council after a military coup, and is a 
remnant of South Africa’s divided history. The reason why it is in force in the Transkei area 
of the Eastern Cape lies in the transitional provisions of the Constitution, which provide as 
follows:  
 
‘Continuation of existing law 
                                                          
413
 See Habitat Council, op cit, para 11 (quoted above). 
414
 Khohliso v S and Another [2014] ZACC 33, para 53 (end note) (Khohliso). 
415
 South Africa was the only country in the world to recognize this ‘Republic’. 
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(1) All law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, continues in force, subject to 
–  
(a) any amendment or repeal; and  
(b) consistency with the new Constitution. 
(2) Old order legislation that continues in force in terms of subitem (1) –  
(a) does not have a wider application, territorially or otherwise, than it had before the 
previous Constitution took effect unless subsequently amended to have a wider 
application; and 
(b) continues to be administered by the authorities that administered it when the new 
Constitution too effect, subject to the new Constitution.
416
   
 
These constitutional provisions were enacted in the interest of legal certainty, given the fact 
that different laws were in existence in the homelands and the rest of South Africa.
417
  
However, the Constitution leaves no doubt that old order legislation can be amended or 
repealed, and must be consistent with the Constitution. But are provinces giving effect to 
their constitutional legislative powers to amend, repeal and align old order environmental 
legislation with the Constitution, or to enact new environmental legislation? The survey 
discussed below provides some answers to these and other questions posed above.  
 
5.2 Survey of Provincial Legislation 
Tables 1 and 2 below reflect the results of a survey conducted to assess the extent of current 
provincial environmental legislation. However, the survey is not intended to be a qualitative 
assessment of provincial environmental legislation, or an attempt to determine whether such 
legislation adequately fulfils the obligations imposed on provinces by section 24 of the 
Constitution. The survey is merely a quantitative analysis to determine the degree to which 
provinces have been exercising their constitutional legislative authority since their 
establishment in 1994 to amend, repeal and enact environmental legislation. Table 1 below 
lists old order provincial environmental legislation
418
 still on the statute books, and 
distinguishes between: 1) ordinances assigned to provinces; and 2) legislation emanating 
                                                          
416
 The Constitution, op cit, Schedule 6, item 2. 
417
 Khohliso, op cit, para 7. 
418
 Constitution, op cit, Schedule 6, item 1 (see fn 6 above for definition). 
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from the former homelands.
419
 Table 2 lists provincial environmental legislation enacted after 
the new constitutional order in South Africa commenced;
420
 as well as legislation enacted but 
subsequently repealed, enacted but not proclaimed, and enacted but not yet in operation – an 
analysis which assists in the assessment of the extent to which provinces are exercising their 
constitutional powers to protect the environment. 
  
Table 1 – Old Order Provincial Environmental Legislation
421
  
1.1 Chronological Table of Ordinances listed under the category ‘Environment and 
Conservation’ assigned to provinces
422
 
YR E/C F/S GAU KZN LIM MPU N/C N/W W/C 
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 Constitution, op cit, Schedule 6, item 1 – defines ‘homeland’ as a part of the Republic which, before the 
previous Constitution took effect, was dealt with in South African legislation as an independent or self-
governing territory; see also article by W Du Plessis ‘Integration of Existing Environmental Legislation in the 
Provinces’ The South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy (1995) Volume 2 (1), 23 – 36. 
420
 Juta’s Statutes – Index, Table of Provincial Acts/Laws, 1-345 to 1-392. 
421
 Refer to abbreviations and colour key below Table 2. 
422
 LexisNexis, Chronological Table of Ordinances. 
423
 Repealed by Northern Cape Nature Conservation Act 9 of 2009 for Northern Cape Province. 
424
 Sections 2 to 11, inclusive; section 11A; sections 12 – 14, inclusive; sections 17 and 18; and section 28 
repealed by the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management Act 9 of 1997. 
425
 Repealed by Northern Cape Nature Conservation Act 9 of 2009 for Northern Cape Province. 
426
 Will be repealed when the North West Biodiversity Management Act 4 of 2016 comes into effect. 
427
 This Ordinance was amended by the Western Cape Nature and Environmental Conservation Ordinance 
Amendment Act 8 of 1999; and the Western Cape Nature Conservation Laws Amendment Act 3 of 2000 
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 Repealed by Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 for Limpopo Province. 
429
 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 for Mpumalanga Province. 
430
 Will be repealed when the North West Biodiversity Management Act 4 of 2016 comes into effect. 
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 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 for Mpumalanga Province. 
433
 Will be repealed when the North West Biodiversity Management Act 4 of 2016 comes into effect. 
434
 See W Du Plessis, op cit, 23 – 36. 
435
 Repealed by Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 for Limpopo Province. 
436
 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 for Mpumalanga Province. 
437
 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 for Mpumalanga Province. 
438
 Will be repealed when the North West Biodiversity Management Act 4 of 2016 comes into effect. 
439
 Repealed by Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 for Limpopo Province. 
440
 Amended by various Ciskeian Acts – see W Du Plessis, op cit, 29, fn 41. 
441
 Repealed by Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 for Limpopo Province. 
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 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 for Mpumalanga Province. 
444
 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 Mpumalanga Province. 
445
 Repealed by Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 for Limpopo Province. 
446
 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 for Mpumalanga Province. 
447
 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 for Mpumalanga Province. 
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 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 for Mpumalanga Province. 
449
 Repealed by Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 for Limpopo Province. 
450
 Sections 4 – 6 repealed by the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management Act 9 of 1997. 
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Table 2 – Provincial Environmental Legislation enacted since 1994 
Chronological Table of Provincial Statutes on the Environment enacted since 1994 
YR E/C F/S GAU KZN LIM MPU N/C N/W W/C 
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 Repealed by Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998. 
453
 Repealed by Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency Act 5 of 2005 
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 Repealed by Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003. 
455

























nt Act 7 
of 1999 
457 












Act 8 of 
1999 








Act 3 of 
2000 





ent Act 3 
of 2002 






Act 12 0f 
2003 458 













nt Act 8 
of 2003459 
 






Act 5 of 
   
                                                          
456
 Published on 22 September 1999 but not proclaimed to date. 
457
 Published on 25 February 2000 but not proclaimed to date. 
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 Repealed by Act 2 of 2010. 
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Abbreviations: 
Province of the Eastern Cape – E/C 
Province of the Free State – F/S 
Province of Gauteng - GAU 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal - KZN 
Province of Limpopo - LIM 
Province of Mpumalanga - MPU 
Province of Northern Cape – N/C 
                                                          
460
 Date of commencement 1 January 2012. 
461
 Date of commencement 1 May 2013. 
462
 Amended by Proc 33 in PG 7671 of 19 July 2016. 
463
 Published in Provincial Gazette on 3 January 2017, but has not come into force. 
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Province of North West – N/W 
Province of the Western Cape – W/C 
 
Colour key: 
Black = in force 
Red = repealed 
Blue = legislation published but not yet in force 
 
5.3 Summary of Findings 
(i) The Eastern Cape, Free State and Gauteng Province have not repealed or amended any 
of the Ordinances assigned to them, or any of the other old order legislation 
administered by them, and therefore the old order legislation remains in effect. Since 
the coming into being of the provinces in 1994, the Eastern Cape enacted the Eastern 
Cape Provincial Parks Board Act in 2003, which was repealed by the 2010 Eastern 
Cape Parks and Tourism Agency Act. However, the Free State and Gauteng have not 
enacted any legislation since their establishment. 
(ii) KwaZulu-Natal has repealed only a limited number of sections of the Nature 
Conservation Ordinance 15 of 1974, the rest remain in force along with the other old 
order legislation. In 1997 the Province enacted the KwaZulu-Natal Nature 
Conservation Management Act 9 of 1997. Since then two Acts were adopted by the 
Legislature in 1999 in an attempt to consolidate and update the environmental 
legislation in the Province. However, despite their adoption, these Act have not been 
proclaimed to date and are therefore of no force and effect. Currently KwaZulu-Natal 
has a Bill in progress which will repeal the old order legislation and deal 
comprehensively with environmental matters once it becomes law. The difficulties 
encountered in this process will be discussed in part II below as a case study on 
drafting environmental legislation for the province. 
(iii) Limpopo and Mpumalanga have repealed all their old order legislation, except for 
legislation emanating from the former homeland Gazankulu. In 1996 Limpopo 
enacted the Limpopo Nature Conservation Act, which was repealed by the Limpopo 
Environmental Management Act in 2005. Mpumalanga enacted legislation to deal 
with their parks board in 1995, which was amended in 1998 and repealed in 2005 by 
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the Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency Act. Mpumalanga also enacted the 
Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act in 1998. 
(iv) The Northern Cape has repealed two out of three Ordinances assigned to them, but 
not the legislation emanating from the former homeland Bophuthatswana. In 2009 the 
Province enacted the Northern Cape Nature Conservation Act, but it only came into 
effect in 2012. 
(v) The old order legislation in North West has not yet been repealed, but once the North 
West Biodiversity Management Act of 2016 comes into effect, their statute book will 
be cleared of all pre-constitutional legislation. Since 1994 they enacted the North 
West Parks and Tourism Board Act in 1997, which was amended in 2002, and 
repealed by the North West Parks Board Act 3 of 2015. As mentioned, their 
Biodiversity Management Act 4 of 2016 has not yet come into effect. 
(vi) The Western Cape has amended their Nature and Environmental Conservation 
Ordinance twice, i.e. in 1999 and 2000, but has not repealed any of the Ordinances 
assigned to them. Apart from the two amendment Acts, the Western Cape enacted 
legislation in 1998 dealing with their nature conservation board, and in 2011 they 
enacted the Western Cape Biosphere Reserves Act 6 of 2011. None of the former 
homelands formed part of the territory of the Western Cape Province and 
consequently they have no old order legislation emanating from former homelands. 
(vii) Since 1994 the nine provinces combined have enacted 21 pieces of legislation in 
total that may be described as related to the environment. However, out of those, 10 
Acts deal primarily with institutional arrangements and structures such as parks 
boards, or parks and tourism boards or agencies, and not with conservation and 
protection of the environment per se as required by section 24 of the Constitution. 
Further, 3 of the 21 Acts that are on the statute books have not yet come into force, 
i.e. 2 in KwaZulu-Natal (enacted in 1999) and 1 in North West (enacted in 2016). It is 
unlikely that the 2 KwaZulu-Natal Acts of 1999 will ever come into force after so 
many years. Therefore, some twenty years after the nine provinces came into being, 
they have enacted a handful of Acts for the protection of the environment.   
  
From the above analysis, it is evident that legislative activity in the provinces has been quite 
uneven as far as the environment in all its facets (as discussed in chapter 3) is concerned, and 
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some provinces have not enacted any environmental legislation at all. These findings suggest 
that provinces are generally slow in exercising their constitutional authority to meet their 
binding legislative obligations imposed by the environmental right in the Constitution, if at 
all. As stated previously, this legislative inactivity by the majority of provinces is significant 
as the environmental right provides the same ‘underpinnings’ for provinces to take legislative 
and other measures to protect the environment as it does for the national government. In 
addition, the binding obligations imposed on provinces by the Bill of Rights generally, and 
the environmental right in particular, are couched in exactly the same terms as those imposed 
on national government.
464
 Yet, in most provinces the provincial laws are still fragmented 
and the statute books ‘cluttered’ by laws predating the constitutional dispensation in South 
Africa, with very little new legislation to replace such outdated and often obsolete laws. The 
remarks of Justice Van der Westhuizen quoted above that the public deserves to be ‘guided 
and protected by democratically elected Legislatures through clearer laws and a cleaner 
statute book’
465
 seem particularly apposite in this regard. Provinces may, therefore, through 
their own omission to meaningfully exercise their legislative authority in respect of the 
environment reduce their de facto role to that of being primarily administrative bodies and 
implementers of national legislation, reminiscent of provincial administrations before 
1994.
466
 This certainly does not accord with the new vision of a less hierarchical system of 
government ushered in by the Constitution.  
 
5.4 Possible Causes of Provincial Legislative Inactivity 
Literature suggests that the causes of provincial legislative inactivity are to be found in the 
political realm, rather than in the Constitution and the law. In this regard, the apparent 
political reluctance to grant provinces significant constitutional powers has been suggested as 




 (in the context of addressing the water crisis in 
South Africa) suggests some of the underlying causes of the crisis are ‘inadequate leadership 
in water management’, and severe skills shortages at an operational level. He submits that 
there are many reasons for this, but ultimately the means of addressing the problems probably 
                                                          
464
 The Constitution, sections 7(2), 8(1) and 24. 
465
 Khohliso, op cit. 
466
 See the provisions of the Provincial Government Act 69 of 1986 (now repealed). 
467
 See for instance the papers by Issacharoff, op cit, and Murray and Simeon, op cit, referred to in chapter 2 
above.  
468
 M Kidd ‘Poisoning the Right to Water in South Africa: What can the Law do?’ UNE Paper (online). 
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lie in the ‘realms of political decision-making rather than law’; and that improved political 
leadership is ‘a prerequisite for effective use of legal tools that are available … ‘.
469
 In this 
regard Kidd refers to numerous provisions in the Water Services Act
470
 that require 
implementation, but are left unattended by the responsible authorities. In many instances 
organs of state are failing to fulfil their statutory duties and responsibilities, not just in the 
sphere of water services.
471
 Kidd also makes reference to the fact that provinces have not 
used their powers in terms of section 139 of the Constitution to intervene, despite a 
‘pervasive failure’ of municipalities to meet their obligations in terms of the Water Services 
Act.
472
 This may suggest that there is indeed a reluctance, or, as stated by Kidd, ‘lack of 
political will’
473
  on the part of provinces to exercise their constitutional powers. He 





A number of the Economic and Social Rights (ESR) Reports published by the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) are also of interest in analysing the extent to which 
provinces are taking legislative measures to realise the economic and social rights in the Bill 
of Rights, i.e. the right to housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the 
environment.
475
 It is generally acknowledged that these rights are interrelated, and that they 
either directly or indirectly affect the health and well-being of people.
476
 However, in line 
with the objectives of this study I will focus on the SAHRC findings and comments that 
relate to the environmental right and legislative measures taken by provinces to give effect to 
their obligations in terms of this right. I will also highlight some of the problems identified by 
them in that regard.  
 
                                                          
469
 Ibid, 7. 
470
 Water Services Act 108 of 1979. 
471
 Kidd, ‘Poisoning the Right to Water in South Africa: What can the Law do? op cit, 9 - 10. 
472




 Ibid, 18. 
475
 See Constitution, op cit, section 184(3) which provides that the South African Human Rights Commission 
must require relevant organs of state to provide the Commission annually with information on measures that 
they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, 
water, social security, education and the environment. 
476
 See earlier discussions; as well as the 5
th







 the SAHRC assesses whether organs of state understand their 
constitutional obligations to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights’.
478
 Only six provinces submitted reports concerning environmental issues. After 
evaluating their responses, the Commission concluded that the responses were too general 
and did not focus on the key terms ‘respect’, ‘protect’, ‘promote’ and ‘fulfil’,
479
 and generally 
lacked focus on environmental issues, particularly the environmental right in section 24 
which was often not even mentioned.
480
 In relation to the implications of rationalisation/non-
rationalisation of laws and policies, the Commission notes that provincial legislation and 
regulations as well as laws and policies of the former homelands have ‘an important and 
enduring relevance’ to the process; and that there should have been more focus on ‘how the 
rationalisation or lack of it, impacted and continues to impact on those victimised by 
discriminatory legal designs.’
481
 This statement resonates with the words of Van der 
Westhuizen J in Khohliso, quoted above, when he comments on the same issue.  
 




 the SAHRC states that it is clear from the responses from 
provincial departments that there were no significant legislative developments at the 
provincial sphere of government. They point out that matters relating to the environment fall 
within the functional area of concurrent national and provincial competence; and that 
provinces are therefore ‘expected to pass their own legislation to protect the environment as 
required by s 24 of the Constitution’.
483
 In addition, provincial departments generally 
provided information to the Commission on measures that were instituted at national level 
but could not explain the impact of those measures on their respective provinces.
484





 the SAHRC comments, somewhat curiously, that: ‘The provinces did not pass 
any legislation, their mandate is generally to implement any legislative measures introduced 
                                                          
477
 South African Human Rights Commission 1
st









Ist ESR Report, op cit, Volume IV, 51-53. 
481
 Ibid, Volume IV 46. 
482
 South African Human Rights Commission 3
rd
 Economic and Social Rights Report (Chapter 9) 
‘Environmental Rights’ (3
rd
 ESR Report), 321-367. 
483
 Ibid, 343. 
484
 Ibid, 344. 
485
 South African Human Rights Commission 4
th








 This statement not only contradicts their 3
rd
 ESR Report 
regarding the duty of provinces to pass legislation for the protection of the environment, 
quoted above, but is also not supported by the provisions of the Constitution. Such a 
comment in an official SAHRC Report is unfortunate as it reinforces the widespread 
erroneous perceptions of the role of provinces. In their 5
th
 ESR Report entitled The Right to a 
Healthy Environment,
487
 the SAHRC reports on only two of the nine provinces, namely the 
Free State Province which was reportedly ‘in the process of drafting an updated ordinance on 
Conservation to replace the Conservation Ordinance of 1969 which is now outdated’; and 
Gauteng, which passed no legislation themselves, but ‘followed the processes for the on-
going national environmental law reform’.
488
 In this report the Commission correctly 
reiterates that the responsibility for realising the right to a clean and healthy environment as 
well as environmental management is an area of concurrent national and provincial 





Key finding in the 7
th
 ESR Report was that a significant impediment to the realisation of 
rights stems from a ‘conceptual misunderstanding by the government of its constitutional 
obligation to progressively realise economic and social rights.’
490
 The Commission points out 
that one of the main problems with assessing the progressive realisation of rights is that the 
norms and standards of many of the state’s constitutional obligations remain loosely 
specified, which implies a lacuna in how the state understands the notion of progressive 
realisation, the nature and content of the respective rights, as well as its obligations in respect 
of constitutional accountability. As a consequence, the state has a limited understanding and 
appreciation of ‘what it means to adopt a rights-based approach to socio-economic 
development and how to fulfil its constitutional obligations in terms of the Bill of Rights’.
491
 
Although the findings were made in the context of government and the state in general, they 
do highlight some of the reasons which may underlie the failure of provinces to meet their 
                                                          
486
 Ibid, 37; see also 349 of the same report. 
487
 South African Human Rights Commission 5
th
 Economic and Social Rights Report Series 2002/2003 
Financial Year, 21 June 2004 ‘The Right to a Healthy Environment’ (5
th
 ESR Report). 
488
 Ibid, 35. 
489
 Ibid, 41-42. 
490
 South African Human Rights Commission 7
th
 Report on Economic and Social Rights 2006-2009 
‘Millennium Development Goals and the Progressive Realisation of Economic and Social Rights in South 
Africa’ (7
th
 ESR Report) vi. 
491
 Ibid, 18. 
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environmental obligations to the extent required by the Constitution. Another important 
factor that may hamper the realisation of economic and social rights raised in the report is 
that such realisation requires significant intergovernmental cooperation and communication, 









 the Commission draws attention to the lack of compliance with the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution such as section 7(2), as well as section 237 which 
provides that all constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and without delay.
494
 
The Report reiterates that the right to a healthy environment is fundamental to the enjoyment 
of all human rights and is closely linked with the right to health, well-being and dignity, and 
is a fundamental part of the right to life and personal integrity.
495
 On legislative and policy 
developments the report unfortunately only deals with such developments at a national level. 
In the recent ESR Report
496
 the SAHRC does report on new environmental framework 
policies, strategies and legislation, but again limits it to the national sphere of government. It 
is not clear why the SAHRC has not included all spheres of government in their more recent 
reports. Ongoing information on the extent to which the provincial sphere of government is 
giving effect to their obligations in respect of the environmental right is of public importance, 
and may even assist in the realisation of the right. This aspect should find its way back into 
future ESR Reports. 
 
Lastly, one may speculate that the complex provisions of section 146 of the Constitution 
(discussed in part II of chapter 4) may also constrain provinces from enacting provincial 
legislation for the protection of the environment. There may be real uncertainty and lack of 
understanding amongst provincial (and other) organs of state as to when provincial legislation 
dealing with matters provided for in national legislation would be in conflict with the national 
provisions. Judging from the case study discussed below, this may very well be the case. This 
could be a fruitful terrain for future research. 
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Part II  
Case Study - Enacting Environmental Legislation for KwaZulu-Natal 
 
5.5 Background 
The KwaZulu-Natal Member of the Executive Council (MEC) responsible for Environmental 
Affairs initiated the drafting of new legislation for the protection of the environment in 
KwaZulu-Natal in 2014. To that end he appointed a drafting team to: (a) consolidate existing 
provincial environmental legislation; (b) give effect to the environmental right in the 
Constitution; and (c) to address the specific environmental needs of the Province not 
adequately addressed by national legislation, or where the province wants to enact stricter 
measures to protect the environment. This necessarily also required the repeal of outdated and 
unconstitutional old order legislation. The new legislation emanating from the process would 
therefore enable the Provincial Legislature to deliver ‘clearer laws and a cleaner statute 
book’.
497
 Thus the drafting team prepared a first draft of the KwaZulu-Natal Environmental, 
Biodiversity and Protected Areas Management Bill (the Bill), which was published for 
comment in an extraordinary KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Gazette on 25 February 2015. The 
case study discussed below is based on this exercise. The case study cannot provide 
substantive answers to the primary and underlying research questions
498
 addressed in this 
dissertation, nor does it attempt to do so. However, it does highlight pervasive 
misconceptions about the role, powers and functions of provinces – misconceptions that exist 
mainly within government itself. Part II is concluded by listing specific examples of 
comments received on the published Bill and how the drafters responded to them.  
 
5.6 General Observations 
Following the publication of the Bill, a large number of submissions were received from 
organs of state, especially from the (national) Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), 
                                                          
497
 Khohliso, op cit, para 53. 
498
 See chapter 1, para 1.2. 
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as well as from members of the public and groups and organisations within civil society.
499
 
Many comments and suggestions were useful and therefore substantially or partly 
incorporated into the second draft of the Bill. However, a number of comments received 
appear to have been based on the erroneous premise that the South African system of 
government is hierarchical. This misconception seems to underlie many comments, not only 
in respect of the roles of the national and provincial executives, but also as far as the 
legislative authority of provinces is concerned. This was evident in a substantial number of 
comments emanating from organs of state, particularly from the national sphere of 
government. Some of their submissions seem to imply that provinces derive their legislative 
powers from national legislation rather than directly from the Constitution. This suggests that 
the nature and scope of provincial legislative authority and obligations are not fully 
appreciated (or accepted). The comments also often tended to overlook the fact that the 
environment and related functional areas are areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution; and that section 146 is of 
limited application, i.e. it only applies to a conflict between national and provincial 
legislation.
500
 It is of concern that the High Court seems to have laboured under similar 
misconceptions in the Kloof Conservancy case
501
 when it imposed a general obligation on the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs to ensure that all organs of state comply with NEMBA. As 
discussed earlier, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned this High Court order and held 
that such an order appears to misconceive the powers and responsibilities of a national 
Minister, seemingly based on – 
 
‘the erroneous premise that our system of government is hierarchical, with national government 
having the power to supervise the performance of all organs of State in every sphere of 




As discussed earlier, the SAHRC also highlighted a lack of understanding by government of 
the constitutional provisions, especially in respect of the realisation of rights in the Bill of 
                                                          
499
 The comments were consolidated and summarised in the Close Out Report on Public Comments - KwaZulu-
Natal Environmental, Biodiversity and Protected Areas Management Bill, 2015 (Close Out Report). 
500
 See discussion in chapter 4, part II (‘Conflicting Laws’). 
501
 See discussion of Kloof Conservancy, op cit, in chapter 2, part II (‘Multisphere Government’). 
502
 Kloof Conservancy, ibid, para 10. 
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Rights, and a conceptual misunderstanding of the constitutional obligations of government.
503
 
I submit that such a conceptual misunderstanding extends to a lack of understanding of the 
constitutional roles and functions of the different spheres of government, as illustrated by the 
examples below. 
 
5.7 Public Comments and Responses 
Table 3 below provides pertinent examples of submissions and comments received following 
the publication of the first draft of the Bill, which illustrate misconceptions relating to: a) 
provincial powers and functions; and b) what constitute conflicts between national and 
provincial legislation. The responses to the submissions are based on the analysis of the 
nature and scope of the substantive constitutional obligations, as well as the legislative 
authority of provincial organs of state in South Africa to protect the environment through 
reasonable legislative measures.  
 
Table 3 – Comments on published Bill 
Comments Responses 
Different legal regimes in provinces Response 
It is a concern that the Bill will only be 




The legislative authority of a province is vested in 
its provincial legislature. The power of a particular 
provincial legislature to enact legislation is 
territorially limited, i.e. it may only enact legislation 
for its province.
505
 In Weare the Constitutional 
Court pronounced on different legal regimes in 
provinces. The case concerned gambling legislation 
which falls (like the environment) within an area of 
concurrent national and provincial competence: 
 
‘Provinces have the right to regulate their own gambling 
industries. There can be no objection in this case to the 
KwaZulu-Natal legislative regime simply on the ground 
that it is different to that of other provinces. This is not to 
say that the situation in other provinces may not be 
referred to when challenging provincial legislation. But 
the fact that there are differences between legal regimes 
                                                          
503
 See discussion of ESR Reports in part I of chapter 5. 
504
 Close Out Report, op cit, 27 (DEA). 
505
 The Constitution, op cit, 104(1)(b). 
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Duplication/Repetition (‘mirroring’) Response 
Certain animals have already been declared 
as ‘Threatened or Protected Species’ 
(TOPS) in terms of NEMBA. Why are the 




Certain species in KwaZulu-Natal that are 
threatened or require protection are not included in 
the TOPS Lists. The Schedules to the Bill include 
those species in order to provide comprehensive 
provincial lists which include such species. 
Different national and provincial lists can co-exist 




It is unclear why there is a need to list 
provincial protected areas in a schedule to 
the Bill – such areas should rather be listed 
under the National Environmental 
Management: Protected Areas Act 
(NEMPAA). This will avoid amending a 




There are no constitutional impediments to 
provinces providing a schedule to legislation listing 
provincial protected areas, and to make provision for 
the amendment of such schedules as necessary. 
Furthermore, the proposed legislation will be 
incomplete and incoherent without listing provincial 
protected areas as many of the provisions relate 
directly to the management and control of such 
areas. Coherent legislation which does not require 




NEMPAA provides for the adoption of 
internal rules for the management of 
protected areas, and for their publication in 
the national Gazette. There is therefore no 
need for such provincial rules or for their 
publication in the provincial Gazette.
511
 
There are no constitutional impediments to having 
provincial internal rules for the management of 
provincial protected areas, and such rules may even 
be stricter than those provided for in NEMPAA, 
provided there is compliance with the test laid down 
for inconsistency.
512
 The same applies to the 
publication of those rules in both the national and 
provincial Gazettes.  
The designation of Environmental 




To effectively implement and enforce its 
environmental legislation, the Province needs to 
provide for EMIs to fulfil that function. This matter 
directly affects governance in the Province. 
Repetition (or ‘mirroring’) of provisions of national 
legislation in provincial legislation is permissible, 
but only in areas where provinces have legislative 
authority conferred on them by the Constitution. The 
                                                          
506
 Weare and Another v Ndebele NO and Others [2008] ZACC 20; 2009 (1) SA 600 (CC); 2009 (4) BCLR 370 
(CC) (Weare), para 70. 
507
 Close Out Report, 27 (DEA). 
508
 Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, op cit, para 24. 
509
 Close out report, op cit, 45. 
510
 See discussion on the First Western Cape Certification judgment, op cit. 
511
 Close out report, op cit, 46 (DEA). 
512
 See Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, op cit, para 24, and the earlier 
discussions on the test for conflict.  
513
 Close out report, op cit, 43 (DEA). 
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environment is a functional area listed in Schedule 4 
of the Constitution, and therefore provinces have the 
power to enact legislation on the environment.  In 
addition, section 104(4) of the Constitution gives a 
province the authority to legislate on a matter that is 
reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the 
effective exercise of a power concerning a matter 
listed in Schedule 4. As stated in the First Western 
Cape Certification judgment:  
 
‘[i]t would indeed have been difficult for the WCC to be 
coherent and comprehensible without the repetition of 
those NC provisions which form the matrix for the 
related provisions of the WCC. We can find no fault with 
such provisions’.
514
   
Conflicting Provisions and Source of 
Provincial Power 
Response 
Buffer zones: There is a principled objection 
to provisions that enable a Member of the 
Executive to declare buffer zones as this is 
already provided for in section 28 of 
NEMPAA as ‘protected environments’, and 
MECs currently have the power to declare 





Listed ecosystems: The Bill empowers an 
MEC to list ecosystems that are threatened 
or in need of protection. There is no need to 
resort to provincial legislation in this regard, 
as NEMBA already provides for an MEC to 
list such ecosystems - any attempt at a 





Prohibited and restricted activities in listed 
ecosystems: How can the Bill provide the 
MEC with power in respect of 
Environmental Impact Assessments, when 
NEMA does not do so? The EIA process is 
already provided for in NEMA, and does 
not extend to the scenarios suggested in the 
Bill. How can the Bill provide such a power 
The Constitution does not envisage a hierarchical 
division of power between the different organs of 
state. The province derives its powers directly from 
the Constitution – not from any other legislation, 
and therefore has original constitutional powers to 
legislate on areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence. Section 
104(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution gives provinces the 
authority to legislate on ‘any matter within a 
functional area listed in Schedule 4’. ‘Environment’ 
and ‘Nature conservation, excluding national parks, 
national botanical gardens and marine resources’ are 
such functional areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence.
518
 Section 146 of 
the Constitution applies to situations where there are 
conflicts between national and provincial legislation 
falling within a functional area of concurrent 
legislative powers, but it does not prohibit a 
province from enacting legislation where it has the 
constitutional competence to do so, nor does it 
provide that national legislation necessarily prevails 
or that there is a presumption in favour of national 
legislation. In establishing whether there is in fact a 
conflict between legislation, Klaaren proposes a 
‘five part legislative competency and conflict test’, 
where the first two parts relate to competence and 
                                                          
514
 First Western Cape Certification judgment, op cit, para 23. See also discussion of this case in chapter 4, part 
I. 
515
 Close out report, op cit, 47 (DEA). 
516
 Ibid, page 79 (Lax & Cox Attorneys (on behalf of TSA & FOSAF)). 
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if the national legislation does not empower 




the last three to conflict: 
 What is the matter with which the challenged 
legislation deals? 
 Does the matter of the challenged legislation 
fall within the competence of the originating 
legislature?  
 Is there any conflict between the challenged 
piece of legislation and another piece of 
legislation? 
 If yes, is the degree of conflict between the 
challenged legislation and the conflicting 
legislation constitutionally significant? 
 If yes, is the area of conflict one where the 
national legislature has an override?
519
 
This makes it clear that only if a conflict is 
established, does the question as to whether national 
or provincial legislation prevails arise. In addition, 
the Constitution requires in section 150 that every 
court ‘must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation … that avoids a conflict, over an 




There are also no constitutional impediments to the 
Province going beyond the provisions in NEMPAA, 
NEMBA, NEMA, or any other national 
environmental legislation, provided that the 
provisions in the Bill do not offend against the test 
laid down for inconsistency or conflicts.
521
 Different 
provisions in national and provincial legislation do 
not per se constitute a conflict. In fact, it ‘is inherent 
in our constitutional system, which is a balance 
between centralised government and federalism, that 
on matters in respect of which the provinces have 
legislative powers they can legislate separately and 





Moreover, NEMPAA does not deal explicitly with 
the specific purpose of buffer zones, neither does it 
provide that people living in buffer zones in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
518
 The Constitution, op cit, Schedule 4. 
517
 Ibid, pages 78, 79 and 80; see also clause 40(4) of the Bill. 
519
 Klaaren, op cit, 5-5. 
520
 See detailed discussion in chapter 4, part II. 
521
 Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, op cit, para 24. 
522
 Mashavha, op cit, para 49.  
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province must be assisted to secure ‘appropriate and 
sustainable benefits’
523
 from buffer zones, as the Bill 
does. The Bill therefore fulfils specific needs and 
objectives of the Province, and the Constitution 
empowers the Province to legislate in respect of 
such matters where they fall within the legislative 
competence of a province.   
 
In addition, NEMBA does indeed provide in section 
52(1)(b) for an MEC to publish a provincial list of 
ecosystems that are threatened and in need of 
protection. However, the constitutionality of section 
52(5) of NEMBA which purports to limit the power 
of an MEC to publish or amend a provincial list by 
providing that this may ‘only’ be done ‘with the 
concurrence of the Minister’ is questionable. In this 
regard, it is reiterated that an MEC does not derive 
his or her power to initiate environmental legislation 
from NEMBA, but from the Constitution itself.  
 
Lastly, clause 40(4) of the Bill provides that the 
MEC may list ecosystems for the purposes set out in 
section 40(1) of the Bill, and stipulate prohibited 
and restricted activities in such areas. There will be 
no conflict or inconsistency if both the national and 
provincial provisions can be obeyed at the same 





Lastly, the Constitutional principles on co-operative 
government must be observed and adhered to by all 
spheres of government.
525
 This means that both the 
MEC and Minister are constitutionally enjoined to 
respect the constitutional status of the different 
spheres of government which they represent, and to 
refrain from assuming any power or function 
‘except those conferred on them by the 
Constitution’.
526
 (Co-operative government is 




                                                          
523
 See section 35 of the second draft of the KwaZulu-Natal Bill. 
524
 Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, op cit, para 24. 
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The above analysis of the extent to which provinces are exercising their constitutional 
authority to enact legislation for the protection of the environment and some of the 
misconceptions in that regard (as illustrated in the KwaZulu-Natal case study) lead to the 
conclusion that South Africa is a long way away from realising the constitutional vision of a 
less hierarchical division of power amongst the three spheres of government. It appears that 
such a vision is still confined to the pages of the Constitution and the judgments which 
pronounce on the vision, rather than living in the hearts and minds of people. In the words of 






DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
6.1 Overview 
The discussions in the preceding chapters leave little doubt that the South African system of 
multisphere government is complex. This research has also demonstrated that within the 
complex allocation of powers to the national, provincial and local spheres of government, the 
Constitution provides provinces with both the constitutional obligation and the original 
legislative authority to protect the environment, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative measures. However, the complexities inherent in 
such a constitutional scheme compel provincial organs of state to carefully navigate a way 
through the various provisions of the Constitution when initiating and enacting legislation on 
the environment - an area of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence, with 
a large body of national environmental legislation in existence. In this final chapter I reiterate 
the research question and the objectives of the study, and provide a summary of the central 
conclusions reached in pursuance of each objective. I conclude this dissertation with 
suggestions for future research. 
 
6.2 Research Objectives 
                                                          
527
 Wendell Phillips, op cit. 
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I set out to examine the constitutional obligations and authority of provincial organs of state 
in South Africa to protect the environment through reasonable legislative measures. The 
primary objective of the research was to provide a critical appraisal of the constitutional role 
of provincial government in respect of the environment, thus complementing current research 
which has, in the main, been done from an international or national perspective.  To this end, 
this dissertation focused in the preceding chapters on the following research areas, informed 
by the relevant provisions of the Constitution, as well as pertinent case law and scholarly 
analyses:  
(i) the nature and scope of the binding substantive constitutional obligations imposed 
on provincial organs of state to protect the environment through legislative 
measures; 
(ii) the nature and scope of the legislative authority of provinces to fulfil their 
environmental obligations;  
(iii) the extent to which provinces are taking legislative measures in pursuance of their 
obligations in terms of section 24 of the Constitution; and  
(iv) constitutional and other factors which may constrain provinces from fulfilling 
their constitutional role in respect of the environment.  
This analysis lead to a number of findings summarised below. 
 
6.3 Summary of Key Findings 
 
6.3.1 The constitutional obligations of provinces to protect the environment
528
 
(i) The South African environmental right is deeply rooted in the global history of 
environmental rights, and must be understood within that history.
529
 
(ii) The provisions in sections 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution describe the 
overarching obligations imposed on the state in respect of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights, including the environmental right.
530
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 See specifically the discussion in chapter 3 – ‘Provincial Obligations to Protect the Environment’. 
529
 See discussion in chapter 3, 3.2.2 ‘International environmental jurisprudence’. 
530




(iii) Section 24 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution imposes an obligation on 
provinces, as organs of state, to enact legislation and institute other measures for 
the protection of the environment that: (a) prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation; (b) promote conservation; and (c) secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development.
531
 Section 24 thus provides the underpinnings for 
provincial organs of state to enact legislation and to take other measures for the 
protection of the environment.
532
 
(iv) Such legislation must be reasonable and must be implemented reasonably.533 
(v) The legislation must protect the environment for the benefit of present and future 




(vi) Legislative measures by themselves are not likely to constitute compliance with 
the Constitution and have to be supported by other measures such as policies, 
guidelines and programmes to be implemented by environmental authorities and 
the executive. These policies, guidelines and programmes must also be 




(vii) The environmental right is justiciable and, consequently, failure to comply with 
the obligations placed on organs of state by section 24 may be challenged in a 








(i)  Provincial government is a sphere of government in its own right and operates 
within a non-hierarchical system of government. Provinces derive original and 
constitutionally entrenched legislative authority directly from the Constitution, 
                                                          
531
 Constitution, op cit, section 24. See also the discussion in chapter 3, 3.2.5 on ‘Interpretation of the provisions 




 Grootboom, op cit, para 42. 
534
 Fuel Retailers, op cit, para102. 
535
 Grootboom, op cit, para 42. 
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 See discussion above in chapter 3, 3.2.7 on ‘Application and enforcement of the environmental right’; also 
see BP, op cit, 25. 
537
 See specifically the discussion above in chapter 4 – ‘Enacting Provincial Legislation’. 
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and not from Parliament. Consequently, a province is bound only by the 
Constitution and its own provincial constitution, where it exists. When enacting 
legislation, it must comply in all respects with the Constitution, and, where 
applicable, its own constitution.
538
  




(iii)  In addition to describing the overarching obligations imposed on the state in 
respect of the rights in the Bill of Rights, sections 7(2) and 8(1) also: a) provide 
the context within which the legislative measures that provinces must take to meet 
those obligations must be understood; and b) illuminate what should be included 
in the content of such legislative measures. Thus, when enacting legislation in 
pursuance of their environmental obligations, legislators must bear in mind that 




(iv) Provinces have the legislative competence to pass legislation for the protection of 
the environment on: a) the concurrent functional area ‘environment’ and 
functional areas related to the environment (cited above) listed in Schedule 4 of 
the Constitution; and b) the exclusive functional areas (cited above) listed in 




(v) The provisions of section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the Constitution, which give the NA the 
authority to assign ‘any’ of its legislative powers (except the power to amend the 
Constitution) to any legislative body in another sphere of government, create the 
possibility (at least in principle) for the NA to assign its concurrent competence in 
respect of the environment and related matters to a provincial legislature. Should 
this happen, provinces would have their legislative authority extended, and would 
                                                          
538
 Constitution, op cit, sections 2 & 104(3); see also discussion above in chapter 4, part I - specifically Habitat 
Council, op cit; and discussion in part II on conflicting laws. 
539
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consequently enjoy exclusive legislative competence in respect of the 
environment (i.e. until such assignment is repealed).
542
 
(vi) The incidental legislative power of provinces can serve to broaden and extend the 
legislative authority of provinces to the extent where a province may validly 
legislate in areas of exclusive national competence.
543
 
(vii) Provinces must exercise their legislative authority rationally, and legislation for 
the protection of the environment must be related to a legitimate government 
purpose in order to meet the test of constitutionality.
544
 
(viii) If a province enacts its own constitution, there is no reason, in principle, why a 
province may not include a bill of rights in its constitution, provided that such a 
bill of rights only deals with matters falling within a province’s legislative 
mandate. This implies that a province may have a bill of rights in its constitution 
that provides for environmental rights. There is also no reason, in principle why a 
province may not place greater limitations on its powers, or confer greater rights, 
even rights that do not exist in the Constitution, provided that those provisions are 
not inconsistent or in conflict with other provisions in the Constitution. The same 
principles apply to any law which a province is competent to pass. Where a 
province has the legislative competence to enact legislation, such legislation may 
thus go ‘further’ than national legislation.
545
 
(ix) There is no problem with repeating, or mirroring national provisions in provincial 




(x) Different provisions in national and provincial legislation are not automatically in 
conflict with each other, or inconsistent. The test laid down by the Constitutional 
Court for inconsistency between national and provincial legislation on the same 
matter is that provisions are inconsistent when they cannot stand at the same time, 
or cannot stand together, or cannot both be obeyed at the same time. When it is 
possible to obey each of the provisions without disobeying the other, they are not 
                                                          
542
 See discussion in chapter 4, part I, 4.3.3 on matters assigned to provinces by national legislation. 
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inconsistent, and there is then no reason why such provisions cannot operate 
together harmoniously in the same field.
547
 
(xi) The conflict resolution scheme in the Constitution does not follow the 
conventional hierarchy that national legislation automatically prevails over 
provincial legislation. There is therefore no presumption in favour of national 
legislation over provincial legislation in the Constitution, nor does there 
necessarily have to be uniformity. The possibility of overlapping and conflicting 
provincial and national legislation is anticipated in the Constitution, and courts 
must prefer any reasonable interpretation of such provisions that avoids conflict, 
over an interpretation that results in conflict.
548
  
(xii) Uniformity only applies when any of the limited conditions in section 146(2)(a)(b) 
and (c) of the Constitution is met.
549
 This means that provincial legislation 
prevails over national legislation,
550
 except where national legislation applies 
uniformly countrywide, and if any of the following conditions is met: 1) the matter 
cannot be regulated effectively by the respective provinces; or 2) to be dealt with 
effectively, the matter requires uniformity and the national legislation provides 
such uniformity; or 3) the national legislation is necessary for certain purposes.
551
 
National legislation aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a province 
prevails, but may only do so if it is ‘objectively probable’ that it will achieve that 
end.
552
 Thus, national legislation prevails only in the limited circumstances 
envisaged by section 146(2) and (3). In there is a conflict, provincial legislation is, 




(xiii) Approval of national legislation by the NCOP will not create any presumption in 
favour of the national legislation – but a court is required to have ‘due regard’ to 
the approval or rejection of the legislation by the NCOP.
554
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 KwaZulu-Natal Certification judgment, op cit, para 24; see also discussion in chapter 4, part I, 4.5 and part 
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140 
 
(xiv) National legislation specifically required or envisaged by the Constitution, and 
national legislation enacted in terms of section 44(2) interventions, are given 
preference over the provisions of a provincial constitution.
555
  
(xv) Conflicts between national legislation and provisions of a provincial constitution 
in the field of concurrent legislative competences are dealt with in the same 




(xvi) In the event of conflicts between provincial and national legislation in an area of 
Schedule 5 exclusive provincial competence, national legislation prevails only 
when it is necessary. Evidence is required to establish whether national legislation 








(i) An overview of the existing environmental legislation in the provinces
559
 reveals 
limited legislative inactivity in the provincial sphere of government, despite 
provinces having both the constitutional obligation and authority to enact 
legislation to protect the environment. In most provinces, the provincial laws are 
still fragmented and the statute books still contain a number of laws predating the 
Constitution, with little new legislation enacted to replace outdated and often 
obsolete laws. This suggests that provinces are generally not exercising their 
constitutional authority to meet the obligations imposed on them by section 24 of 
the Bill of Rights to the extent provided for in the Constitution. As a result, 
provinces may in practice have become primarily administrative bodies and 
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 Liquor Bill, op cit, para 80; and discussion in chapter 4, part I, 4.3.2. 
558
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6.3.4 Factors which may constrain provinces from fulfilling their constitutional role in 
respect of the environment
561
 
(i) Literature suggests that the cause of limited provincial legislative activity lies 
essentially in the political realm, rather than in constraints imposed on provinces 
by the Constitution. Thus, deference to the policies and centralised political power 
of the ruling party may act as a more compelling constraint on provinces than any 
of the complex relationships between the different spheres of government created 
by the Constitution. This deference could be so strong that it inhibits provincial 
executives and legislators from initiating and enacting provincial legislation.
562
 
This is relevant to this study in that it offers an explanation for some of the 
underlying reasons why provinces are not exercising their constitutional powers to 
the extent permitted, and indeed required, by the Constitution. However, as 
important as political influences on provinces are in suggesting reasons why 
constitutional powers and obligations of provinces may in many instances exist on 
paper only, an extensive analysis of such influences will not be undertaken in this 
dissertation. Nevertheless, the relationship between politics and law remains 
important as it impacts on the legitimacy of legislation, particularly in a 
constitutional democracy. I will briefly return to this point in my concluding 
remarks. 
(ii)  The SAHRC reports that a significant impediment to the realisation of rights in 
the Bill of Rights (including the environmental right) stems from a limited 
understanding (or even a conceptual misunderstanding) by the government of: a) 
the nature and content of the respective rights; b) how to fulfil its constitutional 




(iii) The case study on drafting environmental legislation for KwaZulu-Natal 
illustrated a similar misunderstanding of the role and functions of provincial 
government, which may have the effect of inhibiting provinces from meeting their 
constitutional obligations in respect of the environment.
564
 It appears that the most 
fundamental misconception, namely that the South African system of government 
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is hierarchical, lies at the heart of the problem. This apparent lack of 
understanding of how the Constitution conceives of the different spheres (as 
opposed to ‘levels’ or ‘tiers’) of government in the Republic gives rise to a 
number of additional misconceptions regarding the roles of the national and 
provincial executives, as well as the nature and scope of the legislative authority 
of provinces. The fact that provinces derive original powers directly from the 
Constitution, and not from Parliament, or national legislation, is also often 
overlooked. Consequently, the nature and scope of provincial legislative authority 
and obligations and the fact that the environment (and related functional areas) are 
areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence listed in 
Schedule 4 of the Constitution, does not seem to be generally recognised. 
Furthermore, the fact that national legislation does not automatically prevail over 
provincial legislation, and that section 146 is of limited application, also does not 
seem to be fully realised.
565
 This leads one to postulate that: a) the implications of 
constitutional democracy in South Africa; b) the difference between parliamentary 
and constitutional supremacy; and c) the complexities inherent in the system of 
multisphere government in South Africa,  have not yet been fully recognised, 
understood or accepted; and that such a lack of understanding may have a 
significant inhibiting effect on provincial governments which constrain them from 
fulfilling their constitutional role in respect of the environment. 
 
(iv) The realisation of rights may be further hampered by the fact that it requires 
significant intergovernmental cooperation and communication, which appears to 
be lacking. Although the findings of the SAHRC in this regard were made in the 
context of government and the state in general, they do suggest further reasons 
which may underlie the failure of provinces to enact environmental legislation to 
the extent allowed by the Constitution.
566 
 
6.4. Concluding remarks 
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The Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa, law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.
568
 That is what constitutional 
supremacy and the rule of law, articulated in the principle of legality, means. Thus, from a 
constitutional perspective, quite simply, all spheres of government must observe and adhere 
to the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations set out in 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution, and must conduct their activities within the parameters of those 
provisions. In provinces Premiers could establish dispute resolution mechanisms, which 
could be in the form of provincial legislation, to deal with environmental disputes between 
departments and organs of state within a particular province. Further, provinces must comply 
with the substantive obligations imposed on them by section 24 of the Bill of Rights to 
protect the environment in accordance with the specific needs identified in each province. 
Nothing in the Constitution prevents provinces from doing so. The Constitution also provides 
provinces with the necessary legislative authority to give effect to their constitutional 
obligations,
569
 and they must exercise that authority. That is what is to be done. If provincial 
organs of state do not do so, they breach peremptory requirements of the Constitution. 
However, a number of provinces have not in some 20 years exercised their authority to 
protect the environment to the extent envisaged by the Constitution. In this regard I reiterate 
that the above statements are not intended to imply that provinces must enact environmental 
legislation whether there is a need for it or not. However, the research findings discussed in 
chapter 5 above
570
 on the existing environmental legislation in provinces indicate that not all 
provinces have repealed outdated and even unconstitutional provisions still on their statute 
books, or consolidated fragmented legislation. This, as a bare minimum, should have been 
done. Furthermore, from the discussions in chapter 2
571
 it appears that co-operative 
government is also not working as well as it should in practice.  And it seems that it is at 
these points that politics meets (or collides with) law. 
 
                                                          
567
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568
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Earlier in this study I argued that deference to the policies and centralised political power of a 
dominant ruling party could be so strong that it has a paralysing effect on provincial 
leadership, thus preventing them from initiating and enacting provincial legislation to meet 
their constitutional obligations.
572
 The case study discussed in chapter 5 above also highlights 
pervasive misconceptions and even inadequate understanding of the nature and scope of 
multisphere government in South Africa, resulting in a similar deference - even subservience 
- to the national sphere of government.
573
 In this regard a paper by Barbara Oomen
574
 on the 
relationship between law, politics and human rights makes for instructive reading. She 
emphasises the importance of the legitimacy of human rights, with legitimacy being the 
‘conceptual place where law and politics meet’.
575
 Legitimacy is a term that has been defined 
in a ‘myriad of different ways in different disciplinary traditions, invariably emphasising how 
legitimacy is more than legality, and also points to the right to rule that is involved’.
576
 
Oomen submits that if one accepts that legitimacy is subjective and ‘in the eyes of the 
beholder’, then one accepts that it can change over time, and is therefore not ‘fixed’ like the 
concept of legality.
577
 In this regard I postulate that it may very well be the case in South 
Africa that the Constitution, including the environmental right in the Bill of Rights (and many 
of its other provisions) have lost a degree of legitimacy over time. This may be due to what 
Oomen calls the striking ‘gap in knowledge between professionals and the public at large, 
and the lack of ongoing public deliberation on the value of human rights and their 
implementation that feeds and sustains such knowledge’ (emphasis added).
578
 Here Oomen 
mentions Habermas who considers this kind of deliberation as the ‘core of the democratic 
process’, where legitimacy becomes the result of a process and the result of general 
deliberation – not the expression of a ‘general will’ (emphasis added).
579
 Oomen also 
reminds us that human rights are not ‘self-executing’; and that in the Netherlands the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) ‘is a present that we forgot to unpack’.
580
 
When the ‘New Constitution’ was adopted, President Mandela referred to a ‘fundamental 
                                                          
572
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sea-change’ in South Africa.
581
 Have we in South Africa also forgotten to unpack that 
present? Or perhaps we assumed the Constitution would be ‘self-executing’. It seems then, 
that in addition to implementing the provisions of the Constitution to protect the environment, 
South Africa also needs to restore the legitimacy of the Constitution by embarking on a 
process of ongoing public deliberation - that ‘core of the democratic process’ - to eliminate 
the knowledge gap to which Oomen refers. That, also, needs to be done. 
 
Lastly, we saw in earlier discussions that the Constitution has adopted a ‘generous approach’ 
towards legal standing; and that the provisions in NEMA on standing are largely the same but 
also allow any person or group of persons to seek judicial recourse where that person or 
persons act on behalf of the environment, and not only on behalf of that person or persons 
where their environmental interests are affected.
582
 Thus, organs of state can be challenged 
before a competent court for failure to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by section 24, 
on the basis that such failure infringes or threatens environmental rights.
583
  South Africa 
does have an active civil society and strong environmental lobby groups – they too should 
exercise their power to enforce the environmental right in the Constitution to a greater extent 
than is currently the case.  
 
6.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
The research done in this dissertation lead me to suggest the following areas for future 
research: 
 In chapter 3 of this dissertation I argued that whilst the environmental right in the 
Constitution is anthropocentric, there seems to be an implied or indirect right afforded to 
the environment itself in section 24 of the Constitution.
584
 I based this view on the 
wording of section 24(b), which provides that everyone has a right to have ‘the 
environment’ protected, for the benefit of present and future generations. It therefore 
appeared to me that the wording of section 24(b) of the Constitution allows for a broader 
                                                          
581
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interpretation which includes the notion that the environment itself has rights.
585
 This may 
be a fruitful area for further research. 
 The SAHRC found that the realisation of rights requires significant intergovernmental 
cooperation and communication.
586
 The IGRFA recognises the nexus between the 
realisation of constitutional rights and effective, efficient, transparent, accountable and 
coherent government.
587
 Further research on the relationship between the Bill of Rights 
and the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations spelt out 
in chapter 3 of the Constitution could be of value. 
 The complex provisions of section 146 of the Constitution (discussed in part II of chapter 
4 above) may constrain provinces from enacting provincial legislation for the protection 
of the environment. In the Second Certification judgment, the Constitutional Court held 
that the powers and functions of the provinces were ‘less than and inferior to’ those 
accorded to the provinces in the IC, ‘but not substantially so’.
588
 This statement invites 
further research on the constitutional provisions on conflicting laws and their possible 
effect on provincial legislative authority. 
 It seems that the relationship between law and politics is becoming a vexing question in 
South Africa, especially in the context of a supreme Constitution and its implications for 
government. I suggest research into this problem, done from a legal perspective rather 
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